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Preface
It may be said that from the Kleinian perspective that happiness is having the freedom to live for
those things and people for whom one ought to feel grateful.

“There was a patient in analysis with a Kleinian who had a dream that he told her. In this
dream his mother sat on his face or chest and he wasn’t able to breath. The analyst interpreted that
his dream was evidence that he was envious towards her, and didn’t want to take in what she was
offering” … or something along these lines was the story I heard as a first year clinical student,
offered as an example of the abusive potential of psychoanalysis. It didn’t leave me with a burning
desire to study Kleinian technique. I have heard other stories along these lines from clinicians,
stories of perverse abuses of power in Kleinian therapy, offered like warnings of what I don’t want
to become or what they fear I might be doing, a scary image of procrustean bed technique.
When I started graduate school I had no interest in psychoanalysis, in fact I was hostile to it
because as a gay man I had a similar stereotype, that the analytic couch is really a procrustean bed
where patients have no say so with regard to their reality, since the analyst, like an arrogant surgeon,
assumes a god-like perspective when it comes to ailments of the heart and head, disregarding and
disempowering the person. Then, after listening to one lecture after another and one critique after
another asserting that analysis, because of its very concepts and philosophical underpinnings, can be
little other than a procrustean bed my stereotype gained that aura of a “natural attitude.” According
to this natural attitude, psychoanalysis reduces people to parts, dubious entities like egos, ids,
superegos, some energy called libido, and worst of all, some bizarre and ridiculous notion of a death
drive, the final proof of its status as a miscarriage of mechanistic thought that is incapable of doing
justice to human existence. According to this natural attitude and its variants, analysts are cold,
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detached, talk about the past in the most banal clichés, and force their victims’ experience into the
same tired storylines, like the story of the Kleinian analyst above. But if I was familiar with, and to
be fair I participated in it as well, the contempt heaped upon Freud by some, I was not prepared for
the – at times – downright hostility towards all things Kleinian.
Consider the following story. Not too long ago I met with a prospective supervisor – who is
decidedly not psychoanalytic. This was our second meeting, although it had to be rescheduled two
weeks prior because at the last minute, for unforeseen reasons, I did not have the car to take to the
appointment. So I called to explain and apologize and see if we could have our supervision by
telephone in any case. When she called me back she emphasized over and over again that this hour
was one she set aside for me when she could have had a paying client use the time, etc. The nature
of my circumstances had no bearing on her interpretation of my “inexcusable lapse” in “planning.”
So, walking into this, our first appointment since, I was anxious about discussing what had
happened because I felt mistreated. After about twenty minutes of explanation, counter
explanation, explanation, counter explanation, she asked me, after telling me it was no longer an
issue for her, “so I’m wondering why you have a hard time letting me be angry about this.” I replied
that it wasn’t her anger but the fact that I felt like no matter what I said on that phone she was going
to interpret what happened in that one way. Without awareness of what she was saying, she said,
“and I still do see it that way.” Ergo, she is really still angry about it and I’m stuck in the same
pigeonhole in her mind where I was placed before our phone conversation. This supervisor was no
Kleinian, but her difficulty is the same one operating in the genre of abusive Kleinian stories I have
heard (and stereotypes of psychoanalysis in general): the all too human difficulty and ultimate refusal
to encounter the Otherness of the other, respect it, and dialog about it productively. Certainly, this
is not a unique problem Klein invented or patented as a therapeutic technique; it is a problem of an
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attitude towards Otherness in general.1 On the basis of what I’ve learned about contemporary
Kleinian technique I think these stories are caricatures of poor technique period, Kleinian or
otherwise. However, it took a lot of work immersing myself in the worldview of CKPP to rearrange
my ideas about analytic work, analysts, and analytic theory. The study that follows is an account of
this immersion and rearrangement, a story of contemporary Kleinianism in its Otherness.2 Far from
finding its concepts and technique dehumanizing or reductionistic, I have found that they help me
illuminate, examine, and engage – phenomenologically – with the experience of patients in a way
that has transformative potential.
This irony of my graduate education called for an explanation, one motive for undertaking
this study. I am convinced that to evaluate and critique clinical technique and theory it is not
enough to do so as an “outsider.” Certainly we would think it ridiculous for an anthropologist today
to write a book about an indigenous society, making all manner of claim about the language and
world outlook of the society, if he or she had never immersed him or herself in that society and
studied it from the “inside,” to the extent that this is possible. So why do we not bring that level of
sophisticated understanding to the problem of understanding different, highly specialized languages
and the subcultures that produce them within our own society and institutions? If there is always a
surplus of Otherness no matter how much we think we may know someone, does the same
principle not apply to the Otherness of a school of thought and practice?

1

So, continuing the example, the analyst might have said, “your anxious and scared that there’s not enough room in
here for you to breath easy and have your own mind with me, so you feel compelled to say what you think I want to
hear.” Assuming the accuracy of this, it would have provided an understanding to bind the patient’s anxiety and thereby
the symbols necessary to open a discursive space to discuss this terror of attachment and how he’s come to use an over
practiced “habit” for dealing with it at his own expense.
2
Of course the practice of CKPP has the potential for abuses of power like any other therapy. The point is that
perhaps the abuses are not built into the theory, but reflect the limitations of the person attempting to employ them.
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Whatever else may be said of her, Melanie Klein was a woman who stood up for her ideals
with the support of those who believed in what she was doing despite the personal, professional,
and political risks involved. Yet this appreciation is eclipsed by the negative stereotypes of her and
her work – all the negative transference onto Klein that has and does go on today in some quarters.
Perhaps it has something to do with “the objective reality” of Klein and what she did or did not do
or say. Yet perhaps it has to do with a larger problem in our world, the problem of how to take and
deal with people who are carried by their ideals to the point of working to change what has been
handed down by tradition.3 Klein’s work, unlike Freud’s and Lacan’s, eclipsed the radiance of the
Phallus with the shadow of the Breast in a deeply sexist society, a society that has long split itself off
from a cultural image of an omnipotent woman (the non-threatening, idyllic and idealistic figuring of
a Madonna – servant to an infant male – is hardly an omnipotent female figure). Look at what
happened, how Klein has generally been recorded as a distorted character in, what was until recently,
a sexist, heterosexist, white and upper middle institution with little in the way of a built in
mechanism for self-correction and historical change: The American Psychoanalytic and its tributary
scholarship. These are, in my view, equally important aspects of the historical record that
contextualize her objectionable Otherness. This situation is only now, slowly, changing. Of course
this does not mean that as a fallible person Klein was perfect or can never be critiqued for clinical or
personal errors. It does mean that this study is about contemporary Kleinian work and some of its
roots, not the merits or demerits of Melanie Klein as a person.
3

In this regard, perhaps fundamentalism is the symbolic representation of a global false-self idealism (inauthentic
idealism). It – in all its forms – is the parody of genuine idealisms about a better future since they actually lead to selfdestruction. I am not saying that all idealisms are equal or should be embraced unquestioningly, but in our age any
idealism is dismissed as equally “fringe” so, instead, like a neurotic world, we keep going around and around on the same
problems, rather than change course. Without realistic ideals, what or who can one expect to guide growth towards a
better future? Our problem is we no longer seem to believe in following, renewing, or creating fresh ideals like our
forefathers and foremothers. We rehash not political goals or moral goals but monetary goals. Our forefathers stood
for a lot more than that. The Federalist Papers show how our forefathers struggled with the ideals we have reduced to
consumer consciousness as their parody.
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This work, the kinds of thoughts expressed above, and the following historical record of the
kind of practice I’ve been doing are a few results of a process of subjection I began three years ago
as an “novice” or “initiate” to the clinical working of contemporary Kleinian oriented psychoanalytic
psychotherapy (CKPP), and an empirically based, rigorous and human scientific qualitative method
for examining a human phenomena: an “interpretive methodology” as Dr. Packer has accurately
described it in published and unpublished work. Indeed, this study, analyzing and interpreting my
behavior during one session with one patient, has required assuming the perspective of a researcher
to foreground and examine CKPP as an entity-in-the-world and report back from the front line, as it
were, to an audience more or less unfamiliar with this phenomena.
What you read me saying and doing in the following pages follows a comportment pattern.
This comportment pattern is the role, idiosyncrasies of the author aside, of a CKPP practitioner at a
singular point in his training. It is therefore a historical account of a highly specific way of being in a
relationship. This comportment pattern is the result of choosing to follow a discipline of training,
for a period of time, and choosing to use the tools I’ve learned as a phenomenologist to take stock
of what has been accomplished.
What is this comportment pattern? It is a way of learning from the Other that has
transformative potential, more so for one participant than the other. So in addition to an account of
practicing a subject-forming discourse, what follows is the record of a point in the author’s
transformation, the (re)production of his subjectivity by subjecting his Self to a specific disciplinary
tradition – I deploy these loaded terms purposefully, since it strikes me as noteworthy that that they
have come to have a distinctly negative connotation.
What Klein’s work says to me as this (re)constituted subject is that subjection takes place in a
context, the context of an extremely important relationship fraught with conflicts and existential
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concerns. Will this Other break his or her commitment to my ontological security? Will I die when
she’s gone? Why does his love come and go? Is this pain going to kill me? Is this a betrayal? How
can I get what hurts away? How can I say no if he can leave? Did she like what I just did so she
won’t be mad? Will my dream come true? Will this ruin me? Klein’s outrageous (outrageously
brilliant) conviction was that adult life is animated by concerns that have timeless salience in and for
our lives, concerns we struggled with in infancy: these problems are first lived viscerally and play
themselves out on the surface of that bodily ego, inscribing it with indelible marks. The human kind
of being is both the same and different with each cycle of itself; the periodicity of becoming has
priority over being – another similarity between the spirit of Klein’s researches and Deleuze. This
becoming is organized by a code of the virtual in response to the environment – the phantasies that
govern the unfolding and evolution of development (i.e., becoming); the production of meaning
must come before action as much as it may evolve through action. However, this development is
not linear but rhythmic. The same “themes” or “melodies” of becoming are patterned and
sequenced.
For example, Klein articulated the paranoid/schizoid and depressive position “melodies” as
two essential moments of time and change (anxiety), which occur differently for people, yet are
similar enough to be classifiable as clinical facts conferred with conceptual status. This shift away
from Freud inaugurated the metapsychology of Object-Relations. Klein’s refiguring of the
therapeutic relationship, a shift to the metaphor of the mother-feeding-infant relationship
foreshadowed by Ferenczi, changed the emphasis from being (Freud and Anna Freud’s models were
structural) to becoming (a developmental model), from what-ness to how-ness. With this change
came an evolution in the psychoanalytic lexicon that she inherited from Freud, Ferenczi and
Abraham, shifting the analyst’s attention to the patient’s anxieties and problems of becoming as a
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patient in the room and, therefore, as a person in the “real world.” If we conceive of self-initiated
and self-determined change on the model of a birth or “re-birth” of the Self as different yet similar,
then one can see how appropriate Ferenczi’s metaphor of the analyst as obstetrical physician, the
“midwife to thought,” may really have been, lending itself to become the image of the motherfeeding-infant triad.
Therefore to help an adult deal with adult human problems, we must notice how they handle
the infantile equivalent of these problems in the here and now of an ongoing relationship, because
that is the location of these precursors of meaning, so to speak, that continue to deform the patient’s
quality of life; what’s infantile in the here and now. Part of the problem is the conception of time.
If it happened back then, why focus on the here and now as done in CKPP? This is usually
conceived as a past trauma acting on the present, so that differentiating the past from the present is
attempted by means of interpretive “reconstructions.” CKPP, as I have learned it, makes little use
of such reconstructions. Perhaps this indicates that it is not the past that needs to be separated from
the present, but a way of becoming in the present that has never changed into a former present,
recycling the same thematic memories and fantasies, albeit with apparently different content. In
other words, perhaps relational time is always in the present (which is why one can have a close
friendship for over ten years that both feels fresh and new yet like a historically permanent feature of
one’s life, “like I’ve known you forever” as the saying goes). In other words, for subjection to occur,
for the patient to continue to develop as a subject – i.e., for the patient learn and grow from his or
her own experience of becoming, attention must be focused on the contemporaneous dynamics of
the relational context within which the original response patterns to subjection formed, persist, and
continue to shape experience.
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Clearly, the stakes are high in this way of working. Learning this approach to therapy has
provided me with tools for listening and speaking to patients, a power for working with them. The
following pages examine and explain these tools and describe the practices of this “power” as they
are occurring. And with power come responsibility and ethical restraint. The Afterward will
provide some discussion on the ethics and limitations of this power after it has been articulated.

xii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

ii

Preface

v

Chapter 1.

Introduction & Literature review

The paradox of subjection

04

Case study methodology

12

Hermeneutic methodology

13

Creative nonfiction genre

18

The critical hermeneutics of CKPP

23

Chapter 2.

Some context for an induction into the Kleinian tradition

Melanie Klein

31

A story of induction

45

Chapter 3.

The feed

The scene

55

The food

66

Chapter 4.

A formula for recognition

Symbolic inference

91

Formulating and reformulating

97
xiii

Chapter 5.

Weaning: Discussion and implications

Weaning: The allure and anxiety of becoming a subject

132

Conclusion

161

Afterward

178

References

186

Appendix A
Consent to Participate in Research

197

Appendix B
Data

200

xiv

1.

Introduction and literature review
Clinical supervision is required for every graduate student pursuing a clinical track in

psychology. A clear example of its importance is that to be competitive for the required predoctoral
internship, every trainee must complete at least 800 hours of supervised clinical work. It is generally
expected that supervisors “deliver the requisite skills to the trainee in a deliberate and effective
manner” (Halloway & Neufeldt, 1995, p. 212). The trainee expects and is expected to change,
insofar as they develop these skills. Wampold and Holloway (1997) proposed a model to organize
the accumulated research in supervision and guide future investigations. They argued that, “whether
it be changes in skill level, attitudes, self-understanding, or some other characteristic, the effect of
supervision results most proximally in some modification of therapists’ characteristics. These
changes in the therapist will then, it is hoped, result in the delivery of more efficacious treatment . . ..
all effects of supervision are transmitted through therapist characteristics” (p. 12, italics in original).
Based on this assumption, the original aim of this study was to provide a new approach to
the study of changes in therapist characteristics as an effect of supervised clinical practice, viewing
them through the trainee’s communicative competence in the practice of delivering
psychotherapeutic treatment. While the study accomplishes the aim of articulating this
communicative competence, the design did not allow for the examination of how this
communicative competence was the direct result of supervision – that is, the design did not provide
for a means to trace each aspect of the trainee’s communicative competence to that of the
supervisor. However, through the course of the analysis it became evident that the design was well
suited for the study of the subject-forming work of psychotherapy in general, and contemporary
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Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy (CKPP) in particular. Thus, the primary aim has
shifted to addressing the subject-forming work of the trainee’s communicative competence.
To date, there is no empirical literature on the subject-forming work of trainee
characteristics while under supervision. Typically, researchers investigating how changes in trainee
characteristics affect therapeutic practice have relied on rating/coding procedures to gauge trainee
competence (cf., Guest & Beutler, 1988; Henry, Schacht, Strupp, Butler, & Binder, 1993; Krasner,
Howard, & Brown, 1998; Newman, McGovern, Kopta, Howard, & McNeilly, 1988; Pierce &
Schauble, 1970). Pierce and Schauble (1970) appear to have been the fi rst researchers to investigate
the effects of supervision on clinical practice. And while more recent studies, such as the often
cited “Vanderbilt II,” have begun to focus more on process, they continue to exclusively employ
these rating/coding systems and statistical analysis, only in a more complex manner and with more
sophisticated statistical methods. (Henry et al., 1993). Wampold and Halloway (1997) note that a
weakness of using rating and coding procedures to assess frequency or sequence is that, “the
construals of the participants (i.e., the meanings given to the events by the participants) are thought
to be nonexistent or not important” (p. 17). This is no minor problem, since it is through the
“construals” of the participants that the subject forming work of psychotherapy is accomplished as
this study demonstrates. This is a problem of the interpretive framework and methodological
procedures that quantitative psychological research has employed in the study of trainee change in
the context of supervision, whether at the site of supervisor-supervisee interaction or superviseeclient interaction in the therapy room.
In short, when the coded event or statement is taken out of the context of the participants’
immediate interaction and placed in the context of the raters’ theoretical background and personal
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preferences, important information is lost regarding the communicative processes involved in the
interaction. This study was designed to explore the consequences of an alternative approach to the
study of the effects of supervised clinical practice, one that does not employ a coding system and
attends to the subject forming work of the psychotherapeutic encounter. It is the study of
supervised clinical practice as an induction process into a specialized linguistic community, requiring
the acquisition of new forms of communicative competence (whether psychoanalytic, cognitivebehavioral, narrative, or client-centered communicative competence).
Learning to become a clinician is a sort of induction, an initiation, of novices into the
practices of experts. There are rituals and rights of passage that are involved – such as completing
so many hours of training under supervision. Viewed as a cultural phenomenon, supervised “direct
hours” are socially created and sustained events that provide a context for the acculturation of the
initiate (supervisee) into the discourse practiced by more experienced members of the specialized
linguistic community (licensed psychologists). More precisely, the interaction between the client and
the supervised therapist is a primary site for practicing new forms of “communicative competence,”
which Habermas (1970) defined in Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence:
it is not enough to understand language communication as an application – limited by
empirical conditions – of linguistic competence . . . . On the contrary, in order to participate
in normal discourse, the speaker must have – in addition to his linguistic competence – basic
qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (role-behavior) at his disposal, which we
may call communicative competence. (p. 138)
By examining Freudian psychoanalysis through the lens of communicative competence, Habermas
argued that it is both a theory about systematically distorted communication and a technique for
working through such patterns of distortion. Analysands suffer from deviations in the acquisition of
certain “normal” communicative competencies, which the analysis seeks to correct by providing the
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condition necessary for “subject-forming processes” to occur. (McCarthy, 1978) Yet to accomplish
this requires a specialized communicative context (e.g., the 50 minute hour), where one participant
in the dialogue (the therapist or analyst) relies “on theoretical perspectives and technical rules that go
beyond the normal competencies of a speaker of a natural language.” (McCarthy, 1978, p. 197)
This study addresses the following question: What cha racterizes the communicative
competence of a supervisee’s clinical practice after two years of specialized supervision in CKPP and
how does it operate to produce occasions for the subjection of the patient, where:
“Subjection” signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process
of becoming a subject. Whether by interpolation, in Althusser’s sense, or by discursive
productivity in Foucault’s, the subject is initiated through a primary submission to power.
Although Foucault identifies the ambivalence in this formation, he does not elaborate on the
specific mechanisms of how the subject is formed in submission. (Butler, 1997, pp. 1-2)
Thus, what began as a method for looking into the effects of supervision became an examination of
CKPP as a site of subjection.
The interpretive analysis of CKPP as a practice of subjection is particularly appropriate for
three reasons. First, the contours or horizon of Kleinian discourse are defined by tropes of
asymmetrical power and dependence – the infant relating to the mother’s body on whom it depends
for life as well as the conditions for becoming a person in his or her own right.4 Within this
tropography therapy is conceived as a feeding situation. The therapist may be a good breast, bad
breast, devouring breast, empty breast, impinging breast, etc. Patients can be understood as getting
rid of unwanted experiences on the model of the baby evacuating burning feces through “anal
sadistic” and “urethral attacks” on the mother-therapist and so on. Klein’s final model of
4

Following Fink (1997) I will use ‘mOther’ to denote the mother as both a person and a symbolic function – a basis of
multiple meaning, a source of meaning. Likewise, ““Other with a capital “O” generally refers to a person or institution
serving a symbolic function (legislating, prohibiting, putting forward ideals, and so on) …” (p. 232)
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development portrays identity (the who one is) as founded on an economy governed by a dialectical
tension between the desire to be (Eros) and the desire not to be (Thanatos) and how this tension
plays itself out in relation to a feeding mother who contributes to the shaping of that identity by
how and what she feeds her child, as well as how and what she does in response to the child’s
feeding reactions. This relation is viewed as the context within which every capacity the subject may
be said to have is begun.
Second, for Taylor (1988) the notion of the self is a spatial one, a “moral topography” that
has changed and changes through history and the configurations of different cultures:
Being a self is not like having some biologically given organs, say eyes or faculty, like vision,
which are there as part of our equipment regardless of how we understand them or interpret
them. Being a self is existing in a space of issues, to do with how one ought to be, or how one
measures up against what is good, what is right, what is really worth doing. It is being able to
find one’s standpoint in this space, being able to occupy, to be a perspective in it. This is what
Heidegger was getting at in his famous formulation a bout Dasein that its being is always in “in
question.” (Taylor, 1988, p. 298)
Kleinian theory is a theory of the development of the self within a moral field. The infant-mother’s
body partnership defines the becoming-in-time for the infant within the contours of goodness (signs
of life, the good breast) and badness (signs of death, the bad breast). The mother’s body as the site
of the infant’s growing sense of self is a body that is experienced as good and bad, and towards
which the infant loves, hates, feels loved, hated, persecuted, etc., as he or she negotiates persisting in
time. Whatever the infant comes to believe about itself “inside” originally comes from “outside” in
this relational matrix with the mother. In the context of the infant’s hunger pangs, weaning
inaugurates the inside of the infant’s psyche predicated on its differentiation from its relation to the
mother within a moral milieu and its struggle to come to terms with this differentiation process.
From its inception, the Kleinian tradition has not viewed the ego as a “neutral steering mechanism”
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that is encapsulated within its own hydraulic machinery, but as the nascent “I” existing, “in a space
of moral questions, [where] that moral topography is not an external addition, and optional extra,
but that the question of being or failing to be a self could not arise outside of this space” (ibid., p.
317). In fact for Klein, the nascent ego has its own practices for trying to shape this moral field,
because its largest struggle is coming to realize that life means being dependently related to another,
which initially, is a painful reality to be mourned. To be confronted with a world that is deficient is
to be confronted with a primordial vulnerability towards a lack in the “in-itself” for “the for-itself,”
in Sartrean parlance, highlighting a dependence on a power external to the self’s control. Moreover,
this circumstance of infantile dependence and relating to those on whom it depends for survival is a
universal circumstance that every person in every time and culture has confronted. And in so far as
culture is transmitted through verbal linguistic practices, then those aspects of human being that can
be said to be universally shared, will most likely by found at the pre-verbal level, the level most
insulated, as it were, from cultural determination.
Third, Both Taylor and Butler are interested in locating the source of conscience. For
Taylor (1988), its origin cannot be found by “radical reflection” inside the self, since that would be a
solipsistic search for an inner essence (the fantasy of ‘natural law’) that is not interpretationdepended and contextualized by social relatedness. In CKPP the problem of the patient is not that
he or she is unable to look inside the self enough, but that he or she has a problem “allowing
another mind to think about their problems differently,” as Dr. R, my supervisor would say during
our supervisory sessions. It is a problem of authority and knowledge, particularly the violence that
attends the forceful entry or extension of one field into another – as Phillips (1998) describes the
Kleinian conceptions of projection and introjection. It requires seriously considering the
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sighting/citing of the self from the vantage point of another, and then take that understanding into
the self to broaden its scope. 5 This is why Kristeva (2001) can argue that Klein reformulated the
analytic question in terms caring for the capacity for thought and the conditions necessary for “our
capacity to become creatures of symbols” (p. 14). As Phillips (1998) argues in his deconstructive rereading of Klein, she was a sort of phenomenologist of the unconscious for whom the question of
how we can come to discern between phantasy and reality, between inside and outside, is the
capacity, sin qua non, for “having” knowledge at all. This capacity begins with and depends on the
psychic equivalent of the mouth:
…the child is born not as a closed circuit of alternating impulses, a fragile entity at the mercy
of external influences, but already as the enigmatic opening to the violence of the outside (its
encroachment into the space of phantasy). This earliest position supplies the conditions for
each occasion where ‘external’ events provide material for the ‘inner’ world. A fissure, as a
kind of original opening to the outside, makes possible all relations. Out of this fissure
comes every experience of authority [including the authority of knowledge], including both
the death instinct and the super-ego. Each functions in the same way within the pattern of
phantasy that must maintain absence, negativity, and mystery in the process of acquiring
knowledge. In other words, these persecuting authorities represent and intrinsically
unknowable element that, whether in phantasy or reality, makes knowledge and its
acquisition possible. (p. 172)6
For Butler (1997) the problem of conscience and subjection is that the subject turns towards
subjection and submits to it; the result of this is the installation of conscience as the paradoxical
effect of power that both subjects us to cultural-moral imperatives and conditions the possibility for
our agency, including any ability to subvert that very power-moral-knowledge complex. Therefore,
5

Throughout the text the signifier “sight/cite” and grammatical variations thereof are employed to indicate the
inextricability of saying and seeing, of the saying power of the word to shape what we visually apprehend. In other
words to see someone as a so in so is to inscribe their body with what one means to say about them. Conversely, to say
someone is a this or that is to foreclose one’s vision upon their potential as an Other. Perhaps one can say what one
does not mean, but it seems impossible to see what one does not mean.
6
Here one can argue that there is a basic agreement between the implicit ontology of Klein and Heidegger’s notion of
Dasein: that each person is fundamentally an opening onto the world, a “world spanning openness” in his terms (cf.,
Heidegger, 1926/1962)
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the basis of this turn cannot be external for there would be an infinite regress of the same question –
it cannot be that the subject turns to subjection because subjection made them turn, and so on.
Butler (1998) ultimately turns to Klein to address the “ambivalence” and “paradox” of subjection,
because Klein’s account of conscience – figured as the “super-ego” – is based in ambivalence. The
superego, under optimal conditions, becomes the source of prohibition and encouragement, for feeling
both good and bad about one’s persistence as a self in time – one’s desires, aspirations, actions and
moral identity (a.k.a., “self-esteem”). Butler’s close reading of Klein emphasizes that conscience
begins with the infant’s desire to preserve the loved mother and source of life from its own
destructive aggression and not with an external prohibition as in Freud and Lacan. Butler finds in
Klein an account for the ambivalence of subjection, because the good mother figure – the superego
as source of support and well-being – is preserved as a sign of life by the rerouting of infantile
aggression into the creation of the super-ego as censorship and inhibiting citations on the self. In
short, we want to hear the voice of the law in our heads to police ourselves because – optimally – it
is the same voice that ensures the possibility of life, love, and belonging: not just being-in-time, but wellbeing-in-time. The desire to persist through subjection and become a subject stems from the
“passionate desire to be” in Butler’s terms, to be in relation with anOther. Thus, “By Butler’s
reading, Klein’s account of an internal world ravaged by rage and guilt is not, as some of her critics
have charged, simply a morbid and solipsistic model of intrapsychic relations: rather, loss, guilt and
love in Klein reveal how the ego is always and precariously socially attached” (Stonebridge,
introductory remarks, in Phillips & Stonebridge, 1998, p. 180)
The problem of being able to occupy a standpoint in a space of issues that confront one
with possible commitments for action is the problem of being a subject whose configuration is
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subject to conditions outside of one’s control. The issues or exigencies of life figured as the hailing
call of reality – everyday interpolation, as it were – require subjection in order for the subject to
respond and make a dent in that reality (i.e., to exercise whatever freedom we may be said to have;
subjection is both the condition and limit of freedom). When patients come to seek treatment, they
are having some difficulty living this paradox of subjectivity, in the form of a problematic present
that refuses to pass. In CKPP the therapist follows the trail of the patient’s anxiety to examine and
make explicit their self-defeating means of dealing with that anxiety.7
What for Butler and Taylor are serious theoretical concerns are vivid realities that come to
life in the therapeutic office. The following case of “John” shows a young man who has tried to
deny the paradox. By running away from the possibility of subjection he also runs away from the
possibility of agency. At the time the following session took place John was a 35 year-old,
Caucasian, gay man. He participated in one kind of therapy or another since the age of 18 for
“depression” including several hospitalizations for suicidal behavior. John was dissatisfied with
every aspect of his life. He had only ever worked in entry level, low paying, temporary clerical and
retail positions. His relationships ended in the same way as his jobs – John would start to feel
“suffocated” by their demands, become despondent and passive, and eventually his boyfriend would
break up with him, or his boss would fire him for unexcused absences. The earliest memory he
reported speaks volumes about his attitude towards life in general: when he was two or three years
old he walked into a neighbor’s house, saw his reflection in the hallway mirror, and became so
frightened that he turned and ran away. In fact by the time of the following session, he had agreed
This is the condition of anguish that drives Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost. In that classic work of literature, Satan can
be viewed as the allegorical representative of humanity, who, out of envy and greed, is forever trying in vain to become
the basis of his own power and deny God as the creator to whom he is subject. Satan’s frustration is his inability to
realize his fantasy that he can become the basis of his own power, resulting in the compromise of existing as the
problem of God, existing as a not towards creation and life.
7
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in one of our sessions that “trying to be invisible” and “feeling like a fake” were two of the unifying
themes of both his social life and his work life. By the time we terminated treatment, John and I
had worked together for two years, twice a week, and for one year three times per week.
“I had a hard time coming in today,” John begins after sitting down near the foot of the
chaise in my office, opposite the window and close to the door. He says this with his head turned
down a bit, his lips puffed out a little. He looks like he’s pouting. John is about 6’2” with reddish
blond hair. He makes no eye contact as usual. When we began working together he explained that
that, “I can’t make eye contact” because if people looked “at me in the eyes they’ll see I’m empty
and weak.”
I write down what John says and he continues a minute or so later, “I almost didn’t make it
in today. I don’t know why…” he begins as his voice starts to crack as if he wants to cry, “… why I
get so upset about the bus. I was walking to the stop and I could see the bus leaving without me.”
We waited a few moments in silence. John began to shift into the corner where the foot of
the chaise meets the surrounding walls. His head drops a bit more as he speaks with the same
distress in his voice, “I almost got killed last night after work. I was walking home after work and
standing on the corner starting to cross the crosswalk. I turned to the right and there was this
woman trying to turn right and she was only looking left, so I jumped up and down and waved my
arms so she would see me but she didn’t. She came this close” – gesturing with his fingers – “to
hitting me!”
Having formulated something to say based on what I inferred from his examples, I told him,
“I think that while a part of you wants to be seen by me another part of you is scared that no matter
what you do I won’t and you’ll be hurt.”
John nods his head up and down a bit before replying, “I want to lie down.” After a
moment of silence he scoots over to his right towards the middle of the chaise and begins to lean
towards its head, stops halfway before reclining, and sits back up with his head still turned down.
“I’m scared to lie down,” he states in a frustrated tone.
“Scared of?” I ask
“I don’t know,” pausing, he continues, “When I was a kid I remember finding this calendar
on the bank behind our house. Someone had taken the time to mark appointments and things on it
and it made me sad.”
“Perhaps a part of you is scared about wasting time in here.”
“No. I was sad because someone took the time to put things on it and now it’s useless. It’s
useless.”
“Useless” I repeat, not sure where this is going.
“I used to have this fantasy of getting away from it all where I drove out of town in a
Volkswagen beetle and as I got out of the city limits a cop pulled me over for speeding and when he
opened the door a wind blew me away and he saw I was made out of paper.”
“So, even though a part of you wants me inside you, another part is scared that if you let me
in I’ll see you are useless and empty.”
“Useless,” he says as he nods in agreement and lies down, face up.
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In terms of Taylor and Butler, John’s fantasy encapsulates his life project as an attempt to
deny the paradox of subjectivity. His being is not “in question;” it is foreclosed. His life is an
argument that he invites others to participate in: the argument that he cannot assume a subjectivity
that can alter the circumstances in which he finds himself because he is depleted of agency.
“Getting away from it all” in his car is an attempt at escape from being “a self [as] existing in a space
of issues, to do with how one ought to be, or how one measures up against what is good, what is
right, what is really worth doing … being able to find one’s standpoint in this space, being able to
occupy, to be a perspective in it”. This attempt is a failure because the law (reality, his job, his
boyfriend, his therapist) pursues John and is bent on sighting/citing him, and in doing so making
citations about the subject he is – and thereby requiring a response. However, John thwarts this
effort to be reached by a trick. As a fake person (invisible) he tries to evade subjection, the
obligations of being in relationships that matter. The long arm of subjection can’t grasp him; as the
simulacra of a subject he is “useless.” At the same time however, he negates the only possible way
to truly resist subjection. After all, an agent cited by the law could still choose to speed away even
after citation. John’s only option is to be carried by circumstances like a useless surface.
As a form of power, subjection is paradoxical. To be dominated by a power external to
oneself is a familiar and agonizing form power takes. To find, however, that what “one” is,
one’s very formation as a subject, is in some sense dependent upon that very power is quite
another. … this fundamental dependency on a discourse we never chose, but that,
paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency. (Butler, 1997, pp. 1-2)
Thus, this study examines the paradox of subjectivity in the context of therapeutic practice.
It employs a hermeneutic case study method to study some of the author’s clinical work while
supervised by a contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic psychotherapist and reports the findings in a
manner that draws from the creative nonfiction genre.
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Case study methodology
The case study approach, utilizing the author’s own clinical work, was adopted for three
reasons. First, from the object-relations perspective, every case is a case study – quite literally. It
involves the study of each patient’s complex history and difficulties, largely through interpretations
based on the therapist’s participant-observation of the relationship that develops with each patient.
Thus, the use of an interpretive study focusing on relational dynamics parallels the nature of the
phenomenon under study.
Second, Clarkson (1995) and Pugh (1998) have argued that a disciplined and methodological
case study conducted by the therapist using their own clinical data provides a means for an
integrated approach to therapy and research. Noting the traditional separation between research and
clinical practice, where research is often conducted as a means for securing a degree to be able to
practice (that is, completing the dissertation requirement), Clarkson (1995) argues that therapy and
research ought to be a simultaneous and ongoing processes with every client, providing the research
is appropriate to the clinician’s approach to therapy. Following Clarkson (1995), Pugh (1998)
believes that encouraging doctoral students to study their own clinical process in depth, using a
method like the one employed in this study, can provide a vehicle for enhancing their own sense of
confidence, independence, and their ability to respond ethically to clients as psychotherapists.
Third, the case study approach is generally considered the appropriate method for
conducting focused analyses of clinical processes, particularly the communicative interactions
(including frequency, type, and patterns) between clients and therapists (cf., Clarkson, 1995; Martin,
Goodyear, & Newton, 1987; Pittenger, Hockett, & Danehy, 1960; Pugh, 1998). While many authors
offer little if any justification for this assumption, Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehy (1960) emphasize
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one that is particularly well suited for this study. By concentrating their study on the first five
minutes of a psychiatric interview, they were able to examine the communicative pa tterning between
the psychiatrist and the patient in greater idiographic detail. They write:
The members of any single human community share literally thousands of behavioral
conventions which are as dominant as our rule of keeping to the right [while driving in
America], but which are much more subtle than that because they are learned, acted, and
responded to, and taught almost entirely out of awareness. Human beings live their lives,
from day to day, and from centisecond to centisecond, in terms of such patterning. In the
discovery and explication of [such] patterning, gross statistical methods are neither necessary
nor possible; what is required, rather, is some method by which things we “really already
knew” – but only out of awareness – can be more or less systematically dredged up for
conscious examination. (p. 212)
And Yin (1984), writing on case studies in general, considers case studies to be appropriate for an
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and when multiple
sources of evidence are used – all of which characterize the present study. In fact, from the
perspective of hermeneutics the phenomenon and context under question for this study (or any
study, for that matter) are inexorably linked.

Hermeneutic methodology
As one approach within the family of qualitative research methods, hermeneutics in
psychology takes the position that the way to understand an action is to bring to light the world
outlook of which it is a response (cf., Packer, 1985; Packer, 1993; Packer & Addison, 1989) and
articulate the “rules” or interpretive framework that structures it. The everyday, practical activities in
which we engage make sense when viewed in terms of human interests and purposes that are always
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embedded in social and historical circumstances 8 – conventions that circumscribe the actors’ grasp
or understanding of a situation and therefore the range of behaviors in which the person is likely to
engage.
Before I can venture any guesses as to why a particular chess player makes a certain move, I
have to be familiar with the rules of the game of chess. Once I know these rules and have examined
the unfolding sequence in which the player moves – what did the other player do before and after
him/her? – I can interpret and make sense of the player’s move, with or without using his or her
own account of the move. For hermeneutics this kind of engaged, “on-line” activity is the focal
point of analysis because every human action or practice is grounded in a network of shared,
“constitutive” rules and conventions that give the action its meaning (cf. Kögler, 1996; Packer &
Addison, 1989; Taylor, 1971; Thompson, 1981). Every human action is placed or situated in a
myriad of other actions that change and unfold over time. The purpose of a hermeneutic study is to
make more explicit the scope and character of the rules – often tacit and informed – that make sense
of the action.
Psychotherapy is one kind of game people play. Psychotherapy is a game in the sense that
every human interaction is a game: its central feature is communication, it has its own rules, legal
and illegal moves, positions, field of play, values, and goals (cf., Packer, 1993; Taylor, 1971; Walsh,
1995; Walsh, Perrucci, & Severns, 1999). In therapy people make moves towards, away, and, often,
against each other. Each participant agrees to meet and interact with the other in the ostensible
hope that they “get somewhere” – namely, they get to a place where the person in the game position

While this underlying assumption was argued nearly thirty years ago (Taylor, 1971) as well as in disciplines outside
psychology (cf, Geertz, 1976/1979), its history can be traced back much farther. Its lineage reaches back to Hegel and
Dilthey (Palmer, 1969), Heidegger (1926/1962), Gadamer (1960/1994), and Wittgenstein (Walsh, 1995).
8
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of “patient” no longer needs the help of the person in the position of “therapist.” Therefore, to
understand what happens in therapy one must examine what is done by means of words, the
principle tools participants use to communicate while playing the game of therapy (Watzlawick,
Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). Hence, this study focuses on the pragmatics of the communication
between the author and the patient included in the study. Pragmatics is the study of actual language
as it is used in specific situations (cf., Levinson, 1983). As Nofsinger (1991) writes:
The approach of pragmatics thus contrasts with the study of language’s system of sounds
(phonology), its rules for constructing correct or valid words and sentences (morphology
and syntax) and its system for representing meaning in linguistic form (semantics).
Pragmatics is the study of how we use these various aspects of language to accomplish our
goals and do communicative work (pp. 5 – 6).
Importantly, although the pragmatic approach applies to utterances, it can also be extended to
emotions, which themselves are communicative acts (cf., deRivera, 1977; Parkinson, 1995).
Parkinson (1995) describes the basic principle of pragmatic function as it relates to the
communicative model of emotion:
What we say when we talk in emotional terms is never intended simply to characterize
something happening inside us, although such a characterization may be one of the effects
achieved. Emotional representations are deployed in specific contexts to serve specific
social functions. The nature of the function determines the content of the representation
that is deployed. (pp. 287–288)
This communicative model of emotion views “getting emotional [as] making identity claims that are
physically communicated via the various channels of individual emotional expression with socially
appropriate level of bodily involvement . . . .to influence a specific target person” (Parkinson, pp.
264, 291). These claims have a context dependent function which usually involves defining a piece
of reality or making claims about reality that cannot be maintained simply through supposedly
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neutral, factual discourse (e.g., “the painting is ugly!” stated with anger as if socially claiming the
identity of “angry person” legitimizes the speaker’s position).
De Rivera’s work (1977) provides a model for understanding how emotions comprise a
significant part of our continuous, on-line interpersonal negotiations over our rights, obligations,
and roles with respect to other people and the environment. Like Parkinson, on this view emotions
are used to regulate our interactions. The interpretive methodology employed here draws on the
work of de Rivera (1977) and Parkinson (1995) to interpret the emotional work that unfolded as a
part of the clinical interactions. Recalling Foucault’s (1982, p. 220) definition of power relations as
those which act on the actions of others, influencing or shaping their experience and subsequent
behavior, the importance of examining the emotional work of social interactions is clear. Getting
emotional is an everyday practice of power that does more to shape everyday social reality than
direct force.
Yet in order to study these actions, they must be “fixed” by some means, such as video,
audio, or other type of recording. In this way they can become a text-analogue and can be
interpreted (cf., Ricoeur, 1971). The author’s supervisor required the use of detailed process notes
written during every session and reviewed, line-by-line, during supervision. These verbatim process
notes provide a record of such fixed actions, written as a participant in the midst of them. These
notes, therefore, provided a record of the interactions that were used for the study.
This case study concentrates on the notes that were written during one psychotherapy
session with one patient. The session was chosen on the basis that it seem to exemplify particular
aspects of the technique the author had been learning. The session is analyzed to articulate the
structure of the therapeutic game the author had been learning, drawing on the literature in the
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pragmatic analysis of human communication (Levinson, 1983; Nofsinger, 1991; Watzlawick,
Jackson, & Bavelas, 1967). First, a pragmatic analysis is done to articulate the moves that were
made, what the author and patient were “up to” in terms of the communicative context. This is
followed with an examination of how the patient and the author positioned themselves relative to
each other in the communicative context that was articulated. This positioning is important because
it is through the moves that were made with respect to each other and features of the
communicative context that the constituting or construction of social reality, including the
maintenance and alteration of identity and subjectivity, occurred. Taken together these steps
constitute an interpretive analysis that moves beyond the patterning of the interaction to interpret
how this patterning shapes the participants – the ontological work that is accomplished (cf. Packer
& Greco-Brooks, 1999). As Packer writes:
In broad terms our hermeneutic approach seeks to uncover and elucidate the ontological
work that people accomplish in their everyday practical activity, including the interchange
that takes place in therapy. This work includes the ongoing construction and reconstruction
of social reality, and especially the production and reproduction of persons. Much of this
work is done by means of (through the medium of) language, and so our interpretive
methodology incorporates the analysis of language pragmatics: the conversational action that
makes up discourse. (Packer, 2000, p. 1)
The result is that several aspects of the communicative competence that characterizes CKPP
are articulated and related to several key technical terms and the tropography employed in the
Kleinian literature. Terms and tropes such as central anxiety, transference, development, feeding,
the breast, etc., will be discussed and explained to show how the theory and its underlying
metaphors are related and constitute the practice, its “discourse” as defined by Ochs(1990): “... a set
of norms, preferences, and expectations relating language to context, which speaker-hearers draw on and modify in
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producing and making sense out of language [and behavior, I would add] in context” (p. 289, italics in
original).

Creative nonfiction genre
The following study, then, “tells a story” of contemporary Kleinian clinical practice through
the window of a novice’s supervised clinical work – one who has been intent learning the practices
and methods of understanding clinical phenomena inherent to this specialized way of working with
people in psychological distress. In addition to articulating this form of clinical practice and
examining its subjectivizing practice, there was the challenge to present the work in a manner that
both reflects its complexity and communicates this complexity in a way that is accessible for both
more general and clinical audiences – to offer a glimpse of this world, how it works, and a sense of
what it is like to work within it. The creative nonfiction genre was chosen to achieve these aims for
two reasons.
First, creative nonfiction provides a rhetorical style that is appropriate for coping with three
challenges inherent to this kind of study. Perhaps the biggest challenge in learning (and
understanding) clinical practice is integrating and appropriately utilizing a wealth of theoretical
concepts and constructs to help this particular live-blooded person sitting across from you who
never fits neatly into psychological constructs. A second challenge for this kind of study is the
balance to be sustained between a detailed and specific “first-hand” account of the phenomenon
under study with the appropriate distance of the researcher-observer who draws on the body of
academic knowledge to make sense of the details encountered as a participant. And third, a study
such as this ought to be rigorous, informative, and interesting. Unfortunately, reading clinical
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material overloaded with technical jargon in standard expository format tends to be not only
burdensome, but often results in boredom and lack of interest. As a rhetorical form, creative
nonfiction deals with all of these challenges, because it moves between describing concrete,
historical events and tying them to more general ideas and issues. It depicts concrete instances of an
idea, ethos, or aesthetic for the reader to measure what is happening in some part of the world, a
depiction for the reader’s comparison between what “goes on” in one place and how it “goes on”
differently for the reader in their own place (cf. Gerard, 1996). Moreover, it accomplishes these
things with the underlying aim of offering a gripping account of a real-life event of set of events.
Secondly, misconceptions and, I believe, often misguided critiques have been lodged against
psychoanalysis, because too often psychoanalytic discourse has not done a good enough job of
linking abstract constructs to concrete clinical happenings. The “story telling” approach allowed
each concept to unfold with the clinical material that is presented. Showing how the terms inform
practice, the pragmatic use of these constructs, is different from the more typical context-less
wrangling over abstract terms that characterizes clinical literature. Moreover, each “school” of
psychoanalysis has somewhat different ways of understanding the same concepts such as
transference, projection, etc. Like the narrator of a film whose cuts back and forth in time, between
past, present, future, and horizontally across multiple context of the protagonist’s life to present a
three dimensional character, this study tacks between the concrete to and fro of an actual session,
the analysis of what is happening in the talk as it unfolds, and a retrospective view of the narrator
who wants to tie these elements together and use clinical work as the basis for telling “a story” about
contemporary Kleinian psychotherapy practice and how it works to foster subjectivity.
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Gerard (1996) outlines five characteristics of creative nonfiction. One of the primary aims
of creative nonfiction is teaching. “Creative nonfiction contains a sense of reflection on the part of
the author.” (p. 10). This reflective exposition, at the heart of creative nonfiction, is part of what
motivates the reader to read on: “One important distinguishing factor is this teaching element – a
reader reads on to learn something. It’s not just personal experience” (Gutkind, quoted in Gerard,
1998).

I would add that the organizational structure of creative nonfiction, the tacking back and

forth between moment or event and context, also contributes to its efficacy at teaching readers
something – helping the reader to see that there might be an alternative to the way they are seeing
the world, that there may be another way of doing things than the way they are familiar with doing,
conceiving, and talking about them.
Two related characteristics of creative nonfiction are that it tells a story and uses literary
devices to make it a gripping. “Creative nonfiction is [also] narrative, it always tells a good story.... It
takes advantage of such fictional devices as character, plot, and dialogue” (Gerard, 1996, p.9). This
study employs different literary devices throughout to achieve distinct purposes. For example, the
text includes turns of phrase, metaphor, and the like to enhance the descriptive quality of the setting
and the story. Also, technical concepts that figure as “central players” in the game of contemporary
Kleinian technique are entirely capitalized without necessarily providing immediate explication of the
concepts. This is done to mark the special place these terms hold and signify where they are figuring
into ongoing action. It is hoped that with subsequent exposures to these marked terms across
multiple contexts that the reader will develop a sense of the terms through how they are used, where
they figure into the clinical discourse, the supervisory discourse, and the discourse of the clinical
literature. This approach also parallels the process by which the author gradually came to

21
understand and integrate the concepts and theories with the clinical work over the course of the
supervision.
The study deviates from the standard approach to organizing the description of the study,
including its participants, purpose, development, as well as its place in the current literature. Rather
than summarizing this information up front, it is woven throughout the work as it has been done in
other works of creative non-fiction (e.g., Hersch, 1988). In general, this information is introduced as
it becomes relevant to the ongoing story. For example, informative digressions are used to provide
additional information on technical concepts as the dissertation progresses. In this study, and as
Hersch does, the “voice” of the participant and the researcher-observer are combined through
tacking between a description of the context of the ongoing experience and the context of the
literature that is relevant to the action.
The fourth and fifth characteristics of creative nonfiction are also related – and perhaps the
most important from the standpoint of this study. Creative nonfiction “has an apparent subject and
a deeper subject” (Gerard, 1996, pp. 7-8). In her book A Tribe Apart: A Journey into the Heart of
American Adolescence, (Hersch, 1998) follows the lives of several teenagers through a few years of
their adolescence. Yet her book is also a study in the estrangement and isolation that plagues not
only teens but their families. There is a duality of focus in creative nonfiction.
And the last characteristic, related to the fourth, is that it is “grounded in paradox” (Ibid, p.
9). This paradox is between the story as a concrete historical happening and its function as a
window into subjects that confront people (including the reader) in other places and times. Take the
following excerpt from The Culture of Desire: Paradox and Perversity in Gay Lives Today. In it the
author uses a memory from his childhood (the surface content) as a window into a broader,
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culturally bound pubescent experience (the “deeper” subject Gerard discusses) of grappling with
eroticism as a facet of one’s existence, and the role of peer story telling in this process:
One image rises from a strawberry field. Two teenage boys are bent down between
the rows, boasting to a third, much younger boy about what they’d got and who they’d
gotten if from. The younger boy, eager to keep the talk going, hungry to make it more
explicit (and to expand his own secret library of masturbatory fantasies), plies them with
dumb questions about body parts and places.
“You just find the hardest place on you and the softest place on her, and then . . .
you know,” the older braggart says.
“Like your big toe?” the little boy ventures.
“Haint your daddy learned you nothing with all them books? the big boy snorts,
reaching down through the bushy strawberry vines to grope himself. “This here’s all you
gotta know,” he says, laughing with his buddy.
The mystery of what “this here” was also took in the fantastic and delectable notion
that if you really knew what to do with it, you magically discover who you were. You would
discover that you and your body were in fact one whole being. You would discover that the
growing adolescent physicalness of your body was not disconnected from the self that hid
within that strange gangling thing – and then, privy to the mystery, you would enter into the
brotherhood of the knowing, the brotherhood of men who knew, men (boys?) whose
solidarity with one another had guided and released them into the natural bodies of women
(girls?) – released them from the terror of their aloneness. All that from a grope and a dirty
joke. (Browning, 1993, p. 13, italics in the original)
This is an example of the way in which creative nonfiction effectively articulates a foreign event or
series of events with an interpretation that invites readers to reflect, consider, and use to learn
something new about themselves and/or the world around them beyond the obvious content of the
story. In this case, the occasion of a grope and a dirty joke can provide a window to notice how our
identities (maleness) become inscribed in our bodies (the phallus) through the sightings/citations of
others: the “self that hid within that strange gangling thing” (emphasis added). In Taylor’s terms, it is
a glimpse into how the self, as “a space of issues for acting” is enlarged as the gangling thing
becomes a new term for questions of how to act and who one is that incorporates the thing within
that space of the self. Importantly, it shows a way that the terms of the incorporation – and hence
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of one’s identity – are fundamentally dependent on a more powerful Other whose defining
(symbolic) function is willingly turned to as definitive by the subject under construction, as it were.
In other words, it shows how our bodily organs – and the sensations of those organs – are
interpreted in relational terms because they are defined within a relational context. For example,
when the boy gets horny he fantasizes someone else who gratifies the urge. As the following
chapters will show, this process is not unique to puberty or adolescence. Within the critical
hermeneutics of the Kleinian tradition it is the starting point for having a self at all, with its roots in
infancy – particularly the ongoing process of weaning. In so far as one’s subjectivity changes
throughout life – or doesn’t in the case of pathology – weaning is a real and foundational aspect of
the adult subject. Clinically speaking, there is always already an infant-in-the-patient.

Critical hermeneutics of CKPP
The way of disclosure, in which Dasein [the human kind of being] brings itself before itself
must be such that in it Dasein becomes accessible as simplified in a certain manner. With
what is thus disclosed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in
an elemental way.
As a state-of-mind, which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the
phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis…. As one of Dasein’s possibilities
of Being, anxiety – together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it – provides the phenomenal
basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being. Dasein’s Being reveals
itself as care. (Heidegger, 1926/1962, pp. 226-227)
As a philosopher of ontology, Heidegger was interested in the question of Being (capital
“B”), the fundamental structure of “isness;” he was not interested in the being (little “b”) of any
particular thing or person. However, since this philosophical question only exists for humans, his
strategy was to examine the fundamental structures of human Being. This is the aim of Being and
Time (1926/1952), which inaugurated ontological and methodological hermeneutics. He formulated
his answer to this question through the interpretation of humans in their “average everydayness”
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rather than as objects detached from the contexts in which they existed. His famous answer to this
question: human Being is being-in-the-world (Dasein), as opposed to defining humanity it terms of
some inner faculty like reason as had been argued by most philosophers since Aristotle, or “the
mind” divided into and ego, id and superego as in the case of Freudian psychoanalysis. Thus, with
being-in-the-world as the starting point, methodological hermeneutics in psychology examines the
context in which the person finds him or herself to understand the basis of what they do, think, and
how they view themselves (cf., pp. 13-16 above). Importantly, as a method or strategy for
articulating the structure of an entity, ontological hermeneutics is not concerned with what ought to
be or not, simply the examination of what is and how it can be what it is. In other words, its focus
is on something’s conditions for being-in-the-world, not the conditions for its well-being-in-theworld.
Critical hermeneutics, it may be said, by contrast, seeks to go beyond the conditions of
being-in-the-world to articulate the conditions of well-being-in-the-world for particular peoples:
Critical hermeneutics refers to work that seeks to expose and criticize ideological underpinnings
of all social practices, including political and scientific activity. It attempts, in particular, to
reveal the sources of domination and coercion that prevent open discourse, the free exercise of
reason, and the enhancement of possibilities for human self-determination. (Woolfolk, Sass, &
Messer, 1988, p. 4)
This concern with emancipation is what led Habermas to examine Freudian psychoanalysis to
generate guidelines “for the logic of critical science in general” (McCarthy, 1978, p. 201), since Freud
combined interpretation with a normative-explanatory theoretical apparatus into a method of
identifying, intervening and correcting oppressive patterns of individual action. In order to be able
to evaluate social practices as oppressive, liberating, moral and immoral, there must be some
framework of values as a backdrop for sighting/citing this or that practice as good or as bad – in the
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case of psychotherapy, this or that behavior as normal or pathological. The problem with this given
the work of Foucault is: who’s to say and to whose benefit is this normative scheme being
employed?9 Is one person’s emancipatory understanding another person’s oppression? How do the
human and social scientist understand the other without assimilating their otherness – understanding
them primarily in terms of one’s own framework? An obvious example of the danger of this
predicament is the grotesque history of trying to convert homosexuals to heterosexuals on the basis
of traditional conceptions of normal subjectivity by employing various disciplinary technologies such
as chemical injection, electroshock, castration, emotional manipulation, and so on.
Kögler, a student of Habermas, (1996) argues for a critical hermeneutics that allows for an
understanding of otherness without its erasure by turning every form of life into another version of
one’s own world outlook. His solution is an interpretive theory and method that balances the view
that social power shapes every person’s understanding of themselves and reality without robbing
them of the possibility to achieve the critical distance necessary to act on and change those powerknowledge structures for the betterment of their lives. Engagement in his version of the critical
dialog is where both participants come to understand more of their own respective preconceptions
about reality through understanding them in terms of the other’s perspective. The “subject” in such
a study, say a person from another culture, may come to learn through the difference between his or
her world and that of the researcher something about the taken for granted cultural “rules” that
shape their lives. And subsequently, they may choose to alter some aspect of these rules once he or

Foucault’s work can be characterized as the investigation of the transformation of human subjectivities
(sociohistorically contingent manifestations of the subject) as embedded within complex relations of power and semiotic
practices. The possibilities for relations between subjects are conditioned by the operation of power-knowledge
complexes, “a moving substrate of force relations” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93). These relations operate within a sphere of
power that circumscribe its possibilities, shaping subjectivity along lines of specific, historically contingent subjectivities
(e.g., mad-sane, (Foucault, 1965), the criminal (Foucault, 1979), homosexual-heterosexual (Foucault, 1980), etc.)
9
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she has become more aware of its limiting consequences. Likewise the researcher may learn through
the differences something about his or her own background that he or she may want to change. It is
the encounter with difference that produces the “discursive space” necessary for critical selfdistanciation, not with a master text (normative-explanatory scheme) that captures reality outside of
the language within which it is inscribed.
The following chapters show how the communicative competence of CKPP constitutes a
critical hermeneutics that uses dialog to provide occasions for emancipatory subjection by means of
the confrontation with difference in the context of asymmetrical power and dependence. The
encounter with difference is necessary for patients to change their background assumptions of
reality, habits for relating to other people, and gain a greater sense of agency in their experience.
This confrontation is between who and how the therapist is and who and how the patient wants the
therapist to be to purge anxiety-producing reminders from his or her experience. In this view
pathology stems from inappropriately using other people to help manage one’s anxiety, that is, from
the inappropriate assimilation of the other to serve a function for the self.
When patients come in for treatment, they have a problem in their experience, an agitating
gap or lack in their understanding as it were, something, an it, that they want help to figure out -whether it manifests itself as a phobia (e.g., lack of ease with spiders), depression (e.g., lack of
fulfillment), sexual compulsion (e.g., lack of restraint on a desire that causes problems), etc.
Something is felt to be lacking and chronically subverts the patient’s sense of well-being-in-theworld. However, since this gap is in their experience it (1) is their way of experiencing that must
change to include whatever is missing, and (2) means the patient’s experience with the therapist will
be subject to the same problematic conditions. Borrowing Butler’s language (1997), the patient
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when he or she walks in the door of every session is a “subject already formed” and it is the
conditions of its formation that therapy risks if the subject is to be reformed and include whatever
human possibility for experience they feel they are denied. In CKPP the patient is subjected to their
experience in a different way so that an opportunity is created for patients to gradually assume a
different kind of subjectivity in relation to their experience.
While Heidegger the ontologist used anxiety as the window to expose Dasein’s basic
structural characteristics as being-in-the-world, Klein the psychoanalyst discovered that infantile
anxiety was the window for understanding the obstacles her child patients confronted with wellbeing-in-the-world. The examination of death anxiety became the path to the truth of their
experience, and later, the method for laying bare the structure of adult experience as well. Chapter
two provides an overview of the Kleinian tradition in terms of the central role it ascribes to anxiety,
particularly death anxiety as the manifestation of the death (aggressive) instinct. The chapter will
begin with a synoptic view of Klein’s life up to her invention of her play technique.
Chapters three and four articulate eight characteristics of CKPP through the analysis of one
session’s verbatim record using the interpretive method outlined above. At the relevant moments
during the analysis digressions are included to (1) explain some of the technical terms of CKPP and
(2) point out how the characteristics of CKPP work within the parameters of critical hermeneutics
as outlined by Kögler (1996). The overall strategy is to show that CKPP differs as a specialized
form of communicative competence by examining the difference between the communicative
patterns of the therapist with those that characterize everyday conversation. This includes what,
how, when, and why utterances are deployed and their pragmatic effect on the communicative
action. These interpretive utterances are geared to reveal something about the difficulties the patient
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has taking an evaluative stance on his or her (1) assumptions about social reality, (2) over-practiced
methods of impacting others, (3) personal experience, and how these ‘unconsciously’ constitute the
problematic experience(s) the patient recurrently faces, known in the psychiatric community as
symptoms.
Through the close interpretive analysis of the interaction between the author and a patient
during in chapters three and four, chapter five summarizes these findings to provide a basis for
studying the subjection process in CKPP. The work of Judith Butler will be used to augment the
analysis of the conversation done in chapters three and four, since she provides a language for
examining the process of subjection in the record. The critical hermeneutics of contemporary
Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy is examined as the weaning of subjectivity. On
the side of the therapist, weaning is the occasion to provide the conditions necessary for the patients
to begin to experientially understand themselves and operate differently in relation to anOther. On
the side of the patient, weaning is desired and feared as the paradox of subjection. Weaning is the
occasion to reunite with a range of experience through another; what becomes a reclaimed
possibility for the self is possible on the basis of dependency on that Other. The fear or anxiety of
weaning is the specter of the dissolution of the self as it engages this project by means of this Other.
The allure of weaning is a greater sense of togetherness in the world (as in “I do/don’t feel very
together today”) and with the world (as in less loneliness and isolation). The implications of
weaning for subjection will be discussed, as well as an evaluation of the methodology employed in
the study and its implications for further research.

2. Some context for an induction into the Kleinian tradition
We have never prided ourselves on the completeness and finality of our knowledge and
capacity. We are just as ready now as we were earlier to admit the imperfections in our
understanding, to learn new things and to alter our methods in any way that can improve
them.
According to Grosskurth (1986, preface) these were “the first words Melanie Klein ever
heard Freud utter.”
Freud first postulated the conflict between Eros and Thanatos, the life and death instincts, in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). However, when he died in 1939 he had not decided whether
the idea of a ‘death instinct’ was central to human existence or as “is felt by many people …a most
undesirable [innovation] which should be gotten rid of as quickly as possible” (Freud, 1933/1965, p.
103). Melanie Klein took the former position. Her use and development of the death instinct as a
heuristic devise in theory and in practice is one of the important ways she extended Freud’s work as
a psychoanalytic pioneer, and made claim to legitimacy in Freud’s own name. For some like Freud,
Anna Freud and her followers, Klein’s extensions ultimately amounted to a heretical departure from
psychoanalysis and made her a target of derision and contempt. Yet for others, her innovations
provided an illuminating source of inspiration for extending the reach of psychoanalytic thought and
practice.
These contrasting reactions to Melanie Klein highlight the idea that conflict resides at the
heart of people’s relations with others who are different, and require an ability to tolerate the loss of
sameness between un-equals for the various forms of good will to prevail in parenting, our
friendships, partnerships, and professional life. For Klein the root of a person’s inability to tolerate
this loss is the hatred of dependence manifested as ENVY of the Other, who has that of which one
feels deprived. The aggression over this experienced deprivation is the origin of the anxiety that
threatens one’s existence as persecution from external sources or the destruction of the
29

30
loved and needed Other at the hands of the self. Klein’s clinical and theoretical innovations
developed out of the psychoanalytic play technique that she invented over several years
beginning in 1919. 10 By 1940 her theories and technique had gained enough social stability
and currency in the analytic community that a reaction had formed against them as such a
heretical departure from Freud’s psychoanalysis that Klein’s legitimacy (and that of her
followers) as an analyst was attacked by Anna Freud and her adherents. Since Klein and
Anna Freud had both emigrated to England to escape the rampant anti-Semitism of the
continent, the tension between them almost proved too much to be contained by the tent of
the British Psycho-Analytical Society, which led to the Freud-Klein controversies between
1941 and 1945 (cf., King & Steiner, 1991). Since there are several biographies of Klein that
cover her life, work, and the controversies surrounding her technique and departures from
Freud from different angles (e.g., Burston, 1996; Grosskurth, 1986; King & Steiner, 1991;
Kristeva, 2001; Likerman, 2001; Segal, 1979), this chapter will not attempt an exhaustive
account of her life and work or its historical place in psychoanalytic thought. This chapter
provides some historical context for CKPP as it developed from Klein and the subsequent
work of her followers as they have continued to refine the practice of “getting to the root of
anxiety.” For Klein this anxiety is proportional to the patient’s inability to tolerate
deprivation of some kind.
Given that Klein’s own career as an analyst began with her own analysis as a
recurrently depressed young woman caught at the intersection of several depriving
relationships, it is not ironic that her last major paper Envy and gratitude (1957/1997),
written with the hindsight of a grandmother, struggled with the issue of how such
deprivations affect the mental health of people. Perhaps Klein’s unwavering conviction that
Except where indicated, the biographical information and quotations are taken from Grosskurth (1986)
Melanie Klein: Her world and her work.
10
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there are innate factors that predispose some people to have more problems with
environmental deprivations than others came from her own experience as an analysand who
was confronted with how she contributed to – and therefore could change – the recurrence
of misery in her own life.

Melanie Klein
From the envy, aggression, and sibling rivalry within her own family, Melanie Klein
had abundant material from which to formulate her later theories. …
It was a family riddled with guilt, envy, and occasionally explosive rages, and
infused with strong incestuous overtones. Melanie’s impending marriage was the
prelude to Emanuel’s death through disease, malnutrition, alcohol, drugs, poverty,
and a will to self-destruction. Melanie Klein was made to feel responsible for his
death and she carried the guilt with her for the rest of her days – just as Emanuel had
probably intended she should. (Grosskurth, 1986, p. 20)
Melanie’s father Moriz Reizes was born into a strictly Orthodox Jewish family in a
small town known since World War II as Lvov, Ukraine. Against the wishes of his parents
he pursued a career as a physician, hiding his studies for matriculation to avoid their
interference. His move towards independence required not only supporting himself
financially through school, but also severing a prearranged marriage. He met his future wife
Libussa Deutch by chance on a trip to Vienna, where they both happened to by staying in
the same boarding home. They soon married in 1875 and settled in what is now
Burgenland, Austria, about 70 miles from where they met. A year later their first child Emile
was born. Emanuel and Sidone were born in 1877 and 1878, respectively. Melanie, the last
of their four children, was born seven years after their marriage in 1882. Given a social
climate of ramped anti-Semitism, Moriz’s attempts to provide for his family as a physician
failed and he settled for dentistry, contributing to the family’s financial strains and Libussa’s
apparent disdain for her husband.
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Libussa was in her mid-twenties at the time she married Moriz, some twenty-four
years her senior. From Grosskurth’s available sources, what seems clear about Libussa is
that she was black-haired, of fair complexion, and intelligent. In addition to her native
Slovakian, she had a adequate grasp of German and French, the latter of which she taught
herself in addition to playing the piano while Melanie was growing up – facts to which
Melanie would refer in her idyllic reminiscences of her mother’s influence on her own
character.
She had a far closer relationship with her mother, whom she remembered as a
woman much younger than her father, very beautify, warm-hearted, courageous and
enterprising. Not only did she keep a shop – an unusual thing for a doctor’s wife to
do in those days – but later, when Melanie was finishing school and her father
became ailing and somewhat senile, it was her mother who supplemented the family
income and held the family together. She spent the last few years of her life in
Melanie Klein’s own home, which was a great solace to Melanie at a generally happy
time in her life. … Melanie was deeply moved by the serenity and courage with
which her mother approached her death after a long-drawn-out illness, and often
spoke of it in her old age. (Segal, 1979, p. 28)
In contrast to the rosy picture of her mother that Klein describes in her unpublished
autobiography, both Grosskurth and Kristeva (2001) depict Libussa as autocratic,
manipulative, and overbearing, a sort of parental parasite on the young Melanie. Kristeva
writes, “Not surprisingly, the biography of Melanie Klein reveals that the childhood
experienced by this discoverer of the “object-mother” and of matricide was dominated by
the imposing figure of her own mother, Libussa Deutsch” (p. 17). This aspect of Libussa
will be most evident when she insinuates herself into Melanie’s young family after Klein
married.
About a year after the death of Sidonie, Melanie began her education at a local state
school with eagerness and dedication: “She had also inherited the family passion for
knowledge and soon became an ambitious student, very conscious of her marks; it was
particularly important for her to receive a report with the words wurde belobt (commended).”
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(Grosskurth, 1986, p.9). Grosskurth explains this ambition in terms of the competitive
dynamics and likely childhood resentments Klein faced, motivating her desire to stand out
and be noticed. First, Melanie was the youngest of four children, born four years later and
she was an unexpected child. Second, her father was fifty years old when she was born, and
in addition to having publicly told the young Melanie that Emile was his favorite, he never
seemed to notice her, as Klein could not recall one time he ever played with her – although
she could remember a time that she tried to climb up his knee and he pushed her away.
Third, it seems that Melanie’s siblings were generally antagonistic towards her except for
Sidonie. Fourth, while Melanie resented and envied Emile’s favored status in the eyes of
their father, she wanted her father’s approval just as she wanted the approval of her brother.
Around the age of fourteen Klein decided that she wanted to pursue a career in
medicine. Apparently, Melanie overheard her father boast that she would attend the
gymnasium – an event that ignited her decision. Yet it was her brother’s approval and
tutelage in Greek and Latin that enabled her to qualify, and provided her with a circle of
young intellectual and aspiring friends, including her future husband Arthur Klein.
The transitional years just before and after the end of the 19 th century brought many
difficult changes for Melanie to cope with emotionally, and perhaps further predisposed her
to take an interest in a discipline focused on the suffering of the psyche. The changes began
with her father’s death in 1900, adding to the family’s financial burden. In the wake of his
death Emile was quickly married, Melanie quit her plans to pursue medicine and was
engaged, Emanuel quit his studies and departed for Vienna to live his last two years, and
Libussa’s attempts to control the members of her family put Melanie in the middle of power
conflicts and resentment between Libussa, Emanuel, and Emile. Added to the burden of
mediating these conflicts and suffering their passive-aggressive abuses, Melanie was

34
embarking on a loveless marriage to the wrong man, which she seems to have known as
soon as they were engaged.
Emilie married a young doctor named Leo in December 1900. Libussa had the
young couple move into the Reizes’ flat, and compelled Leo to assume Moriz’s dental
practice despite his own reluctance. As Leo assumed Moriz’s place to provide financially for
the family, Emilie became a substitute for the life Libussa so eagerly wanted to leave behind:
the home-bound wife and mother of a financially unsuccessful doctor-become-dentist,
confined to a cramped flat. Emilie resented this and occasionally her envy was subtly
expressed to Melanie in their correspondence:
When I read your vivid letter I could hardly suppress certain sadness. Not that I am
jealous; you know that I have no strong inclination for traveling, although I would
not object to it if the opportunity presented itself. … And I do almost get jealous of
your talent for expressing so beautifully everything you have seen. Well, that’s an old
story, and it tells you that there is hardly anybody else who loves you as I do. …
Then it is spring again, and it draws her [their mother] to her beloved Rosenberg’s
[Melanie’s in-law’s] and its over with Emilie, Leo, and Otto! [Emilie’s son] Why does
she neglect us so?” (Quoted in Grosskurth, p. 45)
Meanwhile, Emanuel had been traveling when his father died. His health had
deteriorated, apparently due to tuberculosis, to the point that he became convinced that his
death was quickly approaching. In early 1900 he transferred from the medical school to the
Faculty of Arts to pursue writing. Soon after he withdrew from school altogether and with a
small allowance provided by Libussa, he was able to travel, write, and “seek lands of sun and
beauty in the traditional pattern of the dying artist.” (Ibid., p.18). Yet his departure was an
auspicious occasion for Libussa who wanted to move Emile and Leo into their flat. In fact,
just three days after her husband’s death Libussa wrote a letter to Emanuel describing her
plan, written with enough detail to suggest that it was a well thought out plan in advance
even though her tone is one of sharing a new surprise. As Grosskurth explains, his
romanticized escape may have felt more like an exile: “Emanuel, in his quest for sun and
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creativity, brooded constantly on the pittance he was given for an allowance … His dead
father’s clothes were made over for him, another one of the grievances he was accumulating,
particularly as he saw the finery bestowed upon his sister [Emilie’s trousseau]” (Ibid., p. 20)
Emanuel also disliked Libussa’s increasing emotional and financial focus on Melanie,
including her dowry, as it diminished both the money and affection he received. He dislike
the prospect of her marriage to Arthur – even though it was his endorsement that led
Melanie to accept the engagement – because it meant that he would have a rival for her
attention. Not only did he seem to write letters that preyed upon Melanie’s anxieties about
her pending marriage and his pending death to secure money from her, he acted like a lover
who starts a fight with the beloved to test his or her dependence by threatening withdrawal.
Such a letter of Emanuel’s drew the following response from Melanie:
But perhaps it is because you are so far away now that I feel so driven to ask you for
your confidence. I would, with regard to you, be so much calmer, if I knew that I
could share everything with you that concerns you … you will never find a more
loyal friend and person who understands you better than I. Let me be your
confidante, and be convinced it will be reciprocal! (Quoted in Grosskurth, 1986, p.
33).
Apparently her letter is what he wanted. Emanuel responded to her reply by proclaiming
that Melanie and Libussa were the true loves of his life and decrying her use of the word
“friend” instead of “brother”.
In addition to using the allowance he received from Melanie and Libussa for
legitimate expenses, Emanuel spent it on gambling, morphine, cocaine, and other vices.
Emanuel was in Genoa when he died. His corpse was found on an April afternoon in 1902
by a hotelkeeper. A short card was found, written to Melanie, which complained about the
“scantiness” of her last letter to him, which he blamed for putting him in a bad mood! (Ibid.,
p. 36). About a year later on March 31, 1903, Melanie Reizes became Mrs. Melanie Klein,
and in just under a year she bore her first child, Melitta, in January 1904.
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In Klein’s own words, “I threw myself as much as I could into motherhood and
interest in my child. I knew all the time that I was not happy, but saw no way out” (quoted
in Grosskurth, p. 42). However, the distraction of motherhood could not wholly cover a
gnawing sense of unhappiness, caught at the intersection of pressures from her mother’s
impositions, the growing “weakness of [Melanie’s] nerves” and depression, as alluded to in
correspondence, her unrelenting grief over Emanuel’s death, and the pressure to sacrifice her
own interests and social life to follow a distant husband as he advanced his career.
While marriage often means a further separation from the influence of one’s parents,
for Melanie it came to mean the opposite: the history of her short marriage shows the
increasing intrusion of a controlling mother as Melanie’s own mental health deteriorates: “By
May 1909 her fits of weeping and despair had reached such a point that she went to a
sanatorium in Chur, Switzerland, for two and a half months …” (Ibid, p. 56). As happened
during Melanie’s many other departures from home to recuperate, Libussa assumed control
of the Klein home, which had increased by one two-year old named Hans, born in 1907.
While Libussa’s willingness to take parental responsibilities from Melanie may seem like the
support of a caring mother, it should be kept in mind that Libussa’s correspondence
suggests that she herself engineered some of Melanie’s absences and used them to escape
from Emile’s household in Vienna. Grosskurth writes:
It is a chilling conclusion that Libussa did not want her daughter to be happy, that
she did not want her to find fulfillment, and that she begrudged her the enjoyments
of which she herself had been deprived when she was young. One remembers that
when Melanie was a small girl her mother had told her that she was a surprise – that
is, unwanted. It is not at all unlikely that she was subtly emphasizing that no man
could ever love her, either her father, her husband, or anyone else. Perhaps it was
Libussa herself who had told her that Emile was her favorite. Libussa had been in
fierce competition with Melanie over Emanuel [Melanie’s brother]. According to
Libussa, Arthur [Melanie’s husband] blossomed when she was away, the children
were much better off without her, and her own mother needed the absence in order
to achieve serenity. Melanie was a pampered object, not a loved daughter, but a lap
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dog, who had been taught to sit up and beg and to lie down passively. (Grosskurth,
1986, pp. 57-58).
Perhaps the contrast between this depiction of the relationship between Melanie and
Libussa with the one cited above (p. 32) can be reconciled through one of Klein own
memories. Regarding her sister Sidonie’s death at the age of eight, Klein comments in her
autobiography, “I have a feeling that I never entirely got over the feeling of grief for her
death. I also suffered under the grief my mother showed, whereas my father was more
controlled. I remember that I felt that my mother needed me all the more now that Sidonie
was gone, and it is probable that my spoiling was due to my having replaced that child
(quoted in Grosskurth, 1986, p. 15). Where Klein remembers the “spoiling” as having been
due to becoming a substitute, it seems she does not remember the cost of that spoiling:
feeling unwanted as a unique person, a failure unless she lived up to expectations designed
for someone else. Both Libussa and Klein’s brother Emanuel tended to treat others a s plugs
to fill a hole of loss within themselves, perhaps leaving Klein with an “unsatisfied longing for
an understanding without words … [a] sense of loneliness and derives from the depressive
feeling of an irretrievable loss” as she would later describe the sense of loneliness (Klein,
1963, p. 301). In the case of Melanie and her mother, it was a loss of autonomy, acceptance
and approval, which foreshadowed her controversial (aggressive?) rise and aspirations within
the psychoanalytic community. This sense of “not measuring up” may be one factor that
predisposed Melanie to strive for excellence and renown, dovetailing with what Grosskurth
described as competitive family dynamics.
Saddled with a yearning for a self free of an oppressive future, Melanie was able to
persuade Arthur to move the family (now including Libussa) from the stifling provincial
town where they lived to Budapest in the winter of 1909. Meanwhile she had befriended an
older woman, Klara, who became a confidant, ally and source of confidence and inspiration
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to assert her dominance in the Klein household. Not surprisingly, it was during this period
that Libussa suffered the “breakdown” and was sent away to recuperate. “On September 18,
1911, in a letter to Melanie, Libussa expressed relief that Melanie’s health seemed much
improved. She also proposed to ask Klara to go shopping with her to advise her on
purchases for the children. Libussa was beginning to realize that she was no longer
indispensable” (Ibid, p. 59). Melanie’s recovery was to last until 1914, a year that would
radically alter the course of her life.
In July of 1914 her last child Erich was born. By October Libussa had become ill,
dramatically loosing weight, which suggested to Klein she had cancer. Klein nursed her
mother during her rapid decline in health until her last week of life. Libussa died on
November 6, 1914. And (coincidentally?) according to Klein’s autobiography, it was “about
1914” that she read Freud’s paper On Dreams and knew, “that that was what I was aiming
at, at least during those years when I was so very keen to find what would satisfy me
intellectually and emotionally. I entered into analysis with Ferenczi, who was the most
outstanding Hungarian analyst” (quoted in Grosskurth, p. 69).
When Klein entered analysis with Ferenczi she suffered from acute depression
exacerbated by the death of her mother. She was also struggling with a growing
dissatisfaction in her marriage and resentment toward Arthur. Her divorce – finalized
around 1925 – was precipitated by growing anti-Semitism in Hungary in the wake of the
First World War, since it forced the Klein’s to leave Budapest. In 1919, the year of her first
psychoanalytic presentation and acceptance into the Hungarian psychoanalytic society,
Arthur and Melanie separated. Arthur moved to Sweden where he secured employment, and
later, citizenship. Melanie and the children returned to her in-laws’ in Rosenberg (renamed

39
Ruzomberok by the new government) until 1920, when she moved to Berlin to pursue a new
life as a single mother determined to forge a career in psychoanalysis.
From Crisis to Career
Accordingly, it is mistaken to view the Kleinian infant as a destructive, schizoid
being, because he uses aggressive defenses for a purpose, and only becomes
habituated to them in the event of undue suffering and anxiety. And yet, even with
this thinking, there is no complacency in Klein’s vision. Her infant never becomes
an ideal heroic fighter against environmental privations or ill treatment. He
remains a tragic being, and himself creates some of the worst obstacles to his own
development. This becomes especially evident in Klein’s last major paper, her 1957
work on primary envy. (Likerman, 2001, p. 170)
Klein’s development as a psychoanalytic pioneer was influenced by two
psychoanalyst-mentors, Sandor Ferenczi and Karl Abraham. (Caper, 2000; Grosskurth, 1986;
Kristeva, 2001, Likerman, 2001 #48) Melanie Klein developed her ideas and expanded the
field of psychoanalysis with their tutelage, as her personal analysts and teachers, to become
what Kristeva calls “the boldest reformer in the history of modern psychoanalysis” (2001, p.
16). These reforms were made possible by her invention of the “play technique” and its
theoretical and practical implications during her analysis of her own son Erich, known as
“Fritz” in The development of a child (Klein, 1921/1975).
The following is a summary of the “play technique” based on three of her papers
(Klein, 1926/1975; Klein, 1932; Klein, 1955/1975) First, “it was always part of my technique
not to use educative or moral influence, but to keep to the psycho-analytic procedure only,
which, to put it in a nutshell, consists in understanding the patient’s mind and in conveying
to him what goes on in it” (Klein, 1955/1975, p. 129). Second, this “conveying” occurred in
the form of interpretations that were spoken in terms the child understood, that were (third)
offered from the beginning of the first session and geared towards the level where the child’s
anxiety was the most active. However, the graphic and bizarre nature of her interpretations
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have led detractors of her approach have accused Kleinian, and particularly Melanie Klein, of
making ‘wild’ interpretations, particularly when it came to the things she said to her child
patients. Likerman characterizes it this way:
Technique is psychoanalysis is obviously intimately related to the theory that gives
rise to it, and with Melanie Klein this is no exception. Her forthright technique,
based on what she called deep interpretations, consisted in addressing the child’s
unconscious mind directly, hence talking immediately about the hidden symbolic
meaning of his play. This was done without fi rst addressing the child’s conscious
frame of mind and own version of what his game meant. This technique still comes
across as blunt because, as initially described by Klein, it appears to bypass the child’s
conscious participation in the process of exploration, and so trespass uninvited into
the child’s unconscious mind…. Klein’s intention was not to barge into her child
patient’s mind, but to reach its more inaccessible crevices on the basis of carefully
judged and fully contextualized observations. (2001, p. 49).
Fourth, one way Klein inferred what was happening in her patient’s minds was on
the basis of “contextualized observations” – what occurred between the child and herself in
the immediacy of their ongoing relationship. In the jargon, her focus was the
TRANSFERENCE understood as the child’s whole experience of the analysis (and the
analyst) in the present as the reiteration of the child’s unconscious phantasy originating in his
or her infantile anxiety situations. Thus, her interpretations emphasized the present
transference as related to earlier situations. With adults one makes use of reconstructions,
whereas with children their conflicts are “directly represented” through their play. Thus,
play became the means for gaining access to the child’s unconscious thoughts as free
association was used when working with adults:
Take for instance, the case of Ruth who, as an infant, had gone hungry for some
time because her mother had little milk to feed her. At the age of four years and
three months, when playing with the washbasin, she called the water-tap a milk-tap.
She declared that milk was running into mouths (the holes of the waste-pipe), but
that only a very little was flowing. This unsatisfied oral desire made its appearance in
countless games and showed itself in her whole attitude, For instance, she asserted
she was poor, that she only had one coat, and that she had very little to eat – none of
these statements being in the least accordance with reality. (Klein, 1926/1975, p.136)
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This quote also indicates a fifth characteristic of the play technique: that that content
of the interpretations was derived from the symbolic meanings of the child’s play within the
context of the child’s relation with the analyst. Through the use of this technique, first with
children and then with adults, Klein:
aroused a good deal of controversy, she assumed from the outset that a child analysis
was to be conducted in exactly the same way as an adult one – except that the
analysis of verbal associations was to be supplemented by the analysis of play. She
assumed that the transference was possible, observed that a super-ego, though a
more rudimentary one, was present, and believed that no moral or educative pressure
was to be exerted by the analyst. In other words, she adopted Freud’s transference
analysis both for adults and for children; and if she later introduced any changes at all
these were in the direction of purer transference analysis, her role becoming more
and more confined to interpretation. A characteristic which was perhaps the most
specific for her technique was that, from the beginning, she always gave preference
to the interpretation of unconscious anxiety based on unconscious phantasy
wherever she could see it – even when the first results of this appeared to be an
increase in anxiety (Introductory remarks of R.E. Money-Kyrle in Klein, 1975)
What was particularly controversial and disturbing for some about Klein’s ideas and
technique involved the counterintuitive implications of her work, specifically the intense and
graphic nature of the aggressive phantasies that she ascribed to infants and children as the
cause of pathogenic anxiety and therefore pathological symptoms. Consider Klein’ s
description of the case of Trude:
I will now turn to consider the content and the causes of these early feelings of guilt
by reference to another case. Trude, aged three years and nine months, repeatedly
played ‘make believe’ in her analysis that it was nighttime and that we were both
asleep. She then used to come softly over to me from the opposite corner of the
room (which was supposed to be her own bedroom) and threaten me in various
ways, such as that she was going to stab me in the throat, throw me out the window,
burn me up, take me to the police, etc. She would want to tie up my hands and feet,
or she would lift up the rug on the sofa and say she was doing ‘Po—Kaki—Kuki’.
This … meant that she wanted to look inside her mother’s bottom for the ‘Kakis’
(faeces), which signified children to her. On another occasion she wanted to hit me
in the stomach and declared that she was taking out my ‘A—A’s’ (stool) and was
making me poor. She then seized the cushions, which she repeatedly called children,
and hid herself with them behind the sofa. There she crouched in the corner with an
intense expression of fear, covered herself up, sucked her fingers and wetted herself.
She used to repeat this whole process whenever she made an attack on me. It
corresponds in every detail with the way she had behaved in bed when, at a time

42
when she was not yet two, she started to have severe night terrors. At that time, too,
she had run into her parents’ bedroom again and again at night without being able to
say what it was she wanted. By analyzing her wetting and dirtying herself, which
stood for attacks on her parents copulating with each other, the symptoms were
removed. Trude had wanted to rob her pregnant mother of her children, to kill her
and to take her place in coitus with her father. She was two years old when her sister
was born. It was those impulses of hatred and aggression which, in her second year,
had given rise to an increasingly strong fixation upon her mother and to a severe
anxiety and sense of guilt which found expression, among other things, in her night
terrors. (Klein, 1955/1975, p. 5)
Ultimately, the recurrent presence of aggressive phantasies directed at the destruction
of the parents, a parent, or a part of the parent, led Klein to believe she had found empirical
evidence of Freud’s death drive Thanatos. Specifically, the earliest manifestation of this
drive was figured as constitutional ENVY, the urge to destroy difference and change by
destroying the differentiator that causes it. This begins with the mother’s breast as its first
object, occasioned by the painful frustrations of weaning. In a state of hunger the infant
wants milk but there is not any there; there is a difference between what it wants and what it
has. This difference is hated and the angry infant blames the breast for causing it. The
infant wants to destroy the “withholding breast” and the milk he or she wants inside it. The
infant has a grievance over his or her dependence. In the case of Trude, described above, it
was no longer her mother’s breast that she envied but her mother’s womb that she wanted
to destroy by greedily devouring what the mother had but Trude did not – special objects of
her father’s desire. However, this hatred was attributed to terrifying imaginary characters at
night. Trude’s anxiety of death was anxiety over her own aggression and its ramifications.
Either too much constitutional envy (aggression), inadequate mothering to help the
youngster deal with painful experiences (which also gives rise to envy), or some combination
of the two, will impair development of the capacities to love, feel secure, and have a sense of
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confidence and autonomy, since this aggression that has been unmitigated remains a source
of self-destructiveness:
In contrast with the infant who, owing to his envy, has been unable to build securely
a good internal object, a child with a strong capacity for love and gratitude has a
deep-rooted relation with a good object and can, without being fundamentally
damaged, withstand temporary states of envy, hatred, and grievance, which arise
even in children who are loved and well mothered. Thus, when these negative states
are transient, the good object is regained time and time again. This is an essential
factor in establishing it and in laying the foundations of stability and a strong ego. In
the course of development, the relation to the mother’s breast becomes the
foundation for devotion to people, values, and causes, and thus some of the love
which was originally experienced for the primal object is absorbed … the feeling of
having injured and destroyed the primal object impairs the individual’s trust in the
sincerity of his later relations and makes him doubt his capacity for love and
goodness. (Klein, 1957/1997, pp. 187-189)
Klein’s work as a whole testifies that she wanted a complicated picture to account
for the person’s inability to deal with life’s hardships – not just an overly simplistic account
that blames the environment on the one side or the person on the other. Her account of
envy straddles this opposition by accounting for two innate factors that cannot be easily
differentiated. One is that the person is born with too much constitutional anti-life force.
However, this is related to the second, one is born with too weak an ego to deal with the
same amount of destructiveness that everyone else is born with. In either case these factors
contribute to the person’s ability to handle deprivations in their dependency on others and
the world. Anxiety is the result of feeling unable to cope with the vicissitudes of having and
not having what one expects.
For Klein the capacity to tolerate anxiety and deal with it in the most adaptive way by
strengthening one’s attachments to depended upon others, depends upon the firm
establishment of a good object in the ego, the sense that the self is sturdy, creative, safe and
capable of recreating security and love in the face of events that show these necessities of life
are missing. In other words, externally viewed, the good in the world can be lost because it
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can and will be recreated; internally viewed, one can tolerate one’s shortcomings and
acknowledge one’s flaws without disproportionate anxiety because the loss of the sense of
the good in one’s self (i.e., guilt) is also temporary and can be reversed by the self (i.e.,
reparation).
While it is beyond the scope of this study to fully explicate the complexity of Klein’s
metapsychology, the point of examining envy is that Klein shifted the definition of analysis
by articulating a feature of every patient to some extent or another in terms of the anxiety of
destruction that is built into the person and the importance of analyzing the patient’s selfdestructive tendencies as they manifest themselves in the transference anxiety:
This leads me to a conclusion regarding technique. During an analysis the
psychoanalyst often appears as an idealized figure. Idealization is used as a defense
against persecutory anxiety and is its corollary. If the analyst allows excessive
idealization to persist – that is to say if he relies mostly on the positive transference –
he may, it is true, be able to bring about some improvement. The same, however,
could be said of any successful psychotherapy. It is only by analyzing the negative as well
as the positive transference that anxiety is reduced at its root. (Klein, 1950/1975, pp. 4647, emphasis in original)
Analyzing the negative transference is crucial because as it is traced it will lead to examining
the patient’s difficulties dealing with deprivation and the habitual ways of not understanding
and relating they have used to avoid this unavoidable element of any significant relationship.
Stated differently, beginning with Klein but extending beyond her as the Kleinian tradition
has expanded, the focus on the deepest source of anxiety has resulted in concepts and
techniques for examining how a patient’s habitual ways of relating are used to avoid the
recognition and understanding of the painful aspects of experience.
Because Klein understood anxiety, that conduit of pleasure, more deeply than
anyone else, she turned psychoanalysis into the art of caring for the capacity for
thought. Attentive to the death drive that Freud had already incorporated into
psychic life … Klein considered the death drive to be the primary agent for our
distress, but also – and especially – for our capacity to become creatures of
symbols…. Under what conditions are the anxieties that tear us apart amenable to
symbolization? That is the question that Klein uses as she reformulates the analytic
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problem, a question that places her work – unwittingly so since she was most notably
a courageous clinician and in no way a “master of thought” – at the heart of
humanity and the modern crisis of culture. (Kristeva, 2001, p. 14)

A story of Induction
As in the case of biographies on Klein, there have been several works within the
psychoanalytic literature that explicate how her pioneering work has developed beyond her
into what has been called neo, contemporary, and even post-Kleinianism.11 These texts
emphasize the evolution of her basic tenants such as the DEPRESSIVE POSITION,
PARANOID/SCHIZOID POSITION, SPLITTING, PROJECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION, INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION, PHANTASY through the
work of her protégées and those who have studied under them, as well as new concepts and
techniques that they have developed (cf., Caper, 2000; Hinshelwood, 1994; Mitchell & Black,
1995; Ruszczynski & Johnson, 1999; Sayers, 2000; Schafer, 1997; Spillius, 1988a; Spillius,
1988b). Since many of these concepts will be introduced and explained in the context of the
session to be studied in the following chapters, they will not be explicated here. This
section, then, provides a segue to the rest of the study by describing how the author was
introduced and became involved in the Kleinian tradition.
Competence is an “anxiety arousing area for the novice therapist,” as Teyber(1992)
understated, and probably most clinicians remember. It has been argued that a central
feature of anxiety is the ability of the anxiety-provoking situation to “reveal affectively to the
individual his/her now uncertain power to realize his/her projects and self understandings”
(Fischer, 1982, p. 75). Training in clinical psychology offers many venues for facing one’s
11

To date the author has not found a definitive source that differentiates the terms neo, contemporary or
post-Kleiniansim.
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abilities in an uncertain light, and one’s sense of one’s self put into question. “What am I
doing?” “What just happened in there?” “Did I do it right?” – whether “it” refers to
psychotherapeutic interventions, paper presentations, lectures delivered to undergraduates,
or written reports. Throughout the first few years of clinical work to become a psychologist
there are moments of feeling a sense of greater competence, reaching a moment of clarity
and slightly altered perspective. Then, self-doubt and confusion set in again. Learning to be
a therapist is more akin to dancing on carpet than a vertical climb: each shuffle stirring static
anxiety we discharge on those around us. During fleeting moments of savoring pride, we
may reflect and smile to ourselves, “I think I’ve finally gotten it.” But what has been gained
and how are the changes to be understood?
During the first two years of supervised clinical training I struggled to integrate
theory and practice to develop my sense of confidence and competence. The first year was
strange. I felt more like a fraud than a therapist – that while I was trying out the role of a
therapist the identity of a therapist did not yet fit with my sense of who I was. I did not feel
I had a coherent way to think and speak about my cases, let alone supervise and guide myself
through the course of treatment, which I believed being able to integrate theory a nd practice
would allow. I had a vocabulary of technical concepts, but I did not have a way to discern if
what the client was doing and saying was an example of one of these concepts. Even more
distressing was the realization that I did not have a way to discern whether what I was doing
was an example of one of these concepts. My professor would ask, “Why did you do that?”
I would think to myself, “How should I know why, I’m not sure what it is you’ve noticed
I’ve done!” I wanted a language for understanding my clinical experiences – not to naively
try and fit the client into a box, but to empower myself to be able to learn from texts that
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used these concepts and employ the theory to help deepen my relationship with my clients
and provide more effective interventions.
While having been exposed to several theoretical orientations, the one I became
most interested in pursuing was object-relations theory. During my third year of doctoral
work I was required to be supervised by a licensed psychologist practicing in the
metropolitan area. The department had a list of several psychologists who had been working
with the department under individual contracts as adjunct faculty. Near the end of my
second year of training, I learned that two of these adjunct faculty supervisors were
resigning. I saw an opportunity and received permission to contact Dr. R and asked her to
supervise my work for the following year.
I became interested in working with Dr. R after hearing secondhand tales of her
group supervision and staff presentations on working with personality disorders to the
community mental health center where I had been working for twelve months. A “yes but
no” refrain characterized the other therapists’ reactions to her work and her style: “I was
really impressed by the level of insight, but I could never say things like that to my clients –
they’d leave the room!” “It’s amazing . . . But she’s too direct for me;” “I’m sure she’d
make you work hard as a supervisor, but she’s not for the faint-hearted.” Who was this
woman who drew such strongly ambivalent reactions from professional clinicians? My
sense was that Dr. R was one of those people whose direct manner can put-off some people,
yet they couldn’t completely dislike her because on some level they liked and respected what
she had to say. All I knew at the time was that she had been trained by James Masterson,
earning certificates in the practice and supervision of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and was
currently on the faculty of the Masterson Institute for psychoanalytic psychotherapy. It was
not until I started supervision that I learned, she had been supervised for six years by
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Alberto Pieczanski, MD., a Kleinian analyst trained at the Tavistock and Portman Clinics
and a member of the British Psychoanalytic Society – supervision that she continues to this
day.
Perhaps what appealed to me about this was that I still felt frustration about the
quality of my work. I believed I hadn’t harmed any of my clients, but I wasn’t sure I had
helped them either, let alone be able to critique and redirect my work on my own.
Retrospectively, I was frustrated that a broad exposure to different therapy schools left me
without a solid foundation from which to evaluate the relative merits or demerits of the
different schools of thought and practice. It’s like the difference between deciding to
become a martial artist but instead of picking one martial art and devoting years to its
mastery you train for two years in Judo, two years in Karate, and two years in Kung Fu, and
then believe you’re a martial artist of six years. Well, you may be in the sense you can
practice a little of each, but you’re not going to be able to handle the challenges that a person
who has spent six years studying one of them will be able to, let alone handle them with the
grace and artistry that only comes with focused discipline.
From reading object-relations theory and examples of its clinical application, I had
come to appreciate it for its conceptual complexity and clinical application for the treatment
of persons struggling with what are known as the “personality disorders.” I had developed
an interest in working with people who struggled with personality issues, but I did not feel
equipped to work with the unique challenges these clients present. In short, after two years
of clinical work I did not feel as though I had a good enough grasp on what I was doing, nor
how to monitor, learn, and grow more independently as a clinician. So I thought Dr. R
might be the right person to supervise my work.
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“Since we have never met before, what happens if after working together for a while
you decide to change your mind?” Dr. R asked, having heard my request and a description
of the university’s contract. I told her that the only time I had been angered by a supervisor
or professor’s ego was when it got in the way of doing the work, and that that was the only
way I could see things becoming a problem. We next spoke three or four months later to
schedule our first meeting.
I began thinking about this study in the context of my excitement and enthusiasm
about working with Dr. R: using her suggestions in the treatment of my clients, noticing how
things changed in the treatment, and noticing the interest of fellow students when I told
stories about my experience. After discussing with some of my fellow students her
supervisory style and some of the Kleinian techniques and conceptual terms I had been
learning, I decided I wanted to study “what was happening” in my sessions in some way as a
result of my supervision.
The following chapters employ an interpretive methodology to articulate “what was
happening” in one session with one patient after two years of supervision with Dr. R,
participation in my own psychotherapy, and readings in Klein and contemporary Kleinians
who:
differ from Klein in their de-emphasizing and deferring detailed reconstructions of
early developmental history. They prefer instead to stay, for as long as possible,
close to, almost fixed to, the shifts of unconscious fantasy in the here-and-now
clinical situation and most of all the transference. … These Kleinians further differ
from Melanie Klein in their emphasis on induced countertransference as an
invaluable form of communication or least a source of information. Specifically,
they try to understand countertransference in terms of projective identification, that
is, the analysands’s unconsciously allocating to the analyst negative or positive
aspects of his or her own self or other internal objects in order to get rid of them,
use them for the control of others, or protect them from internal destructiveness …
these Kleinians no longer [unlike Klein] consistently or prominently emphasize
bodily organs as primitively conceived part objects representing total relationships
(e.g., the devouring breast). They focus much more on what might be called organ
modes such as taking in or emptying out, and also on functions such as thinking,
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understanding, connecting, and remembering. In general, they use terms that
correspond closely to conventional experience in human relationships, such as hope,
despair, dependency, denial, and idealization. Additionally, they no longer engage in rapidfire, symbol-laden interpretations of whatever manifest content comes their way,
being rather measured in the speed and quantity of their interpretations, as well as
oriented toward gathering immediate evidence on which to base each aspect of their
interventions. They favor “showing” over “telling” what’s what … these Kleinians
seem to find signs of transference in everything, I shall discuss next this way of
looking at events in the analytic session. In order to do so, it will be necessary to
take up as well countertransference, projective identification, containment … for
these concepts are intertwined with here-and-now transference analysis. (Schafer,
1997, pp. 4-5, emphasis in original)
Likewise, the following chapters aim to examine and articulate “this way of looking at
events” from the perspective of a novice who has been intent on learning and integrating it
with his own practice of psychotherapy even though it is not psychoanalysis. If the
following interpretive analysis is successful, the reader who is not familiar with the technical
jargon in the quote above, will, by the end of the dissertation, be able to understand the
distinctions Schafer is making. For the reader who is familiar with the technical terminology,
my hope is that by the end of the dissertation my work bears some resemblance to what
Schafer is describing.

3. The feed
With regard to the symbolic level, the interpreter has to deal with implicit, deepseated ontological assumptions held by the subject she investigates. These
assumptions provide a “horizon of intelligibility” for an infinite number of possible
utterances and applications that are open to subjects within the realm of a specific
symbolic order. Thus, the target of critical interpretation is this existing “ground of
possibility” that makes specific beliefs and convictions look rationally acceptable to
the subjects themselves. Kögler (1996, p. 259)
In their developed forms, phantasy thinking and reality thinking are distinct mental
processes, different modes of obtaining satisfaction. The fact that they have a
distinct character when fully developed, however, does not necessarily imply that
reality-thinking operates quite independently of unconscious phantasy … In our
view, reality-thinking cannot operate without concurrent and supporting
unconscious phantasies; e.g., we continue to ‘take things in’ with our ears, to ‘devour’
with our eyes, to ‘read, mark, learn and inwardly digest’, throughout life.
These conscious metaphors represent unconscious psychic reality. It is a familiar
fact that all early learning is based upon oral impulses. The first seeking and
mouthing and grasping of the breast is gradually shifted to other objects, the hand
and eye only slowly gaining independence of the mouth, as instruments of
exploration and of knowing the outer world. … Perception and intelligence draw
upon this source of libido for their life and growth. Hand and eye retain an oral
significance throughout life, in unconscious phantasy and often, as we have seen, in
conscious metaphor. (Isaacs, 1952, pp. 108-109)
Imagine a home where there is a baby and his mother. The baby is on a feeding
schedule and around the time he is due for his next feeding he starts to move and sound in
such a way that the mother turns to you, her friend, and says, “oh, he’s cranky, he must be
hungry. Let me get his bottle ready.” The mother gets everything ready and sits down to
feed him, talking to him the whole time as if he understands what she is saying. She burps
him, returns to you at the table and continues your conversation while intermittently turning
to him to keep him entertained. This vignette is not surprising. Everything seems
completely plausible. Yet what may seem odd is to characterize it as an example of
Foucault’s definition of power relations: relations where actions act on the actions of the
participants to influence or shape their experience and subsequent behavior. (cf., Foucault,
1982, p. 220). Of course the power relations are asymmetrical since the baby
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is utterly dependent on his mother for all of his survival requirements, whereas she has other
sources and resources at her disposal for securing her own.
This is one way that the therapeutic interaction of CKPP “is a feeding on the model
of a baby and its mother” as Dr. R had told me time and again. It is viewed as an
asymmetrical relationship where the patient is dependent on the therapist’s specialized
practices and understanding to examine what he or she needs and is unable to provide for
him or herself – hence, the reason the patient ends up seeking a therapist. There are other
similarities as well. The times of these feedings are regular – if it were a psychoanalysis they
would repeat daily at the same time, four or five days a week. Third, the feedings are
focused on the requirements of the patient and the therapist’s role is to figure out the
requirements with the patient and provide them within that role, which, as Segal writes “is
confined to interpreting the patient’s material, and all criticism, advise, encouragement,
reassurance, and the like, is rigorously avoided” (Segal, 1981, p. 3). Fourth, the setting of the
feeding is set up so the patient, like the baby, is made to feel as comfortable and secure as
possible – a feeding baby is spared anxieties about being dropped, for example, while feeding
(the mother holds the baby so all he or she has to focus on is the experience of feeding, as it
were.). Likewise, the patient is assured that the room within which the feeding occurs is free
of outside distractions, including privacy concerns so he or she can focus on purpose of
their visit.
Finally, there is the expectation that what the patient and therapist do together is
based on how they understand what each other is doing. The mother’s actions depend on
how she interpreted his sounds and gestures – his communications. Her interpretation that
“he’s cranky. He must be hungry…” is made possible by a backdrop of understanding, her
preunderstanding that “is internally differentiated into a symbolic sphere of basic beliefs and
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assumptions [of what constitutes baby reality], a practical sphere of acquired habits and
practices [how she’s learned to handle feeding], and a subjective sphere that reflects
biographical events and experiences [he likes to be held this way and not that]”. (Kögler,
1996, p. 251). But can the same be said of the infant’s actions? In what sense can an infant
be said to have a preunderstanding? Is not the infant’s “relief” and “pleasure” after feeding
just a physiological reflex? Can it be characterized as an understanding? Within the Kleinian
tradition, the answer to that question is an unequivocal yes. The baby is born with an
apparatus (a PRIMITIVE or early EGO) for understanding what the mother does through
his or her experience of the mother and a repertoire of “practices” (called PHANTASIES)
for dealing with its ongoing developing set of basic beliefs and assumptions about his or
herself, the mother, and the world (called OBJECT RELATIONS). Moreover, the set of
basic assumptions of the Kleinian tradition includes the beliefs that these infantile practices
persist through adult hood, informing or shaping the person’s sense of who they are and
what constitutes reality between people, particularly the painful realities that motivate people
to come into therapy.12
The following analysis shows that CKPP is a kind of critical hermeneutics in so far as
critical hermeneutics:
…undertakes to lay out a concept of reflexivity-in-interpretation that allows the
individual to distance herself from the taken-for-granted background of symbolic
assumptions and social practices. The critical practice of self-distanciation is to bring
about a heightened sense of self-understanding, and enlightened insight into usually
hidden linkages between symbolic relations and social networks of power. Such
critical practice aims at a reflexive understanding of the usually unnoticed
implications of meaning in the reproduction of social power mechanisms.
(ibid., pp.251-252)

12

As Segal writes regarding a primary difference between classical Freudian technique and Kleinian technique:
“All the patient’s communications in the session are viewed as containing an element of unconscious phantasy,
though they may seem concerned with incontrovertible external facts” (Segal, 1981, p. 8)
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In this citation, Kögler is referring to “social networks of power” in the sense of macro
social networks that regulate entire cultures or subcultures. However, social relations of
power exist at the level of two people, like the mother and the infant and the patient and the
therapist. The way CKPP employs “reflexivity-in-practice” that allows the patient to selfdistanciate is through the communicative behavior of the therapist; the therapist performs it,
embodies it – feeds it to the patient as a practice by making assertions about the patient’s
sense of herself as she experiences her interaction with the therapist, providing an occasion
for her to notice how she participates in constructing and relating the identities that structure
her experience. In other words, by communicating as a certain kind of Other, the patient
has the opportunity to gain potentially emancipatory insights into him or herself. In
Kögler’s language, “With the loss of the Cartesian and Hegelian subject, the other becomes
the point of departure for critical insights into the self” (p. 252).
Specifically, the analysis below shows how the author, as therapist and novice of
CKPP, communicated or “fed” such “critical insights” to the patient, Mrs. P, about herself.
The “insights” are sightings/citations of alterity, which ultimately raised the saliency of a
fearful voice that belongs to a dying orphan-self, which, ironically, perpetuates its
orphanness (self-understanding/experience) through employing a practice of power –
deflecting speech practices to distance the Other. The how of this citation making is broken
down into three aspects: the setting or ‘scene’ of the feeding, ‘the food,’ and the manner or
approach of ‘the feeding’ – how it was adjusted for consumption. While all three of these
aspects were operative throughout the session, overlapping with one another, it would be
too cumbersome rhetorically to examine them all at once. So, as is the case with many
things, what can be separated for purposes of analysis cannot be in practice.
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The scene
It’s about 2:55 on a late September afternoon, 2001, barely a few weeks after the
disastrous attack on the World Trade Centers. I will be seeing Mrs. P in a few minutes for
our 6th meeting together since she started treatment. It’s our last session before she takes
time off to attend her daughter’s wedding out of state. It is also our last week of once- aweek therapy as Mrs. P agreed with my recommendation that she come for therapy at least
twice-per-week. Outside the office I hear the outer door open and some wheels roll into the
waiting area. The rolling wheels belong to a medium-size suitcase Mrs. P uses as a portable
office, pulling it to and fro from one end of the campus to another – highlighting her hurried
look, like a stewardess crossing from one late plane to another, putting out customer
complaints along the way with pressurized warmth and smiles.
The office is rectangular in shape, with an east-west orientation – when the doors are
open to the outer hall I can see the morning sun as it rises in the east. The desk faces north
at one end of the room, opposite the door. The chair Mrs. P uses faces me but not directly.
Her direct line of sight intersects mine at an obtuse angle, such that she must turn her head
to the right at about 2 or 3 o’clock to make direct eye contact. Mrs. P, a thin, handsome,
late-middle-age woman, mother, and intern in pastoral counseling, works for the same
university based hospital that sponsors the psychology internship program where I am
working.
I open the door and call her name, leaving the door open as I return to my chair
behind the desk. Propping one ankle on the other knee while leaning back in the chair
creates just enough room for my arms to rest comfortably on the tablet in my lap. Mrs. P
rolls in her carry-on office, sits down, and then gets up, remembering that she has something
she wants to give me. Following Dr. R’s instruction some two years earlier, I say nothing
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once I sit down and wait for Mrs. P to start talking – or doing whatever she feels the urge to
do.
Mrs. P found the envelope she’s been looking for and hands it to me, explaining:
001
002

The three or four of these are the silences that I wasn’t able to come up with anything for. I’m trying
to survive his week.

After writing down what she says, I open the envelope and see that she has handed me a
‘Sentence Completion’ form – two pages of incomplete sentences that require the
respondent to write in the answers. The “silences” Mrs. P mentions (001) refer to three
blanks or sentences that she did not complete, even though she had the form for three
weeks.
Mrs. P, by taking the initiative to talk, shows that she understands my silence as a
sign that she should begin the session by taking the first turn. Her opening utterances (001002) are explanations for the incompleteness of the form – much like the fact that one feels
the need to explain a “no” when invited to do something, but not a “yes” since “yes” is the
culturally preferred response to a request. It is as if Mrs. P is saying, “I’m too busy to do
them.” After all, in work settings the expression “I’m trying to survive” is usually taken as
an expression of busyness. Emotionally, it is not clear how she is grasping the form, herself
or myself. Is she too busy as in too busy to bother with such a stupid request, or too busy as
in I’m sorry I’ve failed and feel bad? In any event, her second utterance is unclear with
regard to the context against which “I’m trying to survive” is to be understood. Is she trying
to survive at this moment, yesterday, the last two days, etc.?
“One of the easiest ways to hurt me is…,” “In relationship to me I wish men would
…,” “In relationship to me I wish women would…” I read over the sentences she left
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blank. While I don’t recall what I thought, here is what I wrote down before I said it to Mrs.
P:
003
004

I think you’re feeling overwhelmed inside and don’t know quite how to deal with the feelings of
being scared inside.
In conversation analysis (CA) one examines a subsequent utterance to discern how

the participant understood the prior one. This response shows that I understood the topic
Mrs. P forwarded for discussion was something about her state-of-being at the moment –
the temporal context is the on-going moment of “you’re,” the second-person singular
contraction, present tense of ‘to be.’ This state – or identity – was understood as being
desperate, based is seems on her identity claim, “I’m trying to survive this week.” However,
it should be noted that this is an unconventional move, since most of the time if one hears
comments like Mrs. P’s one interprets them lightly, as if mere tongue-in-cheek hyperbole,
particularly if one is speaking in the work setting to a coworker.
In terms of the interpersonal movements or pragmatics of emotion, my move shows
interest in who she is as the focus of my attention, an attempt to move closer to her concern.
However, as an initiate of CKPP there is a body of knowledge and tradition of technique
that talks about what I was doing in a highly specialized way. Specifically, part of my role as
Mrs. P’s therapist is to maintain the optimal conditions thought necessary for therapy to
occur; these optimal conditions are called the FRAME of therapy. The rules that make up
the FRAME include the fee, time of regularly scheduled appointments, privacy, and
guidelines for when, what, and how to speak, as well as guidelines for when, what, and what
not to do.
One of the first ‘rules’ I learned from Dr. R was to stop saying anything at the
beginning of the session and to let the patient begin, unless there is something I need to
mention that requires an exploration of the patient’s reaction – as in the case of having to
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cancel an appointment. The reason for this is that even something that seems benign, like,
“How are you today?” can impinge on the patient, since it invites an “fine” or could invite a
report on things, which some people (including the therapist) can use to avoid talking about
what is really bothering them (and may be upsetting for the therapist to hear). So, if I were
to start the session by speaking it may restrict Mrs. P’s freedom to begin wherever she
wanted to begin, which is what I was interested in – because where she begins and what she
begins with provides the entry point for examination. In the event I have something to tell
Mrs. P that alters the frame (like changing appointments) that warrants exploration, her
response to what I have introduced becomes the entry point. In the jargon, by refraining
from speaking at the outset, I minimize possible “contamination” of the patient’s presenting
MATERIAL – whatever they say and do, in this case at the beginning.
In other words, the FRAME I have learned is made up of rules; it is an apparatus of
controlled conditions – for the operation of establishing and testing hypotheses or
preconceptions as they structure the “horizon of intelligibility” in Kögler’s language. 13 They
are the conditions that allow the phenomenon to be examined, just as scientific experiments
require controlled conditions. In the laboratory of therapy, however, it is about exposing
through trial-and-error hypothesis testing the regime that governs the occurrence of misery
in each unique patient’s life, component by component. And by exposing these
components, patients have the chance to recognize them, how they figure into their
problematic experiential present, and to decide what they want to do about them now. In
short “maintaining the frame” as the topic is called in the literature, is about maintaining the

Of course, this is not to say that the manner of speaking is not important. The statements I make in the
following sessions can be said with a soft tone, for example, while still not conveying either approval or
disapproval of the patient’s experience, beliefs, or behavior. The tightrope here involves showing acceptance
(interest + compassion = acceptance) without indicating either approval or disapproval.
13
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conditions necessary for examining together at the edges of the unknown in the person’s life
(the UNCONSCIOUS), so it can be thought as it is experienced.
Early in my training with Dr. R she gave me a sheet of paper entitled Case
Presentation, which has been scanned into this document (Figure 1, p. 60, below). This
sheet provides an outline for formally presenting a psychoanalytic case. Dr. R told me that
our supervision – and my therapeutic practice – would focus on the questions listed under
section 6, the “Description of the therapeutic relationship.” Although listed as four items,
over the last two years I have memorized them with slightly different wording and broken
the first question into two separate questions to make remembering them easier, I suppose:
“What is the main anxiety?” is one of the questions. The others are: “How does the person
see you?,” “What does the person do with what I say?,” “How are they trying to use you?,”
and “What does it feel like inside to be with this person?” These questions provide a
structured entry point for examining the patient’s PSYCHIC REALITY and how it is
organized – created, recreated, maintained, and perpetuated. – outside their everyday
awareness.
In the lingo of contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic psychotherapy (CKPP), the
phenomenon to be jointly examined is the patient’s PSYCHIC REALITY ( cf., Caper, 1999;
Hinshelwood, 1994; Segal, 1964; Spillius, 1994), specifically, the part of PSYCHIC
REALITY that causes misery, the PATHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (cf., Steiner,
1993). While there terms will be defined more fully as this interpretive study proceeds, a bit
more detail is in order to explain why my speech specified (003-004) “inside” as the context
for the topic of Mrs. P’s feeling “overwhelmed” and “scared.”
As I have learned from Dr. R, the opening speech of the patient is very important,
since it gives the clearest indication of the patient’s MAIN ANXIETY of the moment, prior
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to any input from me during the session, an anxiety that shapes whatever the patient says or
does during the session and therefore provides the touchstone for the therapist’s
interventions. This anxiety is based on the patient’s INTERNAL OBJECTS – his or her
early ways of experiencing states-of-mind in relation to important people (a.k.a.
EXTERNAL OBJECTS) that are felt to be inside, what we “contain” within the boundary

Figure 1
Psychoanalytic Case Presentation
Document
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of the “me” – the “parts” of ourselves that make up our sense of identity. PSYCHICH
REALITY is made up of INTERNAL OBJECTS that mediate how events and people are
experienced (interpreted, understood, and related to), because:
Our internal objects are manifestations of both how our objects feel or act towards
us and how we feel and act towards our objects. The two combine to produce an
object that we unconsciously experience as being inside us in a very specific state; we
are in a very specific relationship to them, and they are in a very specific relationship
to us. That is, we are doing something to them and they are doing something to us
in kind to us. … while what we call a state of mind may be the same as an internal
object, our internal objects – detailed unconscious phantasies of what we contain –
are far more vivid, detailed and varied than our ordinary vocabulary for states of
mind – such as depression, guilt, love, security, elation, and so on – can convey. A
large amount of the time consumed by psychoanalysis is devoted to capturing the
very details, nuances, and ramifications of the states of mind so crudely represented
by these terms. (Caper, 1999, p. 56)
PSYCHIC REALITY, then, is made up of INTERNAL OBJECTS which are far
from static, discrete things; they are made up of micro, narrative-like structures called
PHANTASIES (spelled with a PH to denote that they are unconscious) that are graphic
recordings of (1) our external objects existing inside us in (2) some condition or other as a
result of our relationship to them, displaying (3) some intention towards us on that basis.
(cf., Isaacs, 1952) In other words, INTERNAL OBJECTS refer to our dynamic and
recycling identity dramas – our shifting “states of mind” as people say – with self-part A
doing something X to object-part B, which in response wants to do Y to A, and so on, all
linked by a logic of emotion that predates linguistic understanding.14

14

Hinshelwood(1991) offers the following definition of the UNCONSCIOUS as it is understood by Kleinian
in terms of PHANTASY and OBJECT RELATIONS:
The unconscious is structured like a small society. That is to say, it is a mesh of relationships between
objects. And unconscious phantasy is a state of activity of one or more of these ‘internal’ object relations…. Thus a somatic sensation [instinct] tugs along with it a mental experience of a
relationship with a object that causes the sensation, is believed to be motivated to cause the sensation
and is loved or hated by the ego according to whether the sensation is pleas ant or unpleasant. In this
way a sensation that hurts becomes a mental representation of a relationship with ‘bad’ object that is
intending to hurt and damage the ego. The unconscious – and, indeed, the mind, – is constructed of sensations
interpreted as relationships with objects. This concept eventually departed from the classical psychoanalytic
theory of mental energy. (pp. 467-468, emphasis added)
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Continuing the example of the mother feeding her baby can illustrate how this
process might occur. Suppose the baby is a six month old, lying in his crib around feeding
time. His mouth is puckering and he is making a sucking motion with his lips. After some
time he starts to cry for food, but his mother is too busy to come for some time and when
she finally does he continues to cry even when presented with the bottle. After some cooing
and comforting, he finally settled in for a good feeding. From the Kleinian view, we could
say he initially soothed his hunger (urge or INSTINCT) for food by hallucinating the
experience of being fed by the gratifying breast (hence, sucking at the air is the bodily
expression of the phantasy). However, as the pain grew in his stomach, this distortion of
reality no longer worked (his mother was not really there) and in his pain he began to feel as
though he would die. Outraged, he phantasizes that he was pained on purpose by a nasty,
withholding breast (persecutory object) that he hated. When his mother finally arrived (the
external object) was resisted at first because within the context of pain and anger she was
grasped as bad and persecuting (a distortion of her identity). The language of phantasies and
internal objects is thus a way to articulate in language what was a sequential chain of
experiences before language that constituted the infant’s experience based on his sense of
himself (identity) in relation to his sense of his mother (how he sighted her identity). “The
earliest phantasies, then, spring from bodily impulses and are interwoven with bodily
sensations and affects. They express primarily an internal and subjective reality, yet from the
beginning they are bound up with an actual, however, limited and narrow, experience of
objective reality” (Isaacs, 1952, p. 93).
Hence, while Mrs. P’s speech was vague in regard to the context to which she was
referring in her opening utterances, mine was not. I sighted/cited “trying to survive” as her
state of mind tied to her insides (“inside you” 003) as she sat across from me, invoking that
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elastic, vague, and invisible yet experientially real boundary line that divides the sense of
oneself from someone else, the “me” from the “not me” – referred to in the jargon as one’s
PSYCHIC SKIN (cf., Bick, 1967/1988). In regard to the question of what is Mrs. P’s
MAIN ANXIETY, my utterance, an assertion, was positing the theory that it had to do with
“feeling overwhelmed” and “scared,” although it could not be more specific without further
MATERIAL to interpret.
005
006
007
008
009
010
011
012
013
014
I 015

Mmmhmm…[T] Yeah, and it’s ironic too because at the same time I feel like I’m making progress
in my new post and in a way my confidence in growing. In one sense it’s all brand new and in
another it’s what I’ve always thrived on – it’s like crisis. It’s not always successful – the visitations
with patients. When people in crisis or end of life issues, but it somehow works out – but it’s a
success when I make out a report and evaluate my work, but I guess at the same time I go with
whatever is my fear or maybe I’m making someone else’s fear my own. Oh, in chaplaincy I saw it
addressed this week on television this whole things of counselors being sought out like madmen doing
all these services and work. It’s what people demand or ask for. But the chaplains are probably the
most pathetic ones when you get a group together you say, “I don’t know what to say,” which gets
people to talk about fear. Whatever I’m afraid of when someone is going to get in there, on my fear
deflect them.

016
017
018

And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of you got
scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept. It’s like you drop your feelings
that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them.
Initially, Mrs. P ratifies my understanding (003-004) and interest in her fear about

being overwhelmed – the [T] in my notes indicates moments where Mrs. P began to tear.
She then describes something (her state, her identity, her week, both?) as “ironic” (L 005),
not what it seems. Given the “it’s” point of contrast is “progress” and “confidence,” (L
005-006) she seems to be elaborating on “overwhelmed” (L 003) and “scared” (L 004).
However, she has shifted the context from the here and now of the relationship with me to
the context of her work – her “new post” (L 006). She continues the parallels of progressconfidence with “not always successful” (007) – “somehow works out” (008) to my original
overwhelmed-scared. Schematically, Figure 2 (below, left) shows the progression of these
topics in three different contexts. My comment was geared at context A, the here and now
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concern of Mrs. P and her emotional state. She shifts to her work context in the hospital
(B), in which case lines 006-007, “In one sense it’s all brand new and in another it’s what I’ve
always thrived on – it’s like crisis” may be a narrative abstract, summarizing the point of the
story(ies?) she wants to tell (context C, the 9/11 crisis). However, her utterances never tell a
complete narrative; they offer fragments of narratives – a character here, a situation there,
but nothing complete.
Indeed, with the speed of
an on-line conversation, or even
an initial reading, her responses
produce a dissonance of
understanding. If this were said
in an everyday conversation the
expected reply might be,
“What?” even though Mrs. P
returns to the topic of her fear at
the end. So, the pragmatic effect of her speech practice is to derail understanding or
“alignment” in the terms of CA.
This is important, because Mrs. P’s move in response to mine is to produce speech
that cannot be interpreted using the basic set of conversational principles that make everyday
conversation possible – Grice’s cooperative principle and maxims: “say no more or no less
than is necessary,” “be relevant,” “say what you believe to be true and can back up,” “be
clear” (cf., Nofsinger, 1991, pp. 36-39). Yet the conversation continued. I made a response.
So, there must be a conversational principle governing CKPP that informed how I made
sense of her extended turn.
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My response to her extended turn shows that I understood her utterances in the
context of her experience of herself and myself in the therapy – “And I’m seeing it in
here…” I understood the “people” in “gets people to talk about fear” and the “someone”
in “when someone is going to get in there on my fear” to be my references to myself. I’m
the one who brought up the topic of fear and the one who is posing the subject as
something “inside” her while she is sitting across from me.
Again, this indicates that another conversational principle is at work that
differentiates this kind of therapeutic conversation from an everyday conversation. In an
everyday conversation someone listening to Mrs. P would probably initiate some kind of
repair, perhaps saying something like “What? I didn’t follow you.” Utterances in everyday
conversation can certainly have more than one meaning. This is the assumption of symbolic
expression that calls for interpretation, as defined by Ricoeur (1970, p. 18):
A symbol exists …where linguistic expression lends itself by its double or multiple
meanings to a work of interpretation… No doubt a symbol is, in the Greek sense of
the word, an “enigma”… Enigma does not block understanding but provokes it;
there is something to unfold, to “dis-implicate” in symbols. That which arouses
understanding is precisely the double meaning, the intending of the second meaning
in and through the first.
However, to respond as I did requires the assumption that these meanings are not
randomly organized. In this case they seem to be viewed as able to designate a second thing
(our relationship) through a first (what she does with some other). Thus far, the scene is a
set up for a conversation where Mrs. P’s identity and the practices subtending that sense of
herself are the subjects to be understood in the context of our ongoing relationship, in the
here and now context. So, in addition to the other elements of the FRAME discussed
above, a central part of the scene of feeding might be stated as the following conversational
principle: “listen to what the patient says as though he or she were talking about herself, you,
or the two of you.” In other words, the second meanings inferred from this are presumed to
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have a direction as a response to the “feeding situation.” Perhaps Mrs. P’s response has to
do with the food and the elements that make up its formulation.

The food
Retrospectively, Mrs. P’s extended turn shows that she ratified or showed agreement
in another way – she performatively showed me herself as “overwhelmed,” projecting it as
an actor projects a persona. She did being-overwhelmed by speaking in a way that was too much
to understand, a cul-de-sac of thought that, a few months later, she would come to call her
“curlicue thinking.” In terms of the feeding trope, the question might be: what was she
reacting to in the food? Just as people sometimes say, “he was feeding me a line” or “I’m
not going to swallow that,” what was I feeding her that she had a hard time swallowing?
This section addresses the question through analyzing the turns we took in more
detail. First, through a closer examination of her response to my first speaking turn, the
interpretive analysis shows that it was the notion that I as needed Other might understand her
as fearful-in-a-state-of-crisis, a notion to which she reacted with anxiety manifested as deflecting
speech. In other words, her extended turn reveals that she understood my utterances as
identifying her in relation to myself, a move to which she has a reaction. In the jargon, what
was upsetting was a kind of OBJECT RELATION that she understood me to be talking
about in my response to her. This communicative move is one characteristic of CKPP.
Second, analyzing my subsequent response and comparing it with the first yields six other
characteristics of CKPP. These elements make up the ingredients, so to speak, of the food I
have been learning to feed as an initiate of CKPP; they allowed me to “formulate” my
INTERPRETATIONS. Finally, a closer look at her next turn reveals the pragmatic effect
of this kind of feeding: it puts the patient in a self-distanciated position for examining her
experience as a self – a linguistically embedded subject or perspective in a field of issues. My
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interpretive utterances provided an opportunity for noticing how her own social practices
contribute to that self, which, in turn, provided an opportunity to be some other way in relation
to the Other in that field of issues as a subject. However, this opportunity is not easy to take
in practice, as the remaining section of the analysis will show.
Contrary to the apparent senselessness of Mrs. P’s first extended turn, her utterances
were an attempt on the part of Mrs. P to swallow (or not) an identity that is disturbing – a
struggle, or conflict of identity.15 Based on her responses, my utterances 003-004, in effect,
project an image of Mrs. P as a person facing questionable survival and desperation, who
needs help – and implied by the therapy context, one who is there for my help as the needed
Other.
In response to my move, Mrs. P shifts from a focus on a familiar “crisis” (007)
aspect of her life to another person who is in crisis, the crisis of facing the loss of losing him
or herself (“end of life issues”, 008). In picking situation C, she is choosing a context where
she is in the role of helping the person in crisis – Mrs. P uses her speaking turn to shift from
talking about her crisis with me as her therapist, where her identity is patient, to a situation
where she is the needed one helping someone else in crisis – that “works out”(008), is a
“success” when she reports on it (009), where her identity is that of healer. Adding to this
successful healer identity is the notion of one who is needed, having, “what people demand
or ask for” (012) as she shifts tracks again to a context where ministers are sought after (in
the wake of September 11th). In other words, she moves from so-so healer, to successful

The notion of “swallowing identity” is purposely left ambiguous here. On the one hand, the expression
indexes a variant of colloquial expression, as when someone says, “he’s trying to feed me a line” or “I’m not
going to swallow that bull shit.” On the other hand, the deployment of the expression here anticipates the
further explication in the following chapters of Kleinian discourse as a symbolic system circumscribed by the
bodily tropes of the infant-mother dyad (the tropography of CKPP). The fullest explication will be addressed
in the final chapter of the study, where the swallowing of identity is argued to be a very material discursive
accomplishment: the appropriation of a new or altered sense of the self – the understanding of bodily
experience as it is brought into language and interpreted relationally.
15
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healer, to needed-healer-in-demand, inverting the valence of the identity she herself agreed
with at first (005), from “one down” to “one up,” as it were, as if my observation and the
identity put forth registered as an affront or risk to her sense of status.
In terms of emotional work, de Rivera contends that anxiety is the emotion we
employ when facing an identity that exposes us to danger, in the attempt to deny the new
identity and hold on to the previous one that promises interpersonal security.16 Perhaps,
then, Mrs. P’s opening lines and hurried behavior were pragmatically geared to argue or
make the communicative case for an identity of the too-busy-needed-successful-healer-to-those-incrisis, to which my opening remarks would fly in contradiction, leading her to expand her
case, so to speak, in her subsequent talk by providing evidence through shifting contexts to
B and C.17 Yet, she also agrees with my assessment both verbally and non verbally,
contradicting her own identity-argument. And it is the identity of overwhelmed-fearful person that
she returns to, “But the chaplains are the most pathetic ones when you get a group together
you say, “I don’t know what to say,” which gets people to talk about fear. Whatever I’m
afraid of when someone is going to get in there on my fear I deflect them.” (lines 013-015)
This return provides some important clues for interpreting her difficulty with the identities I
forwarded in 003-004 relating who I was in relation to who she was as fearful-in-need-of
help.

De Rivera writes, “Later the experience of anxiety occurs when the person considers accepting responsibility
for actions and emotions that would lead to an identity that, he believes, would occasion withdrawal of the
other. The anxiety essentially instructs the person to deny this responsibility, to say “that isn’t me,” and thus
hold on to the old self and relationship whose abandonment is threatened. While this moves the person away
from the new identity, it defends him against a loss of belonging to the other.” (deRivera, 1977, pp. 49-50)
17 In CA an argument is viewed as interactive disagreement over either (1) the failure of one participant to
respond in the desired way to a preceding action, for example, getting a “no” instead of a “yes,” or (2) the
propositional content of a turn. (cf., Nofsinger, 1991, pp. 146-154) Applying this view to the communicative
account of getting emotional, then, suggests that non-verbal arguments can occur over identity claims since
emotionality is motivated by “identity goals” using “identity claims … to influence a specific target person”
(Parkinson, 1995, pp. 274-291).
16
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The interpretive analysis shows that Mrs. P grasped my initial utterances anxiously,
not wanting to be grasped by me as the-needed-other by her as fearful-in-need-of-help, and she tried
to hold onto her identity as overworked-in-demand-healer-to-others to “deflect” me and her
own grasp of me as her needed Other. First, her utterances (013-015) are vague regarding
the context to which they refer – is Mrs. P still talking about the chaplains attending victims
of the World Trade Center crisis? Is she referring to her work at the Hospital? The last
comment is an expressive utterance that brings the subject and object of the action back to
herself – “I’m afraid …” – although the time and place of the situation is not clear, since
“whenever” is not spatio-temporally specific. Second, Mrs. P belongs to the category of
chaplains; it is her “new post” (006), while I belonged to the category of “people” who talk
about fear. Third, consider that the sequence of the events she describes mirrors the events
that happened in the session so far: she starts the session talking about some “silences”
(moments where she doesn’t know what to say), then I talk about fear that is “inside” her
(004), and then she reports on a general rule of certain – but vaguely situated – times of her
life that she is afraid of people getting “in” there “on” (i.e., sighting/citing) her fear and
responds by “deflecting them.” What I am arguing is that these last two lines are a
metacommunication, as if Mrs. P shifts concern from her identity in the moment to what
just happened between us in our communication. Stated differently, Mrs. P indexes the here
and now context by virtue of the sequence of events and general (vague) categories she
describes, rather than the usual indicators of time, space and person (in here, over there, this
here, that there, you, me, and so on), resulting in the apparent lack of contextual referents.
Furthermore, to the extent these lines describe what has been happening in the here and
now, Mrs. P believes that she herself is “pathetic” for not having completed the sentences –
a chaplain who produced “silences” rather than living up to some expectation.
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To feel pathetic is to feel inferior, to fearfully grasp the world as looking down on
one as imperfect with an urge to hide from view; it is a species of shame. It is not a pleasant
way to view the world and oneself; particularly compared with viewing the world as
applauding one for successfully living-up or exceeding what is expected. In other words, it is
the opposite identity to that Mrs. P tries to project in lines 006-012. And since – from the
pragmatic view – every emotional grasp of situation implies an other to whom it is
experienced as a response, we can hypothesize that Mrs. P sighted me as a contemptuous-neededOther, looking down at her identity of fearful as insignificant, without legitimacy – one from
whom she should hide her identity as unacceptable to a dangerous, rejecting Other. 18 The
way she ‘hides’ herself – how she ‘does’ shame in this instance – is to try to maintain the
opposite identity of too-busy successful-needed-healer-to-those-in-crisis and to produce
speech that would not make sense, preventing her from being understood – sighted/cited –
as someone fearful-in-need.
To recap, the interpretive analysis shows that Mrs. P became anxious at the prospect
of being identified in a way that felt shameful as if she sighted/cited me as a rejecting-needed
Other rather than a helpful-needed-Other. Considering this opening section of conversation
spans but minutes in the on-line interchange of the session, a considerable amount of work
has been accomplished. Schematically, this can be summarized in the following way (Figure
2, below).19

Regarding this point, de Rivera (1977, p. 48) writes, “I shall postulate that this is so, that in each of the
emotions where the self is an object of the emotion [anxiety, guilt, panic, security, humility, serenity,
depression, shame, sorrow, confidence, pride, and joy] the self is the object for the movements of an implicit
other.” Importantly, in a footnote to this passage he remarks, “As Dahl (see p. 6) suggests, such a
conceptualization is related to the Freudian conception of internalization. Hence it may possibly serve as a link
between psychoanalytic thought and the ideas of George Herbert Mead and the symbolic interactionists.”
19 This figure is an adaptation of The Ontological Blueprint (Packer, 1993) used to visually represent how
experience is structured based on Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. To summarize simplistically, the
emphasis is that experience is based in the structure of understanding. To apprehend something is to do so in
18

71
Mrs. P forwards or projects (again, as actors “project” a persona) the identity (

)

of important-busy-minister-to-the-fearing-death-needy T1 (time 1). My opening speech
forwards a contrary identity; I showed her that I understood her as needy-one-trying-to“survive”-at-the-moment T2. In response to my move, she agreed then repositioned or
“resubmitted” her initial claim, so to speak, out of anxiety about a shameful or humiliating
identity by shifting the focal point for alignment (èT2) to her identity as a more-or-less
successful healer (m.) to the fearing death needy (n.) in the context of her work in the
hospital (End of life ministry context). However, this attempt to ‘justify’ the initial
identity she argued leads her to shift again. This time it is an appeal to the category to which
she belongs as minister-in-demand-by-those-facing-death-crisis (m to n, 9/11 ministry
situation).

This move leads to a shift in the meaning of chaplain identity from

“counselors being sought out” to “pathetic” and unable to lead a discussion about fear (è
T3

), and how she hides (“I deflect them”) when someone is going “get in there on” that

identity. In a way, it is as if Mrs. P
started to tell parables about her
own two contesting identities –
stories that depict qualities or
attributes of the characters, geared
to encourage the listener/reader to
make comparisons between the
details of the story to the details of
Figure 2

some context of activity, which, along with one’s aims and the concepts at one’s disposal, structures the entity’s
meaning.
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some other system of relations. At least this is one way to understand interpreting what she
talks about as an allegorical or symbolic way to communicate about the therapeutic context.
In CA terms, part of the ongoing work of conversation is “topical coherence” and
my subsequent utterances in the session (T4

) function – in part – to mark the topic as her

behavior of the moment as it was related to her ongoing experience by means of a
“collaborative completion.” In effect, I complete her utterance in 015.
016
017
018

And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of you got
scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept. It’s like you drop your feelings
that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them.

Collaborative completions are a conversational device that “displays alignment
[understanding] between participants.” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 122) through the completion of
the first speaker’s utterance by the second speaker, followed by an acceptance or rejection in
the next turn. My speech indicates the nature of my understanding such that I was able to
anticipate what Mrs. P could recognize about her action and experience closely enough that
it might be accepted. Whether or not Mrs. P would have completed her assertion as I did, or
related what she said (as if to herself) to her current relationship with me, she does agree
with the prepositional content of my speech: “Yeah, I’ve always done that [Tears streaming]
Yeah, I…” (lines 019, below).
Thus far, seven patterns characterize my speaking turns during the session – what I
was feeding. First, they are made in the form of assertions that show my beliefs about Mrs.
P’s reality of-the-moment. They are not directives that operate to commit the addressee to
do something, either in the form of questions, such as the cliché “so, how do you feel about
that?” or mild orders, like “tell me more about that.” Second, they are more or less strongly
anchored to the here and now context – in lines 016-018 “I’m seeing,” “in here,” “when I
just approached,” “you got,” etc., point to the immediate on-line relationship between Mrs.
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P and myself. Third, their topic is selected from what Mrs. P has either said or done first.
Fourth, this topic is selected either from the concepts she employs directly or indirectly. An
example of the latter is “feeling overwhelmed” (003), which describes one way people
belonging to the category of survival-mode would grasp their situation, just as “panicked” or
fear of things “falling apart” (Cf., line 016) might also capture their experience – particularly
if they witnessed the twin towers collapsing. And fifth, these assertions can also take the
form of short narratives in so far as narratives involve the telling of how two or more events
are logically, causally, chronologically or experientially related. Again:
16

17
18

And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of you got
scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept. It’s like you drop your feelings
that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them.

In this case the plot involves something that happened in the moment between the
participants; this is also the first time the first person plural forms (“we,” “us”) are used.
And the final assertion proposes a theory linking how she experiences with what she did.
Summarizing the story: You grasp our identity (“we”) as excluding (can’t “tolerate”) so you
disconnect (“drop”) from an experience (“feeling …overwhelming”).
Sixth, as done previously, this response reflects some of the specialized knowledge I
have learned about CKPP as an initiate. As noted above, my assertion was in the form of a
small narrative articulating or joining her way of getting emotional (marked as “inside” her in
line 003) with her manifest behavior towards me, her object, on the basis of how she may be
grasping my identity as a participant with her. Stated technically, I was marking an OBJECT
RELATION pattern for her and I to talk about – that is, MAKING IT CONSCIOUS by
pointing out how it happened in the room.
In the parlance of CKPP what I did with my speaking turn was to INTERPRET her
DEFENCE against feelings that she was not able to grapple with, “as if we couldn’t tolerate
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them.” (018). This interpretation shows the heuristic application of the questions I learned
from Dr. R (cf., pp. 58-59, above). It consisted of tentative answers, hypotheses, to several
of the questions that shape the investigative apparatus of CKPP. Mrs. P’s MAIN
ANXIETY was cited as “fears of falling apart” (016). What she did with what I said was to
change the subject, “you got scared and deflected us” (016-017). How Mrs. P seemed to be
trying to use me was to help her talk about something else, to avoid feeling shame. She
seemed to be seeing me as one who can’t help her with the magnitude of her upset, “as if we
couldn’t tolerate them” (018). And what it felt like to be with her? I felt anxious about
being able to hold onto her as a patient. Since she had told me that she was taking a week
off I was worried that she was going to terminate therapy. Yet while speaking with her I, at
times, like when Mrs. P would tear, felt that she also needed me. The way I described it for
a case conference presentation was that if there were a caption to the first few sessions it
would read, “I don’t need you please don’t leave me.”
The purpose of these questions about the therapeutic relationship is to provide an
entry point for the on-going elucidation of the problems Mrs. P has dealing with
unmanageable anxiety, “After all, the reason which brings patients into analysis is
fundamentally that they cannot manage anxiety, though it does not mean of course that the
patient is consciously aware of this” (Joseph, 1977/1989, p. 106). And it is through
participating, observing and making judgments about how the patient doesn’t deal with
anxiety in the live, pulsating, on-line relationship with the therapist that each component of
the misery regime can come to light. “In this view, the analyst is not someone who
maintains a ‘neutral’ stance above the fray, but someone who is always being drawn into the
fray, could not do analysis if he were not in the fray, and who does analysis largely by
figuring out what kind of fray he is in.”(Caper, 1999, p. 28).
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The technical term for “the fray” is the “TRANSFERENCE AS THE TOTAL
SITUATION” as articulated by Joseph (1985/1989, p. 167): “…a living relationship in
which there is constant movement and change… [where] everything of importance in the
patient’s psychic organization based on his early and habitual ways of functioning, his
phantasies, impulses, defenses, and conflicts will be lived out in some way in the
transference.”20 “Total situations” are whole experiences or an experience as a whole.
Whole experiences are the stuff of transference – what the patient perceives and believes
about him or herself and the therapist in relation to that self – as manifest in the patient’s
communicative behavior and the therapist’s experience of the patient. As Hinshelwood
writes:
Joseph’s (1985) idea of transference as the ‘total situation’ is not simply restricted to
isolated references to the analyst about which the patient and analyst converse. The
very function of cooperation between them, the arena in which the psychoanalysis
works, is a fulcrum of the patient’s conflicts… In everyday social contact, people
say things ‘for effect’, and this is no less prevalent in the fraught world of the
psychoanalytic consulting room. What the patient does to the analyst, the effects
his words have, have a long history in the patient’s life with his objects. In this sense
there is ‘always something going on’. And so we are more concerned with the
kind of use to which the patient puts the object in order to still anxieties and
conflicts. The patient’s use of the analyst replicates the use of objects in
infancy and childhood. (Hinshelwood, 1994, p. 193, emphasis added)

The trope of therapy-as-mother-feeding-infant has its origin in the assumption that transference (i.e.,
experience) is first structured in infancy, therefore adult experience as the superstructure on this primordial
base is conditioned by its structure. Klein writes:
I shall now draw a conclusion on which the present paper rests: I hold that transference originates
in the same processes which in the earliest stages determines object-relations. Therefore we have to
go back again and again in analysis between objects, loved and hated, external and internal, which
dominate earliest infancy. We can fully appreciate the interconnection between positive and negative
transferences [experiences of the analyst] only if we explore the early interplay between love and hate,
and the vicious circle of aggression, anxieties, feelings of guilt and increased aggression, as well as the
various aspects of objects towards whom these conflicting emotions and anxieties are directed. (Klein,
1952, p. 53)
Furthermore, it is this assumption that underlies the interpretive tactic of listening to the patient’s current life
stories “as containing an element of unconscious phantasy, though they may seem concerned with
incontrovertible external facts … To say that all communications are seen as communications about the
patient’s phantasy as well as current external life is equivalent to saying that all communications contain
something relevant to the transference situation. In Kleinian technique the interpretation of the transference is
often more central than in the classical technique” (Segal, 1981, p. 8)
20
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Transference TOTAL SITUATIONS occur in a repetitive fashion and are the
attempt to maintain and repeat being a certain kind of subject that involves actions to get the
therapist to be (act, feel, talk) a certain way that enables the repetition. The therapist’s job is
to be able to apprehend and effectively show the patient what they are up to, how they do it,
and how it relates to their difficulties. In this sense, the relationship between the patient and
therapist, their respective experiences and communicative behaviors act as a prism to refract
the patient’s OBJECT RELATIONS for careful analysis and interpretation. The Kleinian
conceptions of SPLITTING, PROJECTIVE and INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION,
The PARANOID/SCHIZOID and DEPRESSIVE POSITIONS, ATTACKS ON
LINKING, OMNIPOTENCE, PATHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS, and so on, are
heuristic tools that inform one’s attempt to grasp CLINICAL FACTS – the time sensitive
emotional realities of the session (cf., Caper, 1997; O'Shaughnessy, 1994; RiesenbergMalcom, 1995).
In technical terms, for example, the notion of an ATTACK ON LINKING was
invented by (Bion, 1957/1988) to point to a primary means people can use to not
understand and remain unaware of their reality. He conceived of these as attacks on
anything that joins any couple – two thoughts, two feelings, a thought and a feeling, a feeling
and a person, a feeling and a behavior or perception, two people, a mother and a child, a
patient and their therapist and so on. The therapeutic encounter is ripe for these attacks
because the whole point is for two people to come together and jointly solve problems.
And while I never said either “you’re attacking a link” or “you’re experiencing a
paranoid/schizoid anxiety” the assumption of these terms – implicit ontological assumptions
of Kleinianism – did inform what I said. Mrs. P’s speech (007-015) was an example of an
ATTACK ON LINKING in that she had trouble putting her thoughts together, linking
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them, which would simultaneously prohibit someone else from being able to put their
thoughts together with hers – resulting in unintelligible speech. And the notion of “fears of
falling apart” draws on Klein’s exposition of the PARANOID/SCHIZOID POSITION,
since the danger of ‘falling to pieces’ might have been a manifestation of “the primary
anxiety of being annihilated” (Klein, 1946, p. 5) due to the defense of SPLITTING off
“parts” of her self (her identity).
Klein’s most innovative works came through her psychoanalysis of children, where
she developed beliefs about infantile experience and development – her innovations are
based on an infant ontology, as it were. According to this ontology, the infant’s sense of
himself lacks coherence; he begins life in a state of primary unintegration; he has experiences
but at first these are not integrated into one “I.” The “I” or ego begins to integrate around
positive or pleasurable experiences, like the satiation of a good feeding. Painful experiences
like hunger, excessive gas, burning diarrhea, etc., threatens this collection of “good”
experiences and therefore must be kept separate. In normal development the mother does a
good enough job helping the infant manage his anxieties about integrating the “good” and
“bad” senses of himself. The mother, or part of the mother since the infant cannot yet
perceive her as a whole, is central to this process:
As regards splitting of the object, we have to remember that in states of gratification
love-feelings turn towards a gratifying breast, which in states of frustration hatred
and persecutory anxiety attach themselves to the frustrating breast. Idealization is
bound up with the splitting of the object, for the good aspects of the breast are
exaggerated as a safeguard against the fear of the persecuting breast. While
idealization is thus the corollary of persecutory fear, it also springs from the power of
the instinctual desires which aim at unlimited gratification and therefore create the
picture of an inexhaustible and always bountiful breast – and ideal breast. (Klein,
1946, pp. 6-7)
In his attempt to control the ‘bad’ experience the infant mobilizes aggression to eliminate the
painful experience, to get rid of it, by means of a PHANTASY of SPLITTING it off from
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the self and PROJECTING the self-experience (part of the self) into the mother and thereby
identifies her as a dangerous being that contains these dangerous parts: the persecutory
breast. So, the primary anxiety of this early position is paranoid in nature – the fear of a
persecutory, annihilating object – and the self is split by the schizoid mechanism of splitting;
hence, the PARANOID/SCHIZOID position and its “fear of falling to pieces.” Klein
refers to this as a “position” because it is an always-available state rather than a “stage” that
is traversed once and for all. In its garden-variety manifestation: someone hurts us, we get
mad and feel as if they did it on purpose, like a persecutor. This question is not that an adult
deals with this position; the issue is how and to what extent is the anxiety unbearable.
Where Freud gave priority to castration anxiety in the etiology of neurosis Klein traced its
origin to the PARANOID/SCHIZOID position as the ground of its possibility. Castration
anxiety is but one manifestation of a persecutory anxiety based on projective identification.21
In this way all infant experiences begin to be organized around the poles of good and
bad or painful and pleasurable by means of SPLITTING, PROJECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION and its inverse INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION– the early
means of discriminating what belongs “to me” or “not to me.” Under normal conditions
the good experiences become the context for the bad; in adult terms one may have bad
experiences but within an overall sense of security and confidence in one’s basic goodness
and worth as a person.

21

Likewise, the “renunciation of Oedipal strivings” is but one manifestation of the DEPRESSIVE
POSITION where fear of the loss of the Other motivates INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION. The terms
DEPRESSIVE POSITION and INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION will be explicated in chapters 4 and 5.
The point is that the Kleinian tradition has historically aimed to identify and conceptualize features, processes,
and technical strategies that are common to all pathologies rather than focus on character types. For example,
in the contemporary Kleinian literature the notion of PATHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS is used where
others might specify “borderline,” “narcissistic,” “obsessional,” and other types. Rather than focus on how
they are distinct and mutually exclusive, Kleinians may focus on how each one as a PATHOLOGICAL
ORGANIZATION manifests a common problem such as resistance or difficulties making “contact” with the
object as displayed in their particular manner of deploying projective identification and so on.
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This brief and oversimplified exposition of some Kleinian terms, then, can help
contextualize not only my comment about “fears of falling apart,” but also my opening
utterances and why I took Mrs. P’s comment “I’m trying to survive this week” (002) more
literally that she seemed to intend it. And from the Kleinian angle, an ATTACK ON
LINKING is a manifestation of SPLITTING since a part of the self, an identity, cannot be
verbalized if it is split off. Hence, I interpreted her speech (007-015) as a DEFENSE
(attempt to deny an emotional reality) by “linking” the fear of fragmenting (“falling apart”)
to her communicative behavior.
Of course, there is a seventh common element to my response that is not mentioned
in the talk – the note taking. At the time of this session I had been taking detailed process
notes – writing down every word (more or less) spoken during the session while in the
session – for two years. I write down what I am going to say before I say it to (1) foster the
discipline of carefully choosing my words based on (2) what has just been said and happened
in the session as I have recorded it – it’s a way to “fix” the action of the session so I can
analyze and try to formulate it while writing my response, or, later after the patient has left to
review the session.22 (3) Writing my responses ahead of time allows me a few extra seconds
to watch the patient as he or she hears what I say and reacts to it, so I can monitor or track
how what I say registers (or not). And while the reaction of many to my note writing
(expressed by colleagues) is that they would feel it takes away from their ability to “be
present” or “pay attention” to their patients, I have found that – once I became used to it
The idea of “fixing” action so it can be read as a text or text analogue is central to interpretive inquiry. In
short, since social interaction is fleeting it must be fixed for its patterns to become the object of scientific study
(through audio taping, video taping, etc.), as writing fixes speech and makes it available for interpretation. (Cf.,
Ricoeur, 1971; Taylor, 1971). This fixing provides the kind of distanciation that Ricoeur had in mind when he
wrote, “This way of putting my action at a distance in order to make sense of my own motives paves the way
for the kind of distanciation which occurs with what we called the social inscription of human action and to
which we applied the metaphor of the “record.” The same actions which may be put into “records” and
henceforth “recorded” may also be explained in different ways according to the multivocity of arguments
applied to their motivational background.” (1971, p. 552,)
22

80
and worked out my anxieties about it – the opposite is true. The note writing slows the
process down and provides a record of what happens, which makes it easier for me to
formulate my interventions by paying close attention to everything the patients says and does
in reaction to what I say and do. While it’s true that less gets said in the sessions and that my
writing slows the pace of talk, I think too often one can equate the quantity of talk with
quality, or the quality of it “feeling good” or “feeling right” can obscure what is going on
through the talk.
Indeed, the first hurdle I faced trying to write during the sessions was my anxiety
about not maintaining eye contact. When we discussed this during supervision, Dr. R
summarized by saying, “Let’s put it this way, eye contact may be gratifying but it is not
necessarily therapeutic.” She continued, explaining that the writing “communicates that you
are there to do your work, and doing your work means having a separate mind to think
about their problems …which patients don’t like because they want you to think about their
problems the way they do.” In another supervision session where my anxiety about the
writing came up, she remarked: “so, it creates a distance, a separation, between you and the
patient that makes both of you anxious.” And in response to my other big concern about
the note taking, that it took away from the freedom of the patient and that I was being too
controlling and calculating by writing things out, she responded, “and what’s wrong with
being calculating?” I told her what the patient had said – a view that made sense to me at
the time – and Dr. R stated, “So, it’s as if your patient thinks you’ll be more help to her if
you say the first thing that comes into your head rather than taking your time to think about
what’s happening before you say it … and I’d tell her that.” Dr. R maintained a position
that the note writing was as necessary for the job my patients were hiring me to do as a
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hammer is necessary for a carpenter. Some three years later, I can agree whole-heartedly
with that. I would only qualify her statement by saying if you want to do this kind of work.
Mrs. P has not mentioned the note taking in her response. At times she sees me
starting to write and waits for me to finish and say what I have come up with. At other
times she keeps talking and I hold up my hand or say “hold on a moment” so I can finish,
because I believe what I have to say too important to be glossed over.
Mrs. P ratifies my hypothesis linking what she has just said and done to me with her
previous speech – ostensibly about some other context than the therapy:
019
020
021

Yeah, I’ve always done that. [Tears stream] Yeah, I’m probably going to be processing 15,000
different things. Yeah, processing things to do with my daughter’s wedding all this introspective stuff
between now and Tuesday when I leave.. . . .
Mrs. P is moved by my speech. It seems that I have “touched” on something as

people say. This turn of events is one that is and will be repeated many, many times during
our work together. She wipes the tears from her eyes as she talks and reaches for a tissue –
hospital stock tissues she has often complained about, saying they are not soft enough for
“people with alligator tears.”
In the terms of CA, her response here (019-021) constitutes a positive assessment
secondary to the previous assessment (what I’m calling the theory I proposed in CA is an
assessment, an utterance of evaluation). Her second utterance (020-021) specifies or
expands on what she is going to be processing, introducing another topic and context into
the conversation: “my daughter’s wedding.” Notice, however, that her expression both
confirms “feelings that feel overwhelming” (trying to process 15,000 different things would
be quite overwhelming to say the least) yet negates the here and now indicators of “you
drop,” “you’re,” and “we couldn’t” by shifting to the future conditional of “I’m probably
going to be” (019) “between now and Tuesday” (021) as if it’s not what she was just doing in

82
the moment. Although her previous speech did not contain 15,000 different things, it did
contain that many in the sense that the point of the remark is (005-015) “too many things to
make sense of at once.”
The third time that Mrs. P spontaneously began tearing occurred right after she
mentions the date of her departure for her daughter’s wedding. The first two incidents of
tears followed comments I made, but not the third, which began with her self-selected turn
(021, below). What all three tear events have in common is that they coincide with shifts to
the here and now situation – Mrs. P’s experience and reaction to that experience of herself
during the therapy, either when she aligns her grasp of things with my grasp of the here and
now or reintroduces it herself. In this last case, Mrs. P gets emotional and does getting
emotional by tearing after she shifts her own grasp back to the here and now, focusing on
something “deep” for herself.
The pragmatic function of getting emotional in this way is not clear as I report on it
now. At the time – and currently – I take Mrs. P’s tearing as, at the least, an indication that
what I’ve said has touched on something, as an indication that I’m on the right track, so to
speak. Are they tears indicating sadness, relief from being understood or what?
However, this temporal shift that provokes tearing does not last. After Mrs. P
begins tearing she self-selects a turn to continue talking, and my silence indicates that we
both share the sense that it’s her turn to continue. “This isn’t very deep … I’m feeling guilty
because” (021-022, below) indicates a return to the here and now before another shift to the
wedding context (022), and finally the context of mothering and being a child in the distant
past of “ it goes way back …I can’t remember anyone in my family who...”(023).
022
023
024

. . . [Tears stream] This isn’t very deep -- no for me it is -- I
think one of these things is I’m feeling guilty because I haven’t been able to help out too much with
my daughter’s wedding and it goes way back because I can’t remember anyone in my family who
hasn’t really been totally involved in their daughter’s wedding plus the problems I have with the need
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025
026
027
028
029
030
031
032
033

to control, usually mom’s do their daughter’s weddings. But I’m still from that tradition, so I’m
probably feeling a lot of conflict about -- emotionally I have some input into this. Intellectually I’ve
tried to let my children make all the major decisions on their own. I think maybe I’ve identified
with my own mother who was major controlling, which is what dynamic women are. And the sister
I was in the arms of -- I think I used her or she filled the shoes of my mother. I think I haven’t
looked enough at the input she [the sister] had on my life because she went off when I was ten. I still
have my own mother [her mother died in the 80’s] but she was -- I don’t know -- an institutional
mother. It was an institutional type relationship a parallel between my mother sending me off to
school at an early age and my sending my kids away.

034
035

I think one way you are trying to keep some powerful feelings away is by turning our conversation to
events in the past that are easier to talk about.
My response to her extended turn indicates that I understood her speech to be an

agreement with the theory I had previously proposed, tying her practice of “turning our
conversation” to her emotional grasp of the moment. Her turn constitutes a collaborative
completion of my assessment by doing what I (and Mrs. P herself in 014-015) had described.
Although worded a bit differently (“powerful” instead of “overwhelming” and “events in the
past” instead of “like an abstract concept”) the point is the same. She disengaged from the
experience by changing topics and contexts. In her first extended turn she “dropped” her
feelings by changing logical levels from particular to general; in this turn she changed from
an approaching specific event to specific and loosely linked events in the past. Both of her
extended turns are characterized by speech that is confusing when heard in a real-time
discussion, which affect communication by disrupting what one experiences as the seamless
and transparent “exchange of information” or “flow” of words, as talking is often described.
As noted earlier, this kind of speech Mrs. P and I have come to call her “curlicue thinking;”
it is a kind of speech that disrupts both understanding the speech and the identity of the
subject behind the speech. In stark contrast, her response to my second interpretation is
tight, to the point, and focused:
036
037

Yeah to make the comparisons. I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad. I’m in extreme
circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism.
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So, what happened? In other words, what’s the pragmatics of making a pragmatic comment
in therapy – proposing a theory to explain why she produced talk that had the pragmatic
effect of shifting the focus of the conversation to change her experience?
Here, and in preceding instances, “Yeah” is an “agreement token” that also serves to
indicate the speaker’s desire to take a turn (cf., Nofsinger, 1991 p. 74). “… to make the
comparisons. I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad …” This utterance is another
assessment, an explanation, to account for “turning our conversation to events in the past”
(034-035). Importantly, it differs from her previous assessment (019-020) in that at this
point she has turned to assessing herself in the context of talking to me in here and now
situation, rather than about some upcoming one. Her sadness is active in the moment and
not one among “15,000 things” to be “processed” in the coming week. Let’s call this an
assessment-explanation adjacency pair,23 where the explanation part of the pair is maximally
relevant to the first-part assessment. In other words it is as if I said, “you’re changing topics
again” and she explains, “yeah, to figure out how I’m feeling” versus, “Yeah, and two weeks
from now I’ll be upset.”
So, the pragmatic effect of pointing out to Mrs. P the pragmatics of what I believed
she had just done is (1) to move Mrs. P into selecting the position of sighting/citing herself
as the subject of action in the here and now, an action that is the correlate to her immediate
sense of herself and what was happening (her position as a perspective facing a field of
issues, in Taylor’s (1998) terms), and (2) from this position Mrs. P explains what she’s doing
(“trying to figure out”) and identifying the who she is that’s doing it (“I’m so sad”), which,

In CA adjacency pairs have the following characteristics, “(a) It is a sequence of two communicative actions;
(b) the two actions occur adjacent to each other; (c) they are produced by different speakers; (d) one action is a
first pair part and the other is a second pair part, that is, they are sequentially ordered; and (e) they are categorized
or type-connected so that any given first pair part must be matched with one of a relatively few types of
second-pair parts.” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 51)
23
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overall, (3) tightens her sense of a few things – rather than 15,000 – so they can fit into three
utterances that comply with Grice’s cooperative principle.
In the language of critical hermeneutics after Gadamer and Foucault, the effect of
this power play, where my speech has the effect of inviting Mrs. P to respond by explaining
herself, is to insist on practicing the “concept of reflexivity-in-interpretation.” (cf., Kögler,
pp.251 –260). Mrs. P’s response to my speech is to interpret her own action in the here and
now, to say that her confusing speech was not just a sign of an attempt to avoid powerful
feelings, but was a sign of working on her problem, “trying to figure out.” Her responses
(036-037) are a reflexive explication of meaning – the meaning of her behavior and her
identity. By assuming this position for the first time in the session, Mrs. P engaged me as a
dialogic partner – a “cosubject” or co-interpreter – on the topic of who she is in the context
of what she is doing:
In the ethical dimension [of the critical dialogic model], the subjects are dialogically
constituted as autonomous cosubjects and are thereby seen as having a right to their
own conceptions of self-realization. The conceptions, however, may be undermined
or constrained by the concrete contexts in which subjects find themselves…. The
critical-hermeneutic objective consists precisely in correlating these concrete visions of
the good and just [i.e., of self-realization, of identity] with contextual practices of
power.
Thus, although the interpretive practice of critical dialogue pursues the goal of
subjective self-distanciation so as to make possible greater self-realization, it leaves it
to the subjects themselves the actual use of critique in terms of enhanced selfdetermination. (Kögler, 1996, p. 253, emphasis in original)
Part of speaking as a cosubject in our critical dialog was trying to shape my
understanding of her identity and the identity of what she does. Mrs. P’s utterances in this
turn are qualitatively different from her previous speech and my response, a difference that
is reflected in my subsequent turn.
Mrs. P’s utterances were aimed specifically to me in response to what I said, less
stream of consciousness – more about what I just noticed as another person in the room and
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less like I am confined to be a spectator of different things going on in any number of
situations where she is not with me. Better yet, in her previous speech it’s as if I functioned
as a chronicler (cf., “what you record” line 059, below) of different things she’s dealing with
in her life rather than an interlocutor – just a sounding board for the happenings in different
areas of her life. The explanation Mrs. P’s offered was geared to shift my understanding
from sighting/citing her previous speech as merely another deflection to an attempt on her
part to make further sense about her “extreme circumstances,” (her words) of “falling apart”
(my words).
038
039
040

Perhaps a part of you is feeling sad, scared, and angry at your daughter for getting married as if
she were deserting you now like you felt by your sister, and the problem is you don’t feel you have a
way to contain these feelings inside.
These utterances show that her move to repair alignment by explaining and thereby

shifting my understanding of her prior move worked. I changed from speaking about what I
understood her to be doing to avoid a feeling to commenting on her identity as it struck me,
as if she had said, “what kind of person am I that I am in this state?” In my response I
aligned with the topic of her identity in relation to her daughter, her sister and her feelings,
an identity textured with “feeling a lot of conflict” (026) – “part” “sad,” part “scared,” and
part “angry” in relation to her daughter’s wedding. Mrs. P’s self-initiated repair worked. I
realigned my understanding of the topic and added to it.
In terms of CKPP her move was an example of speaking from the DEPRESSIVE
POSITION. This will be addressed in the next session, since it is related to how the
“feeding” is adjusted during the course of the session. The task of this section has been to
articulate the characteristics of “the food” offered in CKPP in the form of interpretive
utterances. The examination of these utterances led to the inquiry into their pragmatic effect
to understand “the food” in terms of its communicative purpose.
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The interpretive analysis reveals that the pragmatic effect of the food I was offering
as an initiate of CKPP is a self-distanciated position for the patient to assume that involves
critical reflection on the identity she adopted, which involves communicative behavior in the
form of speech and emotional states, bound up with contextual social practices of power –
social practices geared to act on the actions and understanding of another. Moreover,
adding to the findings from the first section that CKPP requires the assumption of a
principle of symbolic expression as a part of its frame of controlled conditions, this
“formula” has seven characteristics:
•

The use of specialized technical knowledge to inform how one understands and
responds to the ongoing therapeutic conversation, stated in experience-near terms
(i.e., without technical jargon)

•

The use of more or less verbatim note taking to “fix” the to and fro action of the
conversation, and provide data or MATERIAL from which understandings are
formed before being offered to patients in the form of:

•

Interpretations. These interpretations are assertions that show the therapist’s beliefs
about the patient’s experiential reality of:

•

The moment. The here and now is the context the assertions index, usually through
very explicit references, and

•

These assertions often take the form of a hypothesis or theory, in so far as theories
involve a proposal telling how two or more events are logically, causally,
chronologically, or experientially related.

•

The topic is taken from what the patient says or does first,

•

Either implicitly or explicitly – the principle of symbolic expression
In one way this finding is unexpected, for the guiding metaphor of a mother feeding

an infant would seem to suggest that the speech of the CKPP practitioner would be
infantilizing, talking to the patient as though he or she were an infant. In one sense this is
accurate, since the fostering of infantile dependence is necessary for the “infant-in-thepatient” to be addressed, be seen and understood by the therapist as a participant of the

88
therapeutic conversation. However, it is not accurate in the sense that the practitioner of
CKPP is somehow making the patient into an infant, anymore than a good-enough mother
is bent on deforming the subjectivity of her children that she raises in a relationship of
asymmetrical dependence.
The paradox seems to lie in the approach of addressing or feeding the infantile-inthe adult as the subject of his or her experience, with the ability to critically reflect on painful
experience and do something about it now. As Mitrani writes:
Such experiences, as I have attempted to convey in this chapter, have convinced me
that careful analytic listening and consistent interpretation of the ordinary patient’s
experience in the here-and-now of the hour facilitate the emergence of the infantile
transference, bringing it out into the open while at the same time mobilizing and
mitigating certain anxieties and those protections constructed to deal with them.
(Mitrani, 2001, p. 18)
This paradoxical quality will be examined further in the next two chapters, since it requires a
fuller articulation of CKPP’s approach to “feeding identity” that mobilizes anxiety (Chapter
4) before examining (Chapter 5) how the “infantile transference” is fostered and examined
simultaneously through interpretive utterances that convey a sense of being “understood
without words” (cf., Klein, 1963/1975, p. 301).

4. A formula for recognition
An interpretation should convey no more exhortation or suggestion about what the
patient should feel or do than a line call in tennis. The linesman should simply
report on whether the ball looked in or out from his point of view, with no claim to
omniscience, and with no implication of what it should have been. The impact that a
good interpretation has on a patient is partly due to the fact that it is so free of
exhortation, a fact that contributes to it being such a unique way of talking about
intimate matters. (Caper, 1999, p. 135, emphasis in original)
This chapter addresses how CKPP uses the content of the patient’s speech and the
sequential turn taking of the dialog to comprehend the patient’s situation and formulate
interpretations. These interpretations do not come from a “god’s eye view.” They are
formulated and evaluated on the basis of their effect on the joint exploration of the
incomprehensible problem the patient seeks help with in each session. Caper continues:
The reason that something about the patient is obvious enough to be detected by the
analyst, but unobserved by the patient is not that the analyst is especially perceptive
or intellectually acute, but because the patient is especially unperceptive in the area
needing to be interpreted. The patient’s lack of perceptiveness is connected with his
being in the grip of unconscious delusions, which makes critical, perceptive thought
about them impossible. (Caper, 1999, p. 135)
Framing our question within the tropes of the feeding infant, the mother has an
approach to feeding that takes into account the state of her baby. She doesn’t try squirting
the formula from a distance into her baby’s mouth or offer it with ice, for example. Nor
does her set of feeding practices include the act of holding her child upside down over the
bottle. And she doesn’t try – hopefully – feeding her crying baby if the cries are a response
to a soiled diaper. Feeding requires a process of adjustment: the right temperature, head
held at the right angle, intervals between putting the nipple to her child’s mouth and letting
the baby ingest, and so on. Moreover, as the last example implies, it requires the mother to
adjust her interpretation of what the baby needs based on her infant’s means of
communicating (cries, gesture, etc.). From the Kleinian perspective there is more
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involved than the physiological pleasure of being fed; there is the matter of how the
experience registers for the infant: the primordial feeling of being understood by the mother
without words – the prototype for the capacity of enjoyment and a circumstance where the
self gains a sense of security, belonging and meaning through being grasped by anOther.
Beyond, or better yet, along with the milk formula is a formula for recognition that is
required for the nascent person to develop a sense-of-self and its contents (possible
meanings or identities), as much as proteins, vitamins, and minerals are required for his body
and its contents (physical organs) to grow. This recognition is required for the infant to
develop sufficient capacities for managing existential anxieties: anxieties about having and
not having, loving and hating the same person, making up and repairing its loving
relationships, being and not being, and so on.
Likewise, formulating interpretations requires a process of adjustment based on the
responses of the patient – literal, symbolic, and nonverbal. This section takes a closer look
at this adjustment process, particularly as it relates to the aims of CKPP, which have now
come into focus as (1) engaging the ‘infant-in-the-patient’ in a way that (2) fosters the
capacity for reflection on the self in the context of its Other-relating practices that shape the
self’s experience. Specifically, the interpretive analysis will show that the adjustment process
relies on (1) the symbolic inference of the emotional difficulties that Mrs. P confronts that
are tied up with conflicts of identity, and (2) determining when she is engaged in
understanding his or her problems – a self-distanciated position.
In the terms of Habermas, this adjustment process leading to a self-distanciated
position is the occasion for the “emancipation” of the patient by “becoming a subject.”
Analytic insights possess validity for the analyst only after they have been accepted as
knowledge by the analysand. For the empirical accuracy of general interpretations
depends not on controlled observation and subsequent communication among
investigators, but rather on the accomplishment of self-reflection and subsequent
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communication between the investigator and his “object,” … In the case of testing
theories through observation … the application of the assumptions to reality is a
matter for the inquiring subject. In the case of testing general interpretations
through self-reflection … this application becomes self-application by the object of
inquiry. … The subject cannot obtain knowledge of the object unless it becomes
knowledge for the object – and unless the latter thereby emancipates himself by
becoming a subject. (Habermas, cited in McCarthy, 1978, pp. 203-204)
Thus, CKPP is a subjectivizing practice and the aim of this chapter is to show how it
operates to provide the occasions for subjectivity to become. This is accomplished by
addressing the anxiety inherent in assuming the position of self-subject formation.

Symbolic inference
Provisionally, symbolic listening is the inference of meanings from the patient’s
speech and other communicative behavior that are not explicitly expressed in their
utterances.24 Let us call this the decoding practice of CKPP. To the extent this decoding
practice requires communicative moves that differ from everyday conversation, this
interpretive analysis should be able to identify the decoding as the adoption of a particular
position towards the content and sequence of Mrs. P’s speech. Since this involves doing
something through talking, thinking through the pragmatics of Kleinian symbolic
interpretation may refine our grasp of this positioning. In terms of the pragmatics of human
communication, this decoding involves the translation of the patient’s analogic
communications into the digital mode so that a problematic relational commitment can be
made explicit and discussed.

24

For example, in the case of “John” described in the introduction above (pp. 9-10) it was inferred from his
story about the car nearly hitting him that John was communicating about his anxiety in the session. In that
case the car symbolized the therapy, the driver was the therapist, and John’s gesticulating referred to his
opening utterances of the session which were attempts to draw my attention to his suffering, and to which I did
not respond, like the driver who was dangerously focusing on something else other than John’s crisis of the
mom ent.
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The quotes below refer to one of the “axioms” of the pragmatics of human
communication outlined in Pragmatics of human communication: A Study of interactional
patterns, pathologies, and paradoxes (Watzlawick et al., 1967). What these authors argue is
that in order for the content of any assertion or statement to be correctly understood the
listener has to grasp the kind of relationship that is defined by the communication:
Every communication has a content and a relationship aspect such that the latter classifies the former
and is therefore a metacommunication. (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 54, original emphasis)
The ability to metacommunicate appropriately is not only the conditio sine qua non of
successful communication, but is intimately linked with the enormous problem of
awareness of the self and others. (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 53, original emphasis)
“That’s an order” or “I am only joking” are verbal examples of such communications about
communications that one may hear spoken when the speaker perceives the listener either did
not “get to it” in the former or took unintended offence in the latter example (cf., Ibid., p.
53). This relationship aspect of every communication commits the speaker and listener to a
kind of relationship. In the case of “This is an order” the relationship is an asymmetrical
relationship of authority; in the case of “I am only joking” the relationship may be that of a
friend, passive aggressive enemy, etc.
The relational aspect of communication is meaningfully conveyed by analogic
communication, which the authors define as nonverbal communication. They caution,
however, that by “nonverbal communication” they include gesture, the sequence, rhythm,
and composition of words and utterances, as well as the context in which the
communication takes place. (Ibid, p. 62). In the following excerpt, the cat communicates its
relationship by means of acting it out. The cat cannot say “be my mother” so it acts as if it
were kitten with its owner, as if it were in the context of mothered:
Thus, to take one of his [Bateson’s] examples, when I open the refrigerator and the
cat comes, rubs against my legs, and mews, this does not mean “I want milk” – as a
human being would express it – but invokes a specific relationship, “Be mother to
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me,” because such a behavior is only observed in kittens in relation to adult cats, and
never between two grown-up animals. Conversely, pet lovers often are convinced
that their animals “understand” their speech. What the animal does understand …
[is] the wealth of analogic communication that goes with speech. Indeed, wherever
relationship is the central issue of communication, we find that digital language is
almost meaningless …e.g., courtship, love, succor, combat … in all dealings with very
young children or severely disturbed mental patients. Children, fools, and animals have
always been credited with particular intuition regarding the sincerity or insincerity of
human attitudes, for it is easy to profess something verbally, but difficult to carry a
lie into the realm of the analogic. (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 63, emphasis added)
The phrase “in all dealings with young children” is particularly relevant considering
that Melanie Klein’s technical and theoretical innovations grew out of her analysis of young
children. In short, Klein translated the symbolic texture of her child-patients’ play through a
process of identifying the child’s anxiety, interpreting what the child was communicating
about a relationship through the play (the child’s metacommunication), and monitoring the
child’s response to make adjustments to her understanding for the next round of: playmoves, identifying anxiety, interpreting, observing (cf., Hinshelwood, 1994). In the terms of
Watzlawick, Bavelas, and Jackson (1967) she was engaged in trying to adequately translate
from the analogic into the digital, to talk explicitly about the relationship and the problems
the children had with the commitment inherent in the communication – to the extent they
engaged in symptomatic behavior.25 For Watzlawick, et al., a symptom is a non-verbal
communication. In terms of the case of Trude, described again below, the communication
was on the order of, “It’s not me that wants to prevent Mom from making daddy’s babies at
night because it’s hateful to me; it’s my night terrors and bed wetting.” It was the hateful
relation that she had difficulty committing to – except in play – until Klein digitalized it
through interpretation.

Watzlawick et al. (1967) note that since analogic communication is characterized by the lack of negation, lack
of qualifiers to indicate which of two discrepant meanings is implied, and the lack of temporal markers, that
“Freud’s description of the id becomes virtually a definition of analogic communication.” (Fn8, p. 65)
25
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I will now turn to consider the content and the causes of these early feelings of guilt
by reference to another case. Trude, aged three years and nine months, repeatedly
played ‘make believe’ in her analysis that it was nighttime and that we were both
asleep. She then used to come softly over to me from the opposite corner of the
room (which was supposed to be her own bedroom) and threaten me in various
ways, such as that she was going to stab me in the throat, throw me out the window,
burn me up, take me to the police, etc. She would want to tie up my hands and feet,
or she would lift up the rug on the sofa and say she was doing ‘Po—Kaki—Kuki’.
This … meant that she wanted to look inside her mother’s bottom for the ‘Kakis’
(faeces), which signified children to her. On another occasion she wanted to hit me
in the stomach and declared that she was taking out my ‘A—A’s’ (stool) and was
making me poor. She then seized the cushions, which she repeatedly called children,
and hid herself with them behind the sofa. There she crouched in the corner with an
intense expression of fear, covered herself up, sucked her fingers and wetted herself.
She used to repeat this whole process whenever she made an attack on me. It
corresponds in every detail with the way she had behaved in bed when, at a time
when she was not yet two, she started to have severe night terrors. At that time, too,
she had run into her parents’ bedroom again and again at night without being able to
say what it was she wanted. By analyzing her wetting and dirtying herself which
stood for attacks on her parents copulating with each other, the symptoms were
removed. Trude had wanted to rob her pregnant mother of her children, to kill her
and to take her place in coitus with her father. She was two years old when her sister
was born. It was those impulses of hatred and aggression which, in her second year,
had given rise to an increasingly strong fixation upon her mother and to a severe
anxiety and sense of guilt which found expression, among other things, in her night
terrors. (Klein, 1955/1975, p. 5)
In this example, Klein demonstrates how she contextualized her symbolic
interpretations of her child-patient’s behavior and speech. Klein repeatedly emphasizes in
her writings that “the generalized translations of symbols are meaningless” (cf., Klein,
1926/1975; Klein, 1932/1975; Klein, 1952; Klein, 1955/1975), and that their interpretation
must be contextualized to the transference – what they say and do with the therapist. In
other words, the symbolism that needs to be translated and interpreted is the symbolism that
has to do with the relationship – that is, the analogical or metacommunicational aspect.
So, the decoding of CKPP is not just, “the inference of meanings from the patient’s
speech and other communicative behavior that are not explicitly expressed in their
utterances. (p. 91, above); it is translating the symbolic communications that tell the therapist
how the patient is defining or trying not to define the relationship. The “architecture of meaning” that
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CKPP subscribes to can be characterized as follows: the secondary meanings that are
inferred in and through the first are analogic metacommunications conveyed in and through
the digital as well as non-verbal messages of the patient. 26 Moreover, since Kleinians believe
the unconscious is structured of sensations interpreted as relationships (cf., fn 14, p. 61,
above) from early childhood, the roots of these analogic meanings are the body and its
functions in relation to the mother’s body; the baby’s body—mother’s body dyad are the
metaphorical basis of language.
So, for an example with regard to Kleinian theory, when Segal writes about a
patient’s capacity to use words as symbols – a developmental achievement – she does so
with reference to fecal attitudes in relation to the mother’s breast. For purposes of
illustrating the following passage, imagine a child that cannot play with clay, paint, or dirt.
She has panic attacks around these substances because their identity is not distinct from her
interpretation of them in terms of her phantasies. The clay does not function as something
that could mean any number of things – that is, as a symbol – its meaning is locked into that
of persecutory-thing and is therefore sighted/cited as a frightening object – a symbolic
equation, in Segal’s terms.
When a substitute in the external world is used as a symbol it may be used more
freely than the original object, since it is not fully identified with it. In so far,
however, as it is distinguished from the original object it is also recognized as an
object in itself. Its own properties are recognized, respected, and used, because no
confusion with the original object blurs the characteristics of the new object used as
a symbol.
In an analysis we can sometimes follow very clearly the changes in the symbolic
relations in the patient’s attitude to his faeces. On the schizoid level the patient
expects his faeces to be the [introjected] ideal breast; if he cannot maintain this
26

Compare, “Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in which the meaning, not
satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another meaning attainable only in and through the first
intentionality …What gives rise to this work [of interpretation] is an intentional structure, which consists not in
relation of meaning to a thing but an architecture of meaning, in a relation of meaning to meaning …
regardless of whether that relation be one of analogy or not, of whether the first meaning disguises or reveals
the second meaning. This texture is what makes interpretation possible, although the texture itself is made
evident only through the actual movement of interpretation.” (Ricoeur, 1970, pp. 16-18)
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idealization his faeces become persecutory, they are ejected as a bitten-up, destroyed
and persecuting breast. If the patient tries to symbolize his faeces in the external
world the symbols in the external world are felt to be faeces – persecutors. No
sublimation of anal activities can occur in these conditions.
On the depressive level, the feeling is that the introjected breast has been
destroyed by the ego and can be re-created by the ego. The faeces may then be felt
as something created by the ego out of the object and can be valued as a symbol of
the breast and at the same time as a good product of the ego’s own creativity.
When this symbolic relation to faeces and other body products has been
established a projection can occur on to substances in the external world such as
paint, plasticine, clay, etc., which can then be used for sublimation. (Segal,
1955/1988, pp. 167-168)
However, with regard to current Kleinian practice, “… the general tendency…is to
talk to the patient, especially the non-psychotic patient, less in terms of anatomical structures
(breast, penis) and more in terms of psychological functions (seeing, hearing, thinking,
evacuating, etc.). Together with this emphasis on function, concentration on the patient’s
immediate experience in the transference often leads to discovery of deeper layers of
meaning, some of which may be seen to be based on infantile bodily experience” (Spillius,
1988b, p. 9). To say, then, that the aim of CKPP speech is to “reach,” “address,” or “make
contact with” the “infant-in-the-patient,” is to say that CKPP is focused on infantile
messaging and message interpretation – the elements of communication that index the
mothered context.
The emphasis of CKPP on the relational dyad, viewed in terms of infantile modes of
understanding is consistent with the view of Watzlawick et al., that the more “mature” and
“healthy” the relationship the more the relational aspect of messages “recedes into the
background” (p. 52). This is due to the fact that “all analogic messages are invocations of
relationship, and that they are therefore proposals regarding the future rules of the
relationship” (p. 101). Theoretically, then, the healthier the relationship the less conflict
there is about who is what in their obligations to the other. In contrast, infantile messaging
and message interpreting is very much concerned with regulating the maternal relation, since
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adequately ‘instructing’ the mother in terms of it’s needs (appropriately defining their
identities vis-à-vis each other) is necessary for the infant’s survival, and infants do not have
the capacity for digital communication, since digital communication requires words, syntactic
logic, and the ability to translate from the analogical into the digital and back again.
A characteristic that sets CKPP apart from everyday communication is CKPP’s
emphasis on how messages are to be taken and given as invocations of relationships, their relational
implications, rather than the surface content aspect (informative value) as is the case in everyday conversation.
Perhaps, then, rather than refer to a principle of “symbolic expression” the rule of CKPP
might be characterized as the principle of analogic decoding – the symbolic interpretation of
the patient’s material in terms of his or her ongoing relational commitments and the identity
claims and goals involved in those commitments. Let us call this the “analytic attitude” of
CKPP. The adoption of this attitude by the therapist towards the patient’s speech is
confirmed by the five questions Dr. R provided this author, since all of them point towards
the live ongoing relational positioning of the patient-therapist dyad (cf., pp. 58-59, above).

Formulating and reformulating
… any communication, as we shall see, implies commitment and thereby defines the
sender’s view of his relationship with the receiver. (Waltzlawick, et al., p. 51)
Communicating commits one to an identity and the sighting/citing of the other in
one way or another in relation to that identity, as well as the possibility of having one’s
identity commitments (claims and goals) contested. And from the preceding section: (1) this
kind of communicating is done symbolically through analogic communication, which (2) in
CKPP is subject to analogic decoding – the symbolic interpretation of the patient’s material
in terms of relational commitments and the identity claims and goals involved in those
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commitments as they occur as a part of the ongoing conversation between the therapist and the patient.
Thus, the governing question for this last leg of the interpretive analysis is: How do the
seven characteristics (Chapter 3), with particular emphasis on symbolic decoding (Chapter 4,
previous section), figure into the construction of the ongoing therapeutic conversation in
such a way that they contribute to the self-distanciated pragmatic positioning that
characterizes “the food” of CKPP?
According to CA everyday conversation has a turn taking structure. So, to the extent
the game of CKPP is “up to” something other than an everyday conversation, we can
hypothesize that there will be a departure not only in terms of what is said and how it is said,
but when it is said through the course of the ongoing construction of the dialog. The seven
characteristics already outlined in the preceding chapter deal in one way or another with
what is said and how the interpretive utterances are structured, but they do not provide a
guideline for the way the therapist takes his or her turns when speaking with the patient.
The eighth characteristic of CKPP is its turn taking structure.
In other words, formulating these recognitions in interpretive utterances requires
communicative work between the patient and the therapist. Our primary interest is in the
therapist’s side to this communicative work, which involves a further explication of CKPP’s
hermeneutic presuppositions of understanding and how they contribute to what is said (the
content of utterances), how it is said (the structure of utterances), and when it is said (how
they affect the turn taking system).
This does not mean, however, that the patient is seen as simply a passive receptacle
for the therapist in the position of absolute objective-truth-speaker – a common
misunderstanding of psychoanalytic practice in general. Quite to the contrary, the following
will show how the author’s understanding and communicative behavior was modified by the
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patient’s actions. Paradoxically, it will show that the turn taking system of CKPP is
organized around instances when the patient is not participating as an “autonomous
cosubject” (cf., Kögler citation, p. 85, above) of the critical dialog, even if that dialog occurs
within a fundamentally asymmetrical power relationship of dependence. In CKPP one
intervenes when the patient is not working to understand his or her problems for his or her
self.
034
035

I think one way you are trying to keep some powerful feelings away is by turning our conversation to
events in the past that are easier to talk about.

036
037

Yeah to make the comparisons. I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad. I’m in extreme
circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism.
Again, Mrs. P corrected my understanding of her second extended turn by means of

initiating a repair of alignment. This was done through a retrospective sighting/citing of her
turn and who she was as the subject of that turn: the identity of “trying to figure out why I’m
so sad. I’m in extreme circumstances” (036-037) as she grasps “my daughter’s wedding and
the recent terrorism.” (037) My subsequent utterances show alignment to her assumption of
the position “trying to figure out…” by giving her a characterization of herself in her
“extreme” situation. But how did I arrive at this characterization, since it includes terms not
employed by Mrs. P such as “anger”, “contain…inside”?
038
039
040

Perhaps a part of you is feeling sad, scared, and angry at your daughter for getting married as if
she were deserting you now like you felt by your sister, and the problem is you don’t feel you have a
way to contain these feelings inside.
Following from the previous section, this requires interpreting the relational

implications of Mrs. P’s communications, but how? Taking an interpretive look suggests
that it was based on adopting a particular position (analytic attitude) towards the content and
sequence of Mrs. P’s speech thus far in the session, and towards her second extended turn in
particular.
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Mrs. P applies a specific emotional term to her identity – “I’m feeling guilty” (022).
This shows that she understood my previous observation, “It’s like you drop your feelings
that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them” (017-018), as indicating a problem to
be corrected, since she agrees with the assessment and picks one feeling to focus on out of
the miasma of “overwhelming” feelings. In short, in response to “you drop your feelings”
she names one, picking it up, as it were, to look at it rather than just standing in it.
Mrs. P justifies her extended turn by explaining, “Yeah, to make the comparisons”
(036). What Mrs. P appears to be comparing are two different contexts in which some
emotional component of the “extreme circumstances” is at work. The first context for this
upsetting state is motherhood as a backdrop of roles for evaluating her own role in her
daughter’s wedding. It is as if Mrs. P had uttered, “Is the feeling because I’m not taking care
of things for her as a mother should, or maybe I’m a controlling mother like my own and I
have no control that I feel I should?” Yet in 028 she abruptly changes the context of the
upsetting feeling(s) – is she still working on the feeling she called guilt? – to childhood (“I’ve
tried to let my own children,” lines 026-027, is followed by, “the sister who I was in the arms
of,” lines 028-029). In the context of childhood the upsetting feeling is linked to her
grasping her mother as institutional, and her sister as a mother-substitute-sister who, while
more caring than an “institutional mother,” “went off” when Mrs. P was still a child in need
of more than an institutional mother.27 The basis of the “parallel,”(032) then, is her grasp of
significant people as leaving her, whether because they withdraw from her by leaving (the
sister), sending her away or responding only out of duty (the institutional mother), or as a
result of her decision (her sending her children away).

In a previous session Mrs.P had mentioned this memory as her first memory, back in infancy, of being held
by her sister, wearing tartan, in front of a fireplace.
27
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And if one assumes that these two ‘bad’ feelings are linked by virtue of their
sequence in her speech – just as the last word of a sentence can change the meaning of the
whole, or in CA the subsequent utterance shows how the preceding is to be interpreted –
then Mrs. P’s “guilt” has to do with feeling guilt about the overwhelming sense of loss –
grasping her daughter as leaving her by getting married. Moreover, the other part of her
“extreme circumstances” is the “recent terrorism” – i.e., people afraid in a situation
involving the collapse of security and the loss of life (“end of life issues”; 9/11 context). So,
the extreme circumstance is feeling scared in the face of the loss of life (sadness) and feeling
guilty about the magnitude of this feeling because it is interfering with her ability to fulfill her
role as mother to her daughter.
So, the position that changed towards Mrs. P’s extended turn and allowed for the
formulation had to include grasping Mrs. P’s turn as an attempt to figure out what is
upsetting her rather than just a deflection. This involved the seven characteristics of CKPP
already outlined (p. 87, above). First, note taking was used. Second, her material that was
recorded provided the basis for my response. Third, specialized technical knowledge was
drawn upon to formulate how I understood and responded to her material (where did
“angry” and “contain …inside” come from?). Fourth, analogic data was inferred from her
material and used to try and understand her immediate problem (“trying to survive this
week” (001-002), facing “extreme circumstances”). Fifth, explicit or digital data was
employed to understand the problem. Sixth, the responses were made in the form of
interpretive utterances that asserted my beliefs about her experience in the moment, and
seventh, these assertions took the form of a hypothesis.
In Kleinian terms the analytic attitude is that her speech contained “representational
content” that needed to be understood within the context of “[her] particular emotions and
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anxieties and in relation to the whole situation which is present in the analysis” as Klein
articulated the principle of symbolic interpretation in regard to her play technique (Klein,
1955/1975, p. 137). This implicates practices and underlying assumptions of CKPP.
Mrs. P is ostensibly talking about what the separation from her daughter is to her,
how she is painfully grasping it. But this speech is produced in a session that is her last
before she separates from the therapy. Furthermore, she began the session talking about an
“irony”: how in her new post her confidence in growing yet she is afraid. Therapy is a work
situation and Mrs. P is new at it – she has only been a patient for five weeks. So, by this
point in the session I was decoding that Mrs. P was distressed by the pending loss of me, as
one on whom she depends like her sister-daughter-institutional mother (Compare, 067-068,
p. 119, below, where I first explicitly stated this hypothesis to Mrs. P). Furthermore, clinical
tradition assumes that breaks in the treatment, whether holiday, sick days or sometimes even
weekends, register as a significant loss for patients and that “you are safe in assuming that it
will come up,” as Dr. R would say, regarding themes of loss before and after breaks in
treatment. And, as happened in this session, I often times forget this piece of wisdom until
contexts of loss were implicitly or explicitly indexed during a session before a break.
Translating the symbolic content (i.e., not just what she says but how she says it) of
what Mrs. P says is a critical interpretive act. And, as a critical interpretive act, it has a
“ground of possibility” that “is made possible by a largely implicit preunderstanding. This
preunderstanding is internally differentiated into a symbolic sphere of basic beliefs and
assumptions, a practical sphere of acquired habits and practices, and a subjective sphere that
reflects biographical events and experiences” (Kögler, 1996, p. 251, emphasis in original).
Retrospectively, for example, my use of the word “angry” could be an example of
the subjective sphere, the symbolic sphere, or both informing the interpretive act. In terms
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of the symbolic register of Kleinian beliefs and assumptions, using “anger” instead of “guilt”
may have been a misinterpretation based on the understanding that Mrs. P’s guilt was a
result of unconsciously projecting and identifying her daughter as angry towards Mrs. P.
The assumption in this case is that Mrs. P was unable to explicitly index (identify herself) as
an angry person. Instead she positions herself as guilty in the face of someone else’s anger –
a punishment phantasy – which is really Mrs. P’s grasp of her daughter’s wedding. In other
words, a part of her would like to punish her daughter for leaving her, which is why she
sights/cites her marriage as a bad thing. In this case, citing “anger” is an example of trying
to fit Mrs. P’s experience into a theoretical preconception that either does not match the
situation at all or is not the salient issue in terms of her main anxiety of the moment.
On the other hand, or perhaps in tandem with the symbolic aspect, it may have been
that I uttered “anger” from the subjective register, where biographical events and
experiences shaped my understanding as a critical interpreter. In this case I derived “anger”
from how I would feel if I believed someone were abandoning me and leaving me to fend
off fears about death all by myself, or my own reaction to the twin towers attack. “Anger”,
then, would be an ASSOCIATION on my part that is not based on a theoretical
presumption, but rather my own personality and personal experience.
Finally, it could have been that Mrs. P struck me as angry – she might have referred
to her daughter’s wedding in a derogatory tone. In this case, to be with Mrs. P at this
moment of the session would have been like being with a resentful person. Using my
experiential reaction to her self-presentation in this way would have been shaping or
formulating my utterance in terms of the COUNTERTRANSFERENCE – recall that one
of the five questions for framing the interpretive apparatus of CKPP is: what is it like inside
to be with this person? (cf., pp 59-60, above).
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Articulating “the problem” as Mrs. P not feeling she “has a way to contain these
feelings inside” (039-040) also stems from the symbolic sphere of Kleinian presuppositions
about reality. In colloquial speech, people sometimes say things like “I’m so excited I just
can’t contain myself.” This notion of containing oneself is also a technical concept
developed in the Kleinian tradition, referred to as CONTAINING or CONTAINING
FUNCTION. To simplify the explanation, imagine a baby is crying at the top of his lungs.
His mother is instantly alerted and scurries it to make sense of the cry. It doesn’t stop when
she holds him or offers him a bottle. She checks his diaper, talking to him in a calming way.
But as her baby screams louder she may begin to panic and believe her baby is also
panicking. Eventually she figures out he has an earache and puts some medicine in his ear
while continuing to offer reassuring words. In Kleinian lingo, the baby, unable to
communicate through words, resorts to communicating by giving a piece, as it were, of the
experience to his mother. He “evacuated” his unbearable anxiety by putting it in his mother
(SPLITTING it off and PROJECTING IT into her) who was able to make sense of it
because she experienced it as in herself ( she “swallowed” the PROJECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION), resulting in her doing things to help him tolerate it (she acted to
CONTAIN it, provided a CONTAINING FUNCTION). Ultimately this means putting
words to the experience, since at some point the child can say, “mom I have an earache”
rather than just start screaming (i.e., containing it himself). Through the rest of his
childhood there will be countless occasions where the mother will model how he is to handle
states or situation that seem overwhelming. It is this model that becomes his GOOD
INTERNAL OBJECT whose primary function is to contain – i.e., make manageable –
painful emotional experiences, so that they can be understood and communicated through
words.
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Asserting, “the problem is you don’t have a way to contain these feelings inside”
(039-040) is in response to “I’m in extreme circumstances” and “overwhelmed.” In other
words, through her speech, Mrs. P was PROJECTING (as in actors projecting an emotional
identity claim) distress, which stirred up some anxiety in me and I was trying to give it back
to her through what I said in an altered form (the sense I made of it) – that might help her
make more sense of it.
But why did I provide the interpretive utterances when I did? Up to this point the
interpretive analysis has not examined how the turn taking system of everyday conversations
is modified (if at all) for a CKPP therapeutic conversation. We have just examined how the
content and, to some extent, the construction of interpretive utterances is related to the
critical hermeneutic preunderstanding of CKPP. Now the challenge is to look at how the
content, construction, and deployment of interpretive utterances worked together to constitute the
author’s work during the therapeutic conversation. This will be the eighth characteristic of
CKPP tied to the practical, symbolic, and subjective spheres that govern the other seven.
In CA turns are constructed around “transition relevance places” (TRPs): “the spot
that participants recognize as the potential end of a turn, [the] place where a transition from
one speaker to another becomes relevant” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 81). TRPs can be words,
phrases, clauses, or entire utterances. So, did I understand the last word or entire utterance
as the TRP of Mrs. P’s prior speech? (036-037)
041
042
043
044

It could be. Yeah. I feel like I’d add to them remorse. Is remorse a feeling or are
sad and remorse the same thing? Remorse is the biggest and that comes to how I
feel. It’s limiting my concept of my daughter’s freedom. It’s not like she’s being
taken off to jail…
Neither. I argue that identity claims can function as TRPs, conveyed through

emotional signaling. Simple behaviors may also function as TRPs in everyday
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conversation.28 Mrs. P’s response, in fact, suggests that the TRP I recognized was her
attitude displayed through her talk: “I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad” (036). My
interpretive utterances (038-040) provide something to help Mrs. P “figure out why”. Mrs.
P’s conditional agreement and adding of “remorse” shows that she understood my
utterances as a means for comparing what she is feeling to how I described it, refining her
own sense of what it is that she is having difficulty with, “I’d like to add to them remorse.”
In Mrs. P’s next turn she continues to talk about her problem with the wedding.
She not only remarks that “remorse” is the “biggest” problem, but comments on how it is
affecting her grasp of her daughter: “It’s limiting my concept of my daughter’s freedom.”
This last remark suggests that in Mrs. P’s remorseful position she grasps herself as a
defective mother (“feeling guilty” in 022) because the feeling of loss (“so sad,” line 036) was
limiting the extent to which Mrs. P was open to her daughter having interests distinct from
her own. In fact her following utterance, “It’s not like she’s going off to jail,” could be an
attempt to cheer herself up, as if I came out to my car to discover a flat tire and said, “well at
least I didn’t get killed from it blowing out on the freeway.”
Mrs. P continues to speak of the wedding although the tone changes with her grasp
of what the event will entail for herself, particularly her “all [her] hopes, wishes and
ambitions for a daughter that I’ll keep repressing.” Notice the change in position that occurs
in her next speaking turn if we divide her utterances into two units for closer examination:
041-046 and 046-049. Mrs. P explains that she is going to repress these things because she
believes she is not supposed to cry. Beginning with the next turn (halfway through line 046)
she shows that she has changed her understanding from wedding as disaster to wedding as

Take, for example, a child whose mother turns to her and says, “don’t do that.” The mother self-selected a
speaking turn based on the child’s misbehavior. Similarly, “don’t talk back” exemplifies a TRP based on an
offensive attitude from the perspective of the parent, and so on.
28
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having something good and even something great, exceeding expectations (“the most you could
ask for,” line 049).
044
045
046
047
048
049

… She’s getting married and she’s fine and I’m keeping all my
hopes, wishes and ambitions for a daughter that I’ll keep repressing because I’m
not supposed to cry at the wedding. So I probably feel good about the ceremony
itself, ca use it’s being worked on by both sides of the family. But I guess the
greatest thing about it is how both planned the ceremony should go, which is the
most you could ask for in an interfaith wedding.

It is as if she collaboratively completes the injunction not to show how upset she is by doing
the “repressing”; she aligns with herself behaviorally and chooses to focus on the pending
loss of her daughter as really a positive event after all. Mrs. P does “repressing” by using her
subsequent speaking turn to change her identity from mother-to-the-bride-painfullysighting/citing-her-separating-daughter to the ceremony critic who approves of “interfaith
weddings.” Rather than using her speaking turn to continue talking about her painful sense
of her daughter’s wedding, Mrs. P interrupts herself as a mother and speaks from the identity
of chaplain. With this shift of identity she alters her emotional grasp of her daughter’s
wedding. Yet, it is not the chaplain who has the problem with the wedding; it is Mrs. P as
the mother. By shifting to her chaplain identity Mrs. P has stopped speaking about her
problem, “why I’m so sad …in extreme circumstances.”
And, like a collaborative completion, her utterances “makes relevant an acceptance
or rejection in the next turn.” I self-select a turn to accept her repositioning as a rejection of
speaking about her problem, an assertion that Mrs. P ratifies in her next turn:
050
051

Just now when you began to feel unbearably bad about your wishes for your daughter’s wedding you
began to focus on the bright side.

052
053
054
055
056
057

Yeah, that’s the annoying thing that happens. Yeah. Because I’ve always done that and I don’t
keep going and I don’t know why or where I stopped but something over and blocks whatever I try to
get at. I’m sure that happens when I’m doing my work. My PC Response score is totally on the
supportive side [some personality type test they are given] It goes from authoritative to instructional
to all way over to empathic and supportive responses – my natural responses are empathic and very
supportive. But I’m naturally that way, but I cannot keep going [with what she is feeling as first
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058
059
060

mentioned], but that’s kind of improved since I started coming here as it’s been reflected in my
verbatims [group supervision]. I want to know why I do the little cheery deal, which you record as
my dramatic voice.
Again, my response emphasizes some element of the action in the here and now of

our conversation (“Just now when…”) and articulated a sequential relationship between
what Mrs. P experienced and what she did in response to avoid that experience. Mrs. P’s
response to this shows she understood it as a move on my part to select her behavior as the
topic for conversation, since she starts to talk about it as “the annoying thing that happens”
and cites it as a problem for discussion (“I’ve always done that…I don’t know why or
where… whenever I try”). This exchange is another assessment-explanation adjacency pair,
like that noted above (pp. 84-85).
However, she changes the topic of the action from herself (I asserted, “you began to
focus on bright side”) to some thing that “happens” to her in the passive voice (“that’s the
annoying thing that happens”). Notice also that her description, “I don’t keep going”,
applies to this extended turn as well, since her talking about this “annoying thing that
happens” is interrupted briefly by describing her identity as a chaplain again, as defined
through their evaluation instruments (“My PC Response score is totally on the supportive
side”) before returning to me as the one who makes an evaluation of her (“…which you
record as my dramatic voice”).
So far, then, the interpretive analysis shows that there is a to and fro quality to the
turn taking in which Mrs. P and I engaged.29 Mrs. P talked about a problem to some extent,
then talked about something else, which I countered with interpretive utterances that had the
29

While there is a distinction, I think it is obvious that turn taking is related to the content of what is said,
even if Nofsinger never explicitly states this. Otherwise there is no way to account for a person abruptly
changing topic (interrupting and usurping another speaker’s turn) when they are bored with what is being said
by the current speaker. The point of this section is that the turn taking structure of CKPP, as a facet of its
communicative competence, involves “rules” for the exchange of talk based on what and how the patient is
speaking and what is or is not being accomplished by his or her talking.
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effect of shifting the topic of the conversation back to a problem of Mrs. P’s. In turn, Mrs.
P talked in a bit more detail about the problem until she stopped. This pattern is not
random. It reflects a specialized communicative practice on the part of the practitioner of
CKPP in response to a particular move or moves of the patient. Provisionally, the eighth
characteristic of CKPP can be characterized as: make interpretive utterances when the patient has
stopped talking about his or her problem in a way that provides more detail about her experience of it. This
shows that there is more than formulating what one says; there is the issue of adjudicating
the right moments for making one’s moves. So, in addition to the content and construction
of interpretive utterances, the practical, symbolic, and subjective spheres must figure
prominently in shaping how the practitioner of CKPP participates in the turn taking system
of the therapeutic conversation – the deployment of interpretive utterances. Practically, there are
specific practices regarding when to make interpretive utterances; symbolically, these practices
are derived from assumptions CKPP makes regarding infantile existence, particularly
infantile modes of communicating and thinking; subjectively, it was through my supervision
experiences and communications with Dr. R that I learned most of the elements of the
practical and symbolic spheres of CKPP.
As Dr. R described it, in the discourse of the Kleinian tradition “interpretations are
food and therapy is a feeding.” How to interpret – the deployment of interpretive utterances
– is as complex as the mother learning to feed her baby. Just as the right combination of
nutrients, provided in the right amounts, at the right time, are required for the baby’s body
to develop, so too the baby-in-the-patient needs a recognition formula, as it were – the food
of identity. Just as mother’s milk contains the nutrients for the baby’s body, this identityfood (more colloquially referred to as understanding) is contained in the therapist’s
utterances (usually called “demonstrating empathy” in therapy speak).
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A baby learns to feed as the mother learns how to feed her child. At the time the
baby refuses its food for different reasons. What does the mother do at these times?
Sometimes the mother persists because she believes the baby needs to eat even if a fever
makes him cranky or he doesn’t like the new kind of food or flavor. Sometimes the mother
recognizes she has tried feeding too much at once and gives him a smaller portion or spoon.
Sometimes she notices the richer formula causes diarrhea so she may dilute it a bit or hold
off on changing the formula until she believes the baby is ready. All of these adjustments
require the mother to use her judgment and attend to the baby’s ways of communicating for
her to decide what’s the right way to feed this particular baby – especially if her baby has
problems feeding, digesting, metabolizing or excreting waste.
The same sorts of complexities face the therapist trying to make interpretations.
Throughout my supervision with Dr. R, the topic of making INTERPRETATIONS has
been addressed in terms of a few guidelines concerning when, what, and why. On numerous
occasions I was anxious before supervision, afraid of having made a mistake and said
something wrong or stupid. And every time Dr. R emphasized how what I said effected the
“flow of the material”: “It’s not about whether or not what you say is right or not; it’s about
how it effects the flow of material … like a river and you are moving rocks and want to see
how it changes the flow.” This flow of material is the feedback of the feeding baby, how the
baby comports him or herself in response to “the flow” from the mother. “What [she] just
did is like the baby turning her head and spitting out [her] food … notice how [she] had a
hard time taking it in, it was too much” is one way Dr. R would talk to help me see how my
attempts at feeding were going. According to Dr. R, every patient presents with “a problem
of feeding” and the therapist’s job is to feed and point out the problems with feeding, where
“food” and “feeding” are the guiding metaphors for gaining greater experiential
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understanding of themselves, that is, INSIGHT. An understanding about their experience is
spoken by the therapist (food), which the patient may or not: hear (“take in” or “ingest”),
consider (work to “metabolize” or “digest” what’s been said), or respond to in a productive
way (the excreta, as in the case where the patient may be said to “soil” the therapist’s work
and negate what understanding he or she was able to consider).
This INSIGHT consists of who the patient – in PHANTASY – believes they are,
and how and what they do with significant others to participate in creating their conscious
reality. In CKPP this goal is conflict ridden for patients, particularly those with a reduced
capacity for tolerating some of the painful emotional realities that are a part of the human
condition.
Recall that the PARANOID-SCHIZOID POSITION is the condition where the
person is faced with an unbearable emotional grasp of a situation and SPLITS it off –
attempts to get rid of having to experience it – by attributing either the emotion or the
practice that gave rise to the emotion to someone or something else, who/which is then
identified on the basis of this disavowed part of the person. In the PARANOIDSCHIZOID position the focus is on preserving the self against destruction. The evacuated
aspect is felt to be persecutory, a threat to the self and therefore must be annihilated. Since
the other is seen as possessing the dangerous aspect, he or she is sighted/cited as threatening
– “his faeces become persecutory,” as Segal might say (cf., Segal citation, pp. 95-96, above),
or in garden variety manifestations, one might accuse someone of being a “shit” when they
don’t give what one wants or expects.
As long as this aspect of the person is disavowed in this manner then it cannot be
understood as a part or product of the self; it belongs, it is someone else. And, therefore,
any attempts to understand the aspect as an experience of the self will be RESISTED
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because it will intensify the MAIN ANXIETY that caused the aspect to be split off in the
first place. This is a simplified way to explain how “the use of primitive splitting defenses
…are working against understanding” (Josephs, 1982/1989, p. 140).
On the other hand, in the DEPRESSIVE POSITION the foregrounding concern is
the preservation of the other as the source of goodness upon whom one depends.
Returning to our hypothetical infant, suppose the infant has begun teething and biting on
the mother’s breast while feeding. The mother begins weaning, which the baby experiences
as a frustrating reality that he is forced to deal with. Around the same time the baby has
begun to acquire the perceptual and motor capacity to perceive the mother as a whole
person, which makes it harder for him to separate the good and bad experiences into two
separate images of the mother. He begins to have to deal with the fact that the good and
bad breasts are aspects of the same whole embodied person. In this circumstance, his
hateful feelings, when frustrated, conflict with the desire to love the same person. The baby
must then deal with another set of anxieties besides those of fearing for his own existence;
he begins to have concern for the good-but-now-attacked-and-therefore-damaged-mother.
He now has to struggle with the painful feeling of causing the loss of the good (guilt) and the
fear that the good-but-damaged mother might retaliate as he wanted to destroy her (as bad):
I said that the baby experiences depressive feelings, which reach a climax just before,
during and after weaning. This is the state of mind in the baby, which I termed the
‘depressive position’, and I suggested that it is a state of mourning in statu nascendi.
The object which is being mourned is the mother’s breast and all that the breast and
the milk have come to stand for in the infant’s mind: namely, love, goodness, and
security. All of these are felt by the baby to be lost, and lost as a result of his
uncontrollable greedy and destructive phantasies and impulses against his mother’s
breasts … There is a constant interaction between anxieties relating to the ‘external’
mother … and the ‘internal’ mother, and the methods used by the ego for dealing
with these two sets of anxieties are closely related. In the baby’s mind, the ‘internal’
mother is bound up with the ‘external’ one of whom she is a ‘double’, though one
which at once undergoes alterations in his mind through the very process of
internalization; that is to say, her image is influenced by his phantasies, and by
internal stimuli and internal experiences of all kinds. When external situations which
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he lives through become internalized, people, things, situations, and happenings –
the whole inner world which is being built up – become inaccessible to the child’s
accurate observation and judgment, and cannot be verified by the means of
perception which are available in connection with the tangible and palpable objectworld, has an important bearing on the phantastic nature of this inner world. The
ensuing doubts, uncertainties and anxieties act as a continuous incentive to
the young child to observe and make sure about the external object world,
from which the inner world springs, and by these means to understand the
internal one better. The visible mother thus provides continuous proofs of what
the ‘internal’ mother is like, whether she is loving or angry, helpful or revengeful.
The extent to which external reality is able to disprove anxieties and sorrow relating
to the internal reality varies with each individual, but could be taken as one of the
criteria of normality. In children who are so much dominated by their internal world
that their anxieties cannot be sufficiently disproved and counteracted even by the
pleasant aspects of their relationships with people, severe mental difficulties are
unavoidable. (Klein, 1940/1975, pp. 345-347, emphasis added)
Thus, the DEPRESSIVE POSITION is the position of doubting one’s own understanding
of reality by working to differentiate the identity of the Other-in-a-situation from one’s own
PHANTASIZED presupposition of the Other’s being as a such and such. One’s own
emotional states are not immediately attributed to another as either their cause or effect.
The thing or person can begin to be differentiated from one’s emotional grasp of the object.
This is the “depressive level” of using symbols rather than the “symbolic equation” type of
thinking Segal writes about in her above-mentioned paper.
In the DEPRESSIVE POSITION there is “continuous incentive” to observe and
makes sense of how the “external object world” matches or does not match one’s own
preunderstanding of the people and events that world. It manifests itself as a concern for
others as separate persons – who they are, what they think, feel and need – outside the self’s
own agenda. Therefore, it is a situation where the person is able to differentiate a position
they are taking on the world from a definitive grasp of the world or the Other in that world.
Is the breast destroyed or just absent? Am I hungry because the breast is withholding from
me to punish me or do I see the breast as mean because I can’t stand feeling hunger pain? Is
my wife a bitch because dinner isn’t on the table as soon as I walk in the door when I expect
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it, and therefore I should abuse her as she has ‘abused’ me – the paranoid/schizoid response
– or is the missing dinner and hunger pain a sign my wife had some problem that she might
need my help overcoming – the depressive position containment of aggression and concern
for the object? In other words, in the DEPRESSIVE POSITION one can understand
aspects of self experience as aspects of self experience – not someone else’s experience – because
they are able to CONTAIN them “to emotionally manage the likely vicissitudes of human
relating, be that the therapist-patient relationship or the parent-child relationship (or the
intimate adult couple relationship)” (Ruszczynski, 1999, p. 103).
Thus, in CKPP DEPRESSIVE POSITION functioning is a required for critical self
reflection, for INSIGHT into the self:
All our patients come to us, we and they hope, to gain understanding, but how they
hope to gain it must vary, I am suggesting, according to their position; that is,
according to the basic nature of their object relations, anxieties, and defenses. The
very nature of the defenses used in the paranoid-schizoid position in itself militates
against understanding; understanding is frequently, but not always, not what these
patients want. In fact, many are against understanding despite their protests to the
contrary …I suspect that it is only those patients in the depressive position who can
use understanding in the sense that we tend to think of the term ordinarily, I mean in
the sense of discussing, standing aside from a problem, seeking, but even more,
considering explanations … ” (Joseph, 1982, p. 140)
In terms of technical implications for CKPP, Joseph’s and Steiner’s work (cf.,
Steiner, 1993) has emphasized the importance of monitoring “the position from which he or
she [the patient] is operating, so that contact can be achieved and with it real understanding,
as opposed to subtle acting out and pseudo-understanding” (Josephs, 1982, p. 150).
Optimally, in other words, one becomes more proficient at feeding, offering the addition of
some new element of understanding about the patient’s PSYCHIC REALITY in a useable
form to help the patient with the task of figuring out his or her own problems – who they
are, what they feel, what they want, what they say the want but don’t want, etc. With this
understanding it is assumed that the patient will be free to make decisions about what they
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do or do not want to do with regard to what they previously did not know they did, the
components that contributed to their problems.
Dr. R offered the following as a rule of thumb regarding when to interpret: “You
only need to intervene when the patient is defending.” This piece of advice was offered in
the context of explaining that one can look at the flow of material in terms of three basic
moments. The first is ACTIVATION, where the patient is actively working on his or her
problem from the DEPRESSIVE POSITION. The second is ANXIETY or
DEPRESSION where the patient begins to experience emotional upset from working on his
or her problem. This upset, at some point or other, becomes too much to deal with, so the
patient then DEFENDS against the feeling and against working on the problem that
brought up the discomfort. It is this last moment of the three that Dr. R marked as the time
to offer an interpretation, because if the interpretation is close enough to what the patient
can recognize he or she will go back to ACTIVATION and the cycle starts over.
In terms of the inquiry into the turn taking system of CKPP, this suggests that the
TRPs of everyday conversation are modified in CKPP to include the identification of a
pattern of speaking: an attitude towards the self and the subject matter under discussion. In
the portion of the session examined above, this turn taking pattern can be seen in my
interpretive utterances (016-018) where I interpreted Mrs. P to be “deflecting” for the
second time in the session against “overwhelming feelings … fears of falling apart.” Mrs. P
ACTIVATED in her subsequent speech (019-023), beginning to talk about her guilt and
relating it to problem. I understood the rest of her turn (021-023) as a DEFENSIVE
maneuver, judging by my response (034-035) to her turn, sighting/citing her speaking about
her past as “turning our conversation to events of the past that are easier to talk about.”
However, her next turn initiated a repair, to realign my understanding of her turn as an
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example of ACTIVATION, turns where she was “trying to figure out” a problem in her
experience. In response, I realigned my understanding, showing I agreed with her, by
formulating interpretive utterances (038-040) regarding why I believed she was in such
“extreme circumstances.”
Mrs. P ACTIVATED again in the first portion of her subsequent turn (041-046).
This time the painful feeling was called “remorse” which she was able to experience and talk
about for five lines or so (041-046) before DEFENDING by focusing “on the bright side”
as I described it (050-051) and she ultimately renamed “my cheery deal” (059) – after briefly
DEFENDING again (054-057). Notice how ACTIVATION depends on something new
being added to the discussion on the table, more detail about her problem is added to the
ongoing construction of the conversation. This is one way to identify if the patient is
speaking from the DEPRESSIVE POSITION.
In the terms of CKPP, most of the additions comes in the form of an
ASSOCIATION, which Dr. R defined roughly as “when the patient takes something from
the here and now of the discussion and adds something to it.” The same definition also
applies to the therapist, since the therapist’s associations (again, loosely defined as ‘what
comes to mind’ while listening or talking about something) also shape what he or she says.
For example, I told Mrs. P that (lines 038-039) “Perhaps a part of you is sad, scared, and
angry …” For any of the reasons discussed above, “anger” was largely my associations to
“my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism,” which I dropped as an explicit topic
when Mrs. P brought up (added) “remorse” in her subsequent turn.
What you interpret ideally includes “something she doesn’t already know about
herself.” For when Mrs. P explained (036-037) “Yeah to make the comparisons …I’m in
extreme circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism” I could have
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MIRRORED her by replying with something like, “your daughter’s wedding seems like a
catastrophe on the scale of the World Trade Center bombings.” In effect, I would have
been highlighting what she was experiencing or believed to be true about the state of things,
but not adding some other element for her to consider how who she is (or what she does
being the kind of person she is) is implicated in what and how she experiences (cf., “…and
the problem is you don’t feel you have a way to contain these feelings inside,” line 039-040).
As Dr. R reiterated, “your job is to make the unconscious conscious.” So, another part of
keeping the “flow of the river going” is the process of making something that Mrs. P does
known to her that was unknown – although recognizable when shown to her – as in 052
above, she agrees by asserting “that’s the annoying thing that happens.” “That’s” was
recognizable when point out, but simply done moments before and moments later
(beginning with “My PC Response score…,” line 054), as seamless and un-thought-worthy a
shift as changing gears while accelerating your car.
This extended turn of Mrs. P’s (052-060) also reveals something about the clinical
phenomenology of SPLITTING, which up to this point has been described as trying to get
rid of awareness of part of the self (pp. 76-77, above) that is rejected as part of the “me” (p.
78, above), because it is experienced as unbearable (p. 111, above), and therefore impedes
understanding one’s self in relation to others in a more differentiated manner (pp. 113-115,
above). As in Mrs. P’s extended turn above, throughout the session SPLITTING occurs
when the subject who is speaking – the voice, the “I” of the utterances – abruptly changes because an
emotional grasp becomes too much so it can no longer be the foreground subject matter of the talk. Thus,
one “I” starts to talk about “the annoying thing that happens … I’m sure that happens when
I’m doing my work” (055). But instead of say, going on to give an example and “make
comparisons” to “figure out why” as she did in her second extended turn, the chaplain “I”
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resurges again and relates it to how empathic she is. Yet the ascendancy of the chaplain “I”
does not last and her figuring-out voice, so to speak, regains saliency: “I want to know why I
do the little cheery deal, which you record as my dramatic voice.” In fact, the rise and fall of
the chaplain “I” is one way to trace Mrs. P’s movements to the SPLITTING DEFENSE:
“the most you could ask for in an interfaith wedding” (049); “processing things to do with
my daughter’s wedding all this introspective stuff between now and Tuesday when I leave”
(020-021); and the analysis of 005-015, where it was a lready shown to be a struggle to
maintain the saliency of the chaplain “I” and its perspective on things. Furthermore, notice
that there is not a resurgence of her chaplain voice in the latter six-eighths (021-033) of her
second extended turn, which I had erroneously sighted/cited (034-035) as defensive speech.
Now, in CA ‘occasioning’ is the way “[participants] are skilled in using utterances as a
resource for constructing another utterance. We will say that one utterance occasions a later
one, or that certain talk was occasioned by certain earlier talk.” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 69,
emphasis in original). Therefore, this interpretive analysis shows that more than utterances
are occasioned in CKPP; a change of position was occasioned by my prior interpretive
utterances.
Mrs. P’s last utterance 059-060 is a question, which, based on my subsequent
utterance, I understood as a request for a response to understand (“get at” or grasp) more
about her “cheery deal” that “over and blocks” the emotion(s) she tries to speak about. In
this position, Mrs. P is ACTIVATED, sighting/citing one of her own social practices (the
identity “cheery deal”) as the topic for discussion. And this sighting/citing is occasioned by
her alignment with my prior understanding, where I sighted/cited her deflecting speech.
So, another way to talk about the cycle of ACTIVATION è
ANXIETY/DEPRESSION è DEFENSE è INTERPRETATION è ACTIVATION is
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that it defines a turn taking system organized around the occasioning of a position where the
patient sights/cites something he or she does automatically, without awareness and how it
affects some aspect of his or her experience. I am arguing on the basis of the empirical data
that just as one can align with the topic of talk to achieve understanding, one can also align with the position
one takes towards the talk for understanding to take place. I am also arguing this on the basis of
theory since analogic alignment (understanding) is required for digital alignment. (cf., Waltzlawick et
al.) In the terms of Waltzlawick et al., my prior interpretive utterance analogically
communicated a “proposal regarding the future rule of the relationship … by my behavior I
can propose love, hate, combat, etc., but it is up to you to attribute positive or negative
future truth value to my proposals” (p. 101). What I proposed wasn’t hate or combat but
critical self-reflection. This is the physiognomy of “reflexivity-in-interpretation” (cf., Kögler
citation, p. 85, above). I showed or projected reflexivity – a reflective position towards one’s
messaging – to Mrs. P, a sighting/citing of herself that she could (and did) align with by
reflecting on her position. In Kleinian terms this might be called an INTROJECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION move on her part – “taking in” what I fed her.
To the extent the relationship I proposed (a stance for herself to adopt towards her
messaging) was critical hermeneutic reflexivity, we can expect the feeding to address the
symbolic, practical, and subjective spheres as discussed above (cf., p. 102). Recall Mrs. P just
expressed a desire, “I want to know why I do the little cheery deal …”:
061
062
063

Like I’ve been saying. I think these fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed get dropped and
perhaps it’s because you don’t expect another person to stay with you and help you make sense of
what feels overwhelming inside.

064
065

Yeah. [tearing] that make sense. Yeah because principle people at crucial ages for me they
disappeared whether death or loosing a sister going to college or marriage is like a death. Yeah.

066
067
068

So, perhaps inside you feels out of control because of there are several death-like changes you are
dealing with right now – the bombing of the terrorists, your daughter’s wedding, and the fact that we
won’t be meeting next week because you won’t be here
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The feeding is another assessment of her identity, sighting/citing her as too afraid of
being left on her own to deal with “fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed.” I was
sighting/citing her identity in relation to another person as the reason she does the “little
cheery deal,” that “annoying thing” that “blocks” whatever she “tries to get at.” Thus, along
with all eight characteristics already articulated, these interpretive utterances tie Mrs. P’s
“cheery deal” way of dropping “fears of falling apart” (a social practice of the practical
sphere) to beliefs about “another person [‘s]” reality (symbolic sphere) based on personal
experience (subjective sphere)
Of course the “another person” indexed here was myself; Mrs. P did not expect me
to help her “make sense.” The first introductory remark, “Like I’ve been saying” indexes the
first and second responses I offered to Mrs. P in the session: “I think your feeling
overwhelmed inside” (003), “your fears of falling apart … it’s like you drop your feelings that
feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them” (016-018). In fact, these interpretive
utterances are almost a verbatim repetition of my second turn.
Compare this recent exchange (below, box on the left) to the second one of the
session (below, box on the right). The difference between the two assessments is that the
early one (at right) describes how she “deflected” us and offers a theory about why – as if
she sighted/cited us an unable or unwilling to “tolerate” them. The latter assessment does
not mention how her “fears…get dropped” but specifies how we might not “tolerate them”;
the dropping is related to how she is grasping some other person – me – as leaving or not
staying “with you to help you make sense of what feels overwhelming inside.”

121
Notice that in the beginning of the session I indexed our immediate here and now
relationship using “I” and “we” whereas in 062 I said “another person” instead of “me.” In
so far as the instruction of anxiety is to hide one’s identity that may offend the other, one
may argue that it was out of my own anxiety that I said “another person” rather than “me”

061
062
063
064
065

Like I’ve been saying. I think these
fears of falling apart or being
overwhelmed get dropped and
perhaps it’s because you don’t expect
another person to stay with you and
help you make sense of
what feels overwhelming inside.
Yeah. [tearing] that make sense.
Yeah because principle people at
crucial ages for me they
disappeared whether death or loosing
a sister going to college or marriage is
like a death. Yeah.

to avoid identifying (and thereby
implicating) myself as the object of her
fears. In retrospect I did not want to be
identified as so self-absorbed as to think
that after only five sessions Mrs. P would
need my presence so badly that the
possibility of not having it for a week
would register “like a death.” In

And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached
your fears of falling apart a part of you got scared and
deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept.
It’s like you drop your feelings that feel overwhelming
as if we couldn’t tolerate them.
Yeah, I’ve always done that. [Tears stream] Yeah, I’m
probably going to be processing 15,000 different things.
Yeah, processing things to do with my daughter’s
wedding all this introspective stuff between now and
Tuesday when I leave. [Tears stream] This isn’t very
deep -- no for me it is -- I think one of these things is
I’m feeling guilty because I haven’t been able to help out
too much with my daughter’s wedding and it goes way
back because I can’t remember anyone in my family
who hasn’t really been totally involved in their
daughter’s wedding plus the problems I have with the
need to control, usually mom’s do their daughter’s
weddings. But I’m still from that tradition, so I’m
probably feeling a lot of conflict about -- emotionally I
have some input into this. Intellectually I’ve tried to let
my children make all the major decisions on their own.
I think maybe I’ve identified with my own mother who
was major controlling, which is what dynamic women
are. And the sister I was in the arms of -- I think I
used her or she filled the shoes of my mother. I think I
haven’t looked enough at the input she [the sister] had
on my life because she went off when I was ten. I still
have my own mother [her mother died in the 80’s] but
she was -- I don’t know -- an institutional mother. It
was an institutional type relationship a parallel
between my mother sending me off to school at an early
age and my sending my kids away

retrospect that is what I should have said,
and what Dr. R would have pointed out as my own defensive maneuver to avoid something
– perhaps the intensity of the patients’ TRANSFERENCE, or to avoid “being wrong,” or to
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avoid feeling like a “narcissistic fool” as Dr. R once called it. This is an exa mple of how my
COUNTERTRANSFERNCE anxiety (subjective sphere) shaped my utterance.
Recall that Mrs. P and I had only met five times before, so it seemed like it would be the
epitome of my own grandiosity to explicitly say “me” when all this time she has ostensibly
been talking about World Trade Center bombings, her sister, mother, daughter, etc. – even
though, as noted previously, I was indexing our relationship earlier in the session. 30
The second utterance in my response (062) shows that I have understood the point
of much of her previous talk to be about Mrs. P being left, and modified what I understood
to be the reason she was not talking about her feelings that “feel overwhelming” (003,017018), “some powerful feelings” (034) that she experienced as “unbearably bad” (050),
“falling apart … feels overwhelming inside” (061-03). The reason changed from her
sighting/citing our identity as a couple “as if we couldn’t tolerate” to Mrs. P sighting/citing
her own identity as left-alone to-deal-with (“you don’t expect another person to stay with
you and help…” 062) that she will eventually identify as being an orphan (cf., 069-070, 071,
078, below)
Mrs. P ratifies this assessment in her next turn and elaborates. Yet notice how
different Mrs. P’s elaboration is to my assessment here when compared with her two
extended turns in the beginning of the session. Here her response is an explanatory
compliment to my move. She is speaking from the position of the identity left-alone-to-dealwith, (i.e., in the face of “principle people” who have “disappeared”) and from the vantage
point of that identity she grasps deaths: “death or loosing a sister going to college or
marriage is like a death.” And by speaking as the subject of this identity, she is showing that
There was also another aspect to my COUNTERTRANSFERENCE anxiety. Up until this session I had
been worrying that Mrs. P was not going to come back for treatment after her holiday, which manifested itself
in prior sessions when I would interpret that she wasn’t coming back or through double checking with her that
she was planning to come back for her sessions the following week.
30
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she is aligning with and ratifying left-alone-to-deal-with as the kind of person I had understood
her to be.
However, this explanatory compliment is much more succinct than her attempt at
the beginning of the session (cf., Box at right, page 121), which is both more wordy and less
coherent due to her anxiety as already shown (Chapter 3). So, in this instance the pragmatic
effect of “feeding” critical hermeneutic self-reflexivity – offering through discourse the
occasion to assume a self-distanciated, sighting/citing of her identity – in a way that she
could align with was that her speech became more coherent. Thus, her anxiety was lessened;
the urgency for avoiding an identity through deflecting speech recessed in saliency – at least
for the moment. In Kleinian terms my interpretation had a CONTAINING effect – I had
“taken in” some of the anxiety Mrs. P was showing (“projecting”), “metabolized” it or made
some sense of it, and fed it back to her as an understanding which she “took in,” and it
helped reduce her MAIN ANXIETY through recognition. Through feeding recognition
came acceptance and an identity that had only been indirectly heard from the beginning of
the session. This identity has a voice concerned with losses in the situation of “like a death”
(065). The loss of a significant Other on whom she depended in an asymmetrical
relationship is grasped as death, and it’s an overwhelming place from which to take a
perspective and talk about. This voice is in stark contrast to her “dramatic voice” as Mrs. P.
characterized it above (060), that does its “cheery deal.”
Indeed, Mrs. P described events linked with death in her first two extended turns:
“people in crisis or end of life issues” in the context of her work (008); “the whole thing of
counselors being sought out like madmen” in the context of 9/11 (011); the motherhood
context of “my daughter’s wedding” (023); the childhood context of the sister who “filled
the shoes” (029) of Mrs. P’s “institutional mother,” (031-032) who sent her off to school as
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Mrs. P sent her own kids off to school. Perhaps, then, these other contexts must be viewed
in light of a supra-ordinate context, the context of death-like changes as mothered.
In terms of the pragmatics of analogical and digital messaging, Mrs. P’s
communicative behavior might be understood in the following way. Mrs. P gave me the
form that contained three “silences” that deal with analogical aspects of messaging. If she
had been able to translate her analogical propositions into digital language she might have
completed the sentences with: “One of the easiest ways to hurt me is to desert me in my
neediness because it’s like death”; “In relationship to me I wish men would not leave me at “principle
times””; “In relationship to me I wish women would not leave me at “principle times”.” Mrs. P
then said that she was “trying to survive” the week. Translating this digital content in terms
of the analogical proposition, her message is “I’m in a state of panic because the rule of this
relationship is annihilation by abandonment, so I don’t want to talk about it to you.”
In my previous (066-068) turn, I showed that I understood her to be grasping her
absence from therapy in similar terms – as a “death like” change, which she selects as the
topic among the other events I mentioned:
069
070
071
072

Yeah cause I like routine right and I’m not going to be here next week and I’m like one of those
orphans – the smartest kids are the one’s who get abandoned in hospitals and learn to have to get
along by being nice which fends off being orphaned. Yeah, because that image just came to me right
now I can – those little orphaned AIDS babies who have been dropped like a hot potato.
Mrs. P ratifies my addition of the absence of therapy from her life next week as

another topic to be understood within the set of other death-like changes. Indeed, she selfselects it to continue talking about. Missing therapy is a death-like change for “one of those
orphans,” who like Mrs. P, must “fend off being orphaned.” How does an orphan fend off
being orphaned? Unless, perhaps, what this contradictory statement implies is that as an
orphan she is trying to fend off being kicked out of the therapy-orphanage by her new
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institutional mother. An orphan without an orphanage is on the street, homeless, and
struggling to “survive this week.”
In terms of emotional pragmatics, Mrs. P has a fearful grasp of having her existence
negated (denied) by the withdrawal of the depended-upon Other. She was sighting/citing a
needed Other in an asymmetrical power relationship as reacting with dread in the face of her
being too-much-to-handle, like a “hot potato.” For de Rivera (1977, pp. 62-65) this is the
grasp of panic, the emotion that instructs the self not to let the offending behavior, speech,
or identity exist. The orphan who has to act “nice” to “fend off being orphaned” is an
orphan who cannot show her own distinct interests and concerns, like “those little orphaned
AIDS babies” whose needs are so taxing and extensive that their mother’s leave them out of
dread in the face of the challenge, dropping them “like a hot potato.” Yet, it also seems to
describe Mrs. P’s predicament in regard to her daughter’s wedding – she has to be the “nice”
mother who doesn’t cry too much at her daughter’s wedding. Mrs. P who previously
described her mother as an “institutional mother” (031-032) now describes herself as an
institutional orphan – one left in the hospital facing death, terminally ill no less. Cast in this
light, her second remark of the entire session, “I’m trying to survive this week” takes on a
literal significance as a expression of panic, particularly given the fact that her first utterance
is an admission that she was not compliant – not the “nice orphan” – not having completed
the form as I had requested weeks earlier.
The verb “dropped” is noteworthy, since the other things that have been assigned as
the objects of dropping during our conversation are her feelings in relation to another (“It’s
like you drop your feelings that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them” 017-018,
p. 63, above; “these fears of falling apart or being orphaned get dropped … because you
don’t expect another person to stay with you and help you make sense…” 061-062, p.121,
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above). It is Mrs. P’s AIDS baby (a ba by feeling overwhelmed) identity that has been
dropped by her speech that deflects, even though she has been attributing that dropping to
her sister, daughter, mother and me as the therapist-mother; in Kleinian terms she has been
PROJECTIVELY IDENTIFYING her sister, daughter and me as “institutional mother[s]”.
So, when Mrs. P self-selects to speak in this turn by choosing the topic of her
absence from me in the week to come, she has turned and grasped her therapy with me as an
institutional relationship where she is terminally ill and under the threat of abandonment for
her neediness by me, identified as the institutional mother. Hence, Mrs. P was grasping me
as a dread-filled institutional mother and her grasp was that of panic, the panic of having her
existence as a separate being negated should it be sighted/cited.
073
074

What I’m hearing is that right now you live with fears of being dropped by me like you felt dropped
by your mother as a baby
However, I was not the one who has been dropping her orphaned AIDS baby identity through

deflecting speech. As this record shows, I was doing the opposite. I was actively pursuing this
voice through refining my grasp of who Mrs. P was: forwarding a grasp of her identity and
adjusting it based on what she said and did through her responses, then forwarding it again
in three or four successive cycles.
Yet, it seems that this is not the only grasp Mrs. P may have of me at this point, since
she is continuing to talk from the perspective of the AIDS baby-self. Recall, in the
beginning of the session she said, “…and it’s ironic too because at the same time I feel like
I’m making some progress in my new post. In one sense it’s all brand new and in another
it’s what I’ve always thrived on – it’s like crisis” (005-006, p. 63, above). So, if the “crisis”
she has always “thrived on” is her state of panic as left-alone-to-deal-with (p.121, above),
and then what is “all brand new” might be the contradiction that I was not leaving-heralone-to-deal-with now, in her “new post” as a patient. In other words, the “irony” she
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mentions is that something about this relationship is not how she expected it to be, like the
other relationships of asymmetrical dependency in which she has been.
This section has examined these cycles as the turn taking system of CKPP that is
organized around occasioning not just understanding, but a specific position or attitude
towards what is understood and how it is understood. The analysis showed that the
pragmatic function of these cycles is grounded in the critical hermeneutics of CKPP and its
presuppositions of understanding. Their purpose was shown to give feedback – pun
intended – that is characterized by reflexivity-in-interpretation, where the analogical aspect
of the patient’s messaging is translated into digital interpretive utterances. When Mrs. P
recognized her situation in what I said it contained the anxiety that made it difficult for the
patient to digitize the analogical aspects of her experience. Finally, when the patient
momentarily swallowed the feeding, she assumed a self-distanciated position of critical selfreflection where she worked to translate the analogical aspects of her experience into digital
communication.
However, showing the positioning of the patient in front of a point where she may
or may not pivot, turn and adopt the role of critical self-reflection does not address how
talking to the “infant-in-the-patient” is necessary for subjectivizing work of CKPP. This
following chapter, after a summary of findings from the first two, will look into this
question.

5. Weaning: Discussion and conclusion
At weaning time the infant feels he has lost the first loved object – the mother’s
breast – both as an external and as an introjected object, and that his loss is due to
his hatred, aggression, and greed. Weaning thus accentuates his depressive feelings
and amounts to a state of mourning. The suffering inherent in the depressive
position is bound up with an increasing insight into psychic reality, which in turn
contributes to a better understanding of the external world… Failure in working
through the depressive position is inextricably linked with a predominance of
defences, which entail a stifling of emotions and phantasy life, and hinder insight. …
It is only by analyzing the negative as well as the positive transference that anxiety is reduced at
the root. In the course of the treatment, the psycho-analyst comes to represent in
the transference situation a variety of figures corresponding to those, which were
introjected in early development (Klein, 1929; Strachey, 1934). He is, therefore, at
times introjected as a persecutor, at other times as an ideal figure, with all shades and
degrees in between.
As persecutory and depressive anxieties are experienced and ultimately reduced in
analysis … the earliest frightening figures undergo an essential alteration in the
patient’s mind. … Good objects – as distinct from idealized ones – can be securely
established in the mind only if the strong split between persecutory and ideal figures
is diminished, if aggressive and libidinal impulses have come closer together and
hatred has been mitigated by love. Such advance in the capacity to synthesize is
proof that the splitting processes, which, in my view, originate in earliest infancy,
have diminished and that integration of the ego in depth has come about. When
these positive features are sufficiently established we are justified in thinking that the
termination of an analysis is not premature … (Klein, 1950/1975, pp. 44-47,
emphasis in original)
TERMINATION is the term for the situation where the therapist-breast disappears
“irrevocably.” This chapter will argue that contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytically
oriented psychotherapy as a whole and as the turn taking system governing each session may be
understood as weaning. Provisionally, then, weaning is the situation of asymmetrical
dependence where self-subject formation is fostered at the same time that infantile desires,
fears, and phantasies are elicited so they can be mourned – not reinforced. This, then, is the
endpoint or “goal” of CKPP viewed as a language game, as a specialized type of
communicative competence.
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This study has employed a hermeneutic methodology to articulate the specialized
communicative competence of CKPP. It has shown that CKPP is a specialized discourse
and as such it has a unique way in which it coordinates behavior with, “… a set of norms,
preferences, and expectations relating language to context, which speaker-hearers draw on and modify in
producing and making sense out of language” (Ochs, 1990, p. 289, italics in original). And, as a
specialized discourse it requires the therapist to possess a specialized communicative
competence, “basic qualifications of speech and symbolic interaction (role behavior) at his
disposal” (Habermas, 1970, p. 138). The aim of this discourse is an environment for “selfformative processes” (cf., McCarthy, 1978, pp. 203-205).
This environment is made up of controlled conditions that include everything from
the length of the sessions and the fee to seven characteristics that typify how, what, why
(Chapter 3) and when (Chapter 4) the therapist speaks. The therapist uses interpretive
utterances to occasion the self-initiated positioning of the patient in a critical self-reflective
manner (Chapter 3) – where the patient examines his or her experience in terms of basic
background assumptions, social practices of power, and biographical events (Chapter 4).
Formulating and reformulating these interpretive utterances in terms of relational content
(analogical decoding) and timing was shown to draw on the presuppositions of
understanding – symbolic, practical and subjective spheres – that make up the critical
hermeneutics of CKPP (Chapter 4). This process of formulating and reformulating, in turn,
defines the turn taking system of CKPP that requires the seven characteristics of CKPP
already outlined (Chapter 3). Finally, the turn taking system of CKPP that organizes
interpretive utterances by governing their deployment defines the self-formative processes of
CKPP as weaning.
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However, what remains to be discussed is the implication of this communicative
competence to understand the paradox of subjection, defined as the longing to submit and
be subject to a power in order to become as a subject. How does CKPP address this
paradox of subjection? And how is the handling of anxiety in CKPP the means by which
the “infantile transference” or situation of infantile dependence is created through the
deployment of interpretive utterances that articulate the sighting/citing of identity? In other
words, what is the allure and anxiety of weaning?
The anxiety of weaning is posited as the anxiety of existing as a separate being-intime with another who demonstrates the capacity to articulate aspects of experience and
motivations better than the patient does for him or herself. The transgressively intimate
utterances of the therapist create an intimacy in a conversation that is lopsided and therefore
intimidating.31 Thus, the asymmetrical relationship of dependence is a necessary condition
for CKPP to operate, since it simulates (or indexes in CA terms) the asymmetrical
relationship of dependence in infancy. In so far as the experience of the mother’s body is
being-in-time for the infant, becoming a separate self in time involves a loss, a negation
within this pre-dualistic milieu to for recognition of the infant’s separate being. Thus, the
absences of the mother in weaning, as the first signs of her existence as separate from the
infant, are experienced as the sign of death – a threatening negation within the infant’s
existence, of separation from the source of the self’s meaningful recognition.

31

According to An elementary Latin dictionary (Lewis, 1891/1993) the word “intimate”(verb) is derived from
the Latin intimates, pp. of intimare “to put in,” “announce,” and the superlative intimus, “innermost,” “deepest,”
and “profound.” Likewise the adverbial form intime is defined as the “inwardly.” Thus, as intimate utterances
about the patient, the interpretations of CKPP are announcements of the inward or innermost. In so far as the
indexical preposition “in” populates my interpretive utterances and Mrs. P. aligns with them this
characterization would appear to hold true. Tracing the process by which the therapeutic discourse of CKPP,
as an ontological accomplishment, creates this “inner” is one aspect of CKPP that will not be addressed in this
study.
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On the other hand, the patient desires alignment with the therapist’s interpretive
utterances because learning how the self works within the attentive gaze of a depended upon
other mitigates the anxiety of being a separate self in time – one feels one belongs to another
on the very basis one fears not belonging. This reverses a double estrangement (within the
self who speaks and between the self and the other) by a double recognition (by the self that
recognizes the experience in the sightings/citation of the other). In other words, whatever
aspects of being-a-self-in-time cannot be brought within the set of sharable experiences on
the basis of language remain terms of exclusion from others and from the self that is one
subject among others, by virtue of a shared communicative competence in time – hence,
they are terms for a sense of a present and future isolation both inside and outside the self.
Thus, the discussion will require some further analysis within an altered interpretive
framework. For what will be shown (next section) is that in CKPP the therapist’s utterances
transgress the range of the patient’s experience (the “horizon” called consciousness) and
thereby open a site for the patient’s unnamed anxiety to be worded within the discursive site
occupied by therapist who works to sight/cite it. It is hypothesized that these transgressive
utterances are alluring because they satisfy the following condition. In so far as they are
based on decoding the cryptic expressions of the patient, they re-create the situation where
the part of the self that attempts to be understood without having to communicate explicitly
can be satisfied – that is, it can avoid the paradox of adult subjectivity by exempting itself
from the communicative requirements of intelligibility as an adult subject. In short, the
transgressive utterances provide the occasion for the pleasure of being intimately known.
They are literally intimate utterances characterized by announcing what is inside the patient.
This pleasure, in turn, is related to the isolation from a lack of intimacy and the anxiety
involved in production of this intimacy.
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It turns out that the paradox of subjection is the paradox of being together with and
yet separate from the therapist. CKPP addresses this paradox in that the job of the therapist
is to embody the displacement or deferral of this paradox for the patient by articulating the
patient’s preverbal expectations of the therapist, thereby dislodging them from their
definitive role in defining the patient’s reality with and towards the Other.

Weaning: The allure and anxiety of becoming a subject
This section examines how CKPP addresses the patient as the subject of his or her
experience and shows the patient how and what they unwittingly do to prevent selfsubjection. Self-subjection is an intimate sighting/citing of experience in language, which
allows problematic experience to become the subject of the patient’s conscious
understanding and thereby his or her conscious action. This is what Dr. R referred to in her
injunction to “describe the patient’s inner experience.” In other words, the patient can gain
greater subjectivity in his or her life and feel less subject to problematic experiences. This
will require adjusting the interpretive framework of the analysis to re-examine how the
discursive work noted in the previous chapter contributed to subject formation. It turns out
that addressing the infant-in-the-patient is central in CKPP because the infant-in-the-patient
is the boundary where problematic experience can be materialized in discourse. The infantin-the-patient is a nascent (pre-verbal) self-possibility. Once materialized, it can become a
basis for the self to subjectify its own experience.
In Freud’s theory the structure of the mind is composed of three main parts
differentiated by their functions. The id, most closely related to the body, is the
reservoir of the instincts and thus the source of all mental activities. This means that
it is the dynamic matrix from which the other systems, ego and super-ego, derive.
The id represents a person’s unconscious, most primitive and elemental urges, which
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are dictatorial and do not know compromise or renunciation. The ego is the
interpreter and intermediary between the various parts of the mind and the outside
world. The super-ego is the internal representative of the person’s most important
objects, his parents, the internal residue of his earliest and most important emotional
ties. It is the system of all morality, conscious and unconscious.
These differentiations are brought about by the fact that the individual exists in a
world on which he is dependent by virtue of his instincts: his wish to keep alive, his
desire for pleasure and his fear of destruction.
It seems evident that an organism, which depends to vast extent on organisms
and powers outside itself, for attaining its purposes, must be influenced and changed
by such contacts. Now what are the processes by which these alterations
(differentiations of the original substance) are brought about? I intend to show in this
section the role, which the mechanisms of introjection and projection play in relation
to these changes. (Heimann, 1953, p. 122, emphasis added)
In the Kleinian tradition INTROJECTION and PROJECTION serve as the terms
for trying to understand the development of the person by means of exchange between inside
and outside to avoid the mind-body-world cleavages.32 The phantasies about the inner world
are the relational meanings ascribed to the infant’s bodily experiences: breathing, eating,
voiding, burping, cramps, sounds, lights, etc. Trying to imagine this requires suspending
one’s adult natural attitude where the body operates as a backdrop for whatever we see, say,

32

Heimann, Isaacs and Klein were aware of the problem of using dualistic terms for explaining how the infant
comes to have a self be virtue of its relations with others:
The phantasies about the inner world are inseparable from the infant’s relation with the outer world
and real people. It is only a limitation in our means of description, which makes it appear as if there
were two distinct entities, which influence one another, instead of one whole, one multi-faceted
interacting experience. (Heimann, 1953, p. 156)
It was said by Dr. W. C. M. Scott, in the Discussion at the British Psycho-Analytical Society, 1943,
that the adult way of regarding the body and the mind as two separate sorts of experiences can
certainly not hold true for the infant’s world. It is easier for adults to observe actual sucking than to
remember or understand what the experience of sucking is to the infant, for whom there is no
dichotomy of body and mind, but a single, undifferentiated experience of sucking and
phantisizing. Even those aspects of psychological experience which we later on distinguish
as ‘sensation’, ‘feeling’, etc., cannot in the early days be distinguished and separated. (Isaacs,
1952, Fn2, p. 92, emphasis added)
The Kleinian doctrine of phantasy can be viewed as an attempt to overcome the dualistic constraints of
language. In order for there to be a shared world, there must be a way to account for that which is not shared,
figurable in spatial terms of inside and outside. Phantasies are ‘distortions’ of the shared world embedded in
the body. Thus, the concept of phantasy is an attempt to overcome the mind/body self/other dualisms.
Furthermore, if there were only one world as some would like to think, then how could there ever be creativity
or alterity? A monism of Being is not the only alternative to Descartes’ ontological dualism.
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hear, and do (cf., Merleu-Ponty, 1962/1992). For the infant the body and its mobile flux of
experiences are in the foreground of its awareness, since it has to learn how to exist as a
body-in-time with Others. If the light is too bright then close your eyes and turn away; if the
colors are pleasing to the eye then stare and grab the thing being dangled. The first
challenge for the infant to master – one that is so overpracticed for adults that we are
scarcely aware it goes on – is how to gain some control over what goes in and out of his or
her body, physically, perceptually, and emotionally:
Life is maintained through an organism’s intake of foreign but useful matter and
discharge of its own, but harmful, matter. Intake and discharge are the most
fundamental processes of any living organism. The mind, also a part of a living
organism, is no exception to this rule: it achieves adaptation and progress by
employing throughout its existence the fundamental process of introjection and
projection. The experiences of introducing something into the self and expelling
something from it are psychic events of the first magnitude. They are the basic
processes, not only for maintaining life (as in physical metabolism), but for all
differentiations and modifications in any given organism. Such taking in and
expelling consists of an active interplay between the organism and the outer world;
on this primordial pattern rests all intercourse between subject and object, no matter
how complex and sophisticated such intercourse appears. (I believe that in the last
analysis we may find it at bottom of all our complicated dealings with one another.)
The patterns Nature uses seem to be few, but it is inexhaustible in their variation.
The combined action of introjection and projection accounts for the change of a
part of the id into an ego; disturbances in this interplay lead to failures in
development…
The view that introjection and projection are the architects of the mental
structure and that they build up the ego [and super-ego] from the beginning of life is
not held universally among psycho-analysts. It is mainly the work of Melanie Klein’s
researches, which have yielded the data enabling us to appreciate this role of
introjection and projection. (Ibid, p. 129)
Take the following situation as an example to illustrate internalization. One week
you visit your friend with her infant and, like dozens of times already, she changes his diaper
by holding onto his legs at the ankles and lifting his bottom to pull out the soiled diaper
while talking to him in “you” terms (“You’re such a good boy,” “Oh, you’re all dirty,” and
so on as mothers can do). Two weeks later you visit her again but you notice that while you
are playing with the baby he suddenly lifts his legs while on his back, a behavior you haven’t
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seen before. You ask and his mother says, “Oh, that means he has to be changed … You’re
such a good boy!” The baby has managed to connect the internal sensation of discomfort
with a behavior to make a claim on mother and thereby effect a change in the flow of his
sensory experiences. All this is tied together with the auditory sensation of “you’re …”
Throughout the duration of infancy and early childhood he or she will hear
thousands of “you” predications. It is through bringing his or her experiences into material
language that the subject is formed from “the original substance” Heimann refers to in the
quote above. Yet for this to happen the infant and child must gradually give up the phantasy
of OMNIPOTENCE that has been easily assumed by the infant, given the scenario just
described, since it lends itself to the experience that he controls his world (his body-mother’s
body) as an extension of his desire of the moment:
The essential difference between infantile and mature object-relations is that,
whereas the adult conceives of the object as existing independently of himself, for
the infant it always refers in some way to himself. It exists only by virtue of its
function for the infant, and only in the world bounded by his own experiences.
Whilst in reality the infant is utterly helpless and depends for the maintenance of his
life completely on his mother (or her substitute), in phantasy he assumes an
omnipotent position to his objects; they belong to him, are part of him, live only
through and for him – he continues the pre-natal oneness with the mother….
Two main patterns follow from the operation of introjection and projection in
early object-relations, and their interaction leads to confusing and unstable situations.
(1) The infant’s feelings about his objects essentially revolve around their being
‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ (and they are closely knit with his sensations)
(2) Within the fusion between self and object the infant tends to usurp the
object’s ‘good’, i.e., pleasurable qualities, and treat them as belonging to the self, and
to disown his ‘bad’ painful qualities and treat them as belonging to the object. In
other words, there is a tendency to introject what is pleasurable and to split off what
is painful. The connection between projection and badness is of particular
significance for the understanding of infantile anxiety33 (Heimann, 1953, p. 142-143)
However, the omnipotent attitude is also the source of death anxiety. Just as
omnipotent gratification is interpreted as oneness with a perfect being, so omnipotent hatred

Heimann notes in a footnote to this passage the example of “the little boy who, seeing his baby sister
sucking at his mother’s breast, pointed to it and said to his mother: ‘That is what you bit me with.’”
33
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is interpreted as the threat of Armageddon; if love can conjure a heaven of perfect being
then hate conjures hell and the end of being. If all goes well, this anxiety and omnipotent
attitude motivates the young child to learn language and play with things as symbols, since he
or she seeks to discern, confirm, and disconfirm phantasies in every tangible thing (blocks,
trains, words, pets, the therapist’s body parts and faculties) representing his or her own
organs and their functioning in the context of a relationship.34 Indeed, in the Kleinian
tradition the acquisition of language and development of cognitive capacities, contra the
classical Freudian position, is motivated by the drive to better manage the anxiety and
emotional pain of life – not to get rid of them as so many discharges. Language helps the
young child to deal with his or her anxiety as a temporal being facing the recurrence of
painful and pleasurable experiences.
Klein postulated that the sense of time begins with the birth experience – the
prototype for a sense of before and after or “periodicity” (cf., Klein, 1923/1975, p. 99). This
implies that for Klein a baby’s being as a being-in-time is to be understood as repetition that
first occurs in the context of the changing relationship to the mother’s body. Being heaved
into the world from the comfort of the womb is the prototype for time, life, and death. It is
a prototype for life in that the infant has a phantasy of the oneness that was. In other words
the longing for the lost oneness within the mother becomes the prototype for the sense of
34

Isaacs offers a vivid example where this process can be derailed into a neurotic symptom:
…a little girl of one year and eight months, with poor speech development, saw a shoe of her
mother’s from which the sole was flapping about. The child was horrified, and screamed in terror.
For about a week she would shrink away and scream if she saw her mother wearing any shoes at all,
and for some time could only tolerate her mother’s wearing a pair of brightly coloured house shoes.
The particular offending pair was not worn for several months. The child gradually forgot about the
terror, and let her mother wear any sort of shoes. At two years and eleven months, however (fifteen
months later), she suddenly said to her mother in a frightened voice, ‘Where are Mummy’s broken
shoes?’ Her mother hastily said, fearing another screaming attack, that she had sent them away, and
the child then commented, ‘They might have eaten me right up’.
The flapping shoe was thus seen by the child as a threatening mouth, and responded to as such, at
one year and eight months, even though the phantasy could not be put into words till more than a
year later. Here, then, we have the clearest possible evidence that a phantasy can be felt, and felt as
real, long before it can be put into words. (Isaacs, 1952, pp. 90-91, italics in original)
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“life,” the breast identified as good. Similarly, the urge to reject the painful change of birth
becomes the prototype for the sense of “death,” the breast identified as persecutory, and,
together with the sense of time, paranoid anxiety – the possibility of being persecuted by the
future, by what might come next as the sign of a “death,” a bad breast. The baby has an
urge to be (Eros) and a hatred for what it does not want to be (Thanatos) in time, since
his/her being is bound to repeat itself in one way or another. This implies that the infant’s
relationship to the mother’s body is the paradigm for time and how he or she will fair
(good=life or bad=death) from one moment to the next.35
Thus, at some point the baby begins to differentiate painful states (loss of being =
loss of oneness with the mother) from death and does this with and only with the help of the
mother, who CONTAINS the anxiety, particularly as the baby begins the process of
weaning, when “oral aggression” is at its peak (the baby can now bite the unsatisfying
breast).
Coming to our main problem, we find that the child feels, when the breast is wanted
but not there, as if it were lost for ever; since the conception of the breast extends to
that of the mother, the feelings of having lost the breast lead to the fear of having
lost the loved mother entirely, and this means not only the real mother, but also the
good mother within. In my experience this fear of the total loss of the good object
(internalized and external) is interwoven with feelings of guilt of having destroyed
her (eaten her up), and then the child feels that her loss is a punishment for his
dreadful deed; thus, the most distressing and conflicting feelings become associated
with frustration, and it is these which make the pain of what seems like a simple
thwarting so poignant. The actual experience of weaning greatly reinforces these
painful feelings or tends to substantiate these fears; but in so far as the baby never
has uninterrupted possession of the breast, and over and over again is in a state of
lacking it, one could say that, in a sense, he is in a constant state of being weaned or
at least in a state leading up to weaning. Nevertheless, the crucial point is reached at
the actual weaning when the loss is complete and the breast or bottle is gone
irrevocably. (Klein, 1936/1975, p. 295)
35

For Phillips (1998) the “violent encroachments” of the “accidental eventness” is the ontological boundary
that Time itself presents, inciting the infant to “dramatize spatially” through phantasy and create the innerouter distinction as well as the impetus to knowledge of the unpredictable “outer” world. “In this sense,
external reality is an a priori condition of infantile development, as the ‘outside-in-the-inside’ or the enigmatic
object in the phantasy” (p. 172).
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The baby needs the mother to help him differentiate what possible experiences put
him in the face of death and which do not, so that every frustration from change does not
feel like death – an unbearable state. Where she is successful the baby is able to
INTROJECT this security – make it a part of self-experience. The painful experience can be
CONTAINED, and later, understood and communicated through verbal language. This is
the contemporary Kleinian conception of EMPATHY. 36
For Bion the elements of the baby’s (or patient’s) experience that register but have
no distinct meaning are “beta elements.” The mother (or therapist), by CONTAINING,
uses her “alpha function” to make the beta elements less concrete and material by putting
her baby’s experience into words (“Oh, its O.K., you just have an ear ache”). Again, the
soothing and cooing and sensuous qualities of the words “bind” the anxiety of death the
pain of the earache stimulates. While the earache may still hurt, the infant can suffer the
pain more easily because the edge of the annihilation fear has been removed by the mother’s
understanding. Beta elements are one example of
Alpha function is an example of

, Bion’s symbol for the contained.

, his symbol for the container.

The archetype for
is the mother’s breast/infant. The scene … is of an infant
in pain (patient’s mind) searching for and being found by the mother’s breast
(analyst’s mind). Bion’s conceptualization is that the personality is constituted out of
dual elements:
. In this case the patient’s mind had not developed the concept
of a strengthening
. This is neither a static situation nor one in which the
infant is passively being ‘held’; Bion’s theory is that it is dynamic. There is a
seeking a , and there is an intercourse between the two. (Symington &
Symington, 1996, p. 52)
So, for Bion, the baby searches for a sense of itself in the mother’s mind, an identity that can
make sense of an experience that registers but has no determinate form, an agitating gap, as
it were, in his or her sense of self-in-a-situation. Following this line of thinking, the therapist
36

For an explication of the Kleinian conception of empathy in terms of projective identification,
container/contained, beta elements, and alpha function see Etchegoyen (1977).
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job is to contain the patient’s unbearable experience through his or her understanding and
model for the patient the

so the patient can gain a sense of confidence in the strength

of their self to bear pain by understanding it.37 Yet, how can this process be examined as a
result of productive dialog? Gadamer’s examination of the relationship between the word
and experience may shed some light on this question, since the therapist is not aiming to
provide an experience that never occurred but a new experience through his or her
discourse:
Although in bringing up children, for example, parents may try to spare them certain
experiences, experience as a whole is not something anyone can be spared. Rather,
experience in this sense inevitably involves many disappointments of one’s
expectations and only thus is experience acquired. That experience refers chiefly to
painful and disagreeable experiences does not mean that we are being especially
pessimistic, but can be seen directly from its nature. Only through negative instances
do we acquire new experiences, as Bacon saw. Every experience worthy of the name
thwarts an expectation. Thus, the historical nature of man essentially implies a
fundamental negativity that emerges in relation between experience and insight. …
[Insight] always involves an escape from something that had deceived us and held
us captive. Thus insight always involves an element of self-knowledge and
constitutes a necessary side of what we call experience in the proper sense. …
In it [experience in general] all dogmatism, which proceeds from the soaring
desires of the human heart, reaches an absolute barrier. Experience teaches us to
acknowledge the real. … Real experience is that whereby man becomes aware of his
finiteness. (Gadamer, 1960/1994, p. 356-357)
For Gadamer consciousness is the experiencing self; every new experience is a
moment of self-awareness since it involves the thwarting of a prior desire for what was
anticipated in experience. Thus, having been thwarted, the desire that conditioned the object
as it was anticipated becomes both an object of self-awareness and the limit of the self.
Hence a real experience “is that whereby man becomes aware of his finiteness.” Moreover,
the medium of this real experience is language, since:

For Bion ATTACKS ON LINKING are attacks on the process of
understanding, a conception.
37

and

uniting to form an
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Being that can be understood is language. … To be sure, what comes into language
is something different from the spoken word itself. But the word is a word only
because of what comes into language in it. Its own physical being exists only in
order to disappear into what is said. Likewise, that which comes into language [as
the totality of meaning] is not something pregiven before language; rather, the word
[as a part of the totality of meaning] gives it its own determinateness. (Ibid., pp. 474475)
Similarly, a desired experience (expectation) outside of language is not an experience subject
to a consciousness. It is an indeterminate urgency from which experiences can be brought
into language and given a place within what can be understood as the self. Trude could not
tell her parents what was terrifying her at night, nor could the little girl Isaacs describes (cf.,
fn 34, p. 136, above) say what horrified her about her mother’s broken shoes.
Just as Gadamer is not arguing that all Being is reduced to language, this does not
mean that the indeterminate urgencies do not exist or find alternate expression, just that that
expression is not one that can be consciously understood as a piece of self-knowledge, and
therefore remains as a foreign body to conscious experience. Instead it “comes out” in
some other analogical (pre-digital) way as a symptom (in the case of pathology).
Furthermore, since the desired experience cannot be renounced before it is announced it
prevents new experiences from occurring, which is another way to describe the “repetition
compulsion”; the patient has a block in terms of being able to learn from experience and
thereby the generation process of new experiences from the old grinds to some kind of halt,
whether it is experienced as anxiety, depression, a compulsion, obsession, and so on:
That is why the person who is called experienced has become so not only through
experience but is also open to new experiences… the perfection that we call “being
experienced,” does not consist in the fact that someone already knows better than
anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone
who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and
the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new
experiences and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its proper
fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in its openness to experience that is made
possible by experience itself. (Ibid., p. 355)
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On this account, to view pathology as the result of “developmental arrest” is to view
pathological expressions as the clues to areas where new experiences are not possible and
avoided: every patient is inexperienced in some area and is struggling with the allure and
anxiety of becoming more experienced in this or that area of life by bringing these
experiences into language. There is a tension involved in leaving the comfort of familiar
experience and with it the deep-seated or “sedimented” ontological preconceptions about
the self and the world. In this sense there is always a virtual “infant-in-the-patent” in the
process of languaging experience and on the verge of a breakdown in its virtual (expected)
world, which is an anticipation of the destruction of his or her familiar life. Becoming, then,
can be conceived as iteration or the repetition of the self that has been modified through the
languaging of some new aspect of experience. Weaning as the becoming of the self is the
unfolding of a new time in a new space of issues by means of the word and the relational context of
power, difference, and repetition (where time = the repetition of passing presents) within which the word is
uttered.
The word organizes a heterogeneous network of events, compressing as it were, the
urges and sensations that impinge from within and without into the ready-made, molded,
acoustic surface of the spoken word. Figuratively speaking, the result is a moment of
subjectivity embossed from the flows of inner and outer perception – a space for the
“you’re” cited by mummy at a point in time for the infant to occupy as part of the intelligible
human world. The baby projects a distress and introjects from the mother a material
understanding that binds the distress – in part – by organizing it among her other “you”s
(the “You’re so dirty” depends on a “You’re so clean,” since the meaning of either one
depends on the contrast with the other). Every apparently wonderful, ecstatic, terrifying,
outrageous, and overwhelming experience of the child’s can find a home in a predicate of
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the mother’s utterances.38 However, to benefit from this seemingly magical transformation
of terror and distress into belonging, the infant must subject him or herself to the “saying
power” of the mother’s words.
The infant is not forced from the outside to accommodate itself to the structure of
language, because in order for a desire to produce its effect it must register its claim upon
the world; verbal language becomes a new vehicle for its expression and organization.
Getting emotional is the infant’s means for expressing desire, betraying a grasp of its
situation in need of expression by analogical (nonverbal) or, later, digital (verbal) means:3940
38

Heimann’s paper does not address how introjection and projection operate as the infant begins to acquire
language explicitly. Although given the notion that it is the digital aspect of language that admits of logic, time,
syntax, etc., the following passage suggests that the greater organization of the id into a dynamic relation with
the ego and super-ego is a function of the child’s induction into linguistic competence:
… the phantasies about internalized objects are uncoordinated, full of contradictions and of changes
from one extreme feeling to another, and highly unstable. Experiences with the outer world, with real
people, are taken over and continued, partly with great distortions, under the sway of the instinctual
urges. In accordance with the modifications of instinctual aims, which, represent instinctual
development and interacts with the progressive development of the ego, the infant’s phantasies about
his internal objects also change. The process can be described in terms of unification,
consistency and stability; gradually the ‘internal objects’ assume an abstract character.
Phantasies about living entities within the self develop into ideas and mental work with
concepts, a process which begins in quite young children. At the height of maturity this system of
phantasies is resolved into the fo rmation of an integrated ego and a uniform super-ego. That this,
however, is achieved only in varying degrees, and may be again disrupted under conditions of strain,
with the result that the primitive phantasies reappear, is a daily observation for the an alyst. (Heimann,
1953, pp. 156-157, emphasis added)
39 Although this follows from de Rivera’s account of emotions, it may also provides a solution to a problem he
was unable to address. He argues that, “The idea of a matrix of emotions suggests that any particular emotion
is the outcome of a pattern of “choices” that organize our relationship with another” (deRivera, 1977, p. 71)
DeRivera distinguishes between a “decision” (conscious choices) and a “choice” (unconscious choices that
structure how an event will be construed by emotional understanding). However, he does not explain why one
“choice” should be made over another. It may be better to conceive of unconscious desire as the governing
factor. Just as perception is an interpretation based in an intention of the body which can only change with
action (cf., Merleu-Ponty, 1962/1990), so an emotional apprehension of a situation depends on a governing
desire that can only change with a change in desire as it is experienced (i.e., not simply by means of intellectual
knowledge).
40
The research of Stern (1985) is an example of how current developmental research has verified the notion
that infants have an inborn capacity and means for interpreting their experiences. From the perspective of
cognitive science, Lakoff and Johnson argue that the sensorimotor systems of the infant are the basis of the
“embodied mind” and rationality in a “cognitive unconscious,” which develops out of the metaphorization of
sensorimotor experience:
Our most important abstract concepts, from love to causation to morality, are conceptualized via
multiple complex metaphors. Such metaphors are an essential part of those concepts, and without
them the concepts are skeletal and bereft of nearly all conceptual and inferential structure.
Each complex metaphor is in turn built out of primary metaphors, and each primary metaphor is
embodied in three ways: (1) It is embodied through bodily experiences in the world, which pairs
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From the moment of birth, the drive engages in a binary expression: sensation/affect
and the object both coexist, and the presentation of the object clings to sensation.
The Kleinian phantasy is the mechanism of this juncture, of the drives’ destiny to be
both inside and outside: it is an “object-seeking” drive. (Kristeva, 2001, p. 142)
However, this does not mean that the process of accommodating itself to spoken language
by means of INTROJECTION and PROJECTION are conflict free. For Butler this is the
site of subjection, its paradox and ambivalence:
In Althusser’s essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” the subordination
of the subject takes place through language, as the effect of the authoritative voice
that hails the individual. In the infamous example that Althusser offers, a policeman
hails a passerby on the street, and the passerby turns and recognizes himself as the
one who is hailed. In the exchange by which that recognition is proffered and
accepted, interpellation – the discursive production of the social subject – takes
place. Significantly, Althusser does not offer a clue as to why that individual turns
around, accepting the voice as being addressed to him or her, and accepting the
subordination and normalization effected by that voice. Why does this subject turn
toward the voice of the law, and what is the effect of such a turn in inaugurating a
social subject? … To desire the conditions of one’s own subordination is thus
required to persist as oneself …. It is not simply that one requires the recognition of
the other and that a form of recognition is conferred through subordination, but
rather that one is dependent on power for one’s very formation, that that formation
is impossible without dependency, and that the posture of the adult subject consists
precisely in the denial and reenactment of this dependency. The “I” emerges upon
the condition that it deny its formation in dependency, the conditions of its own
possibility. The “I,” however, is threatened with disruption precisely by this denial, by its
unconscious pursuit of its own dissolution through neurotic repetitions that restage the primary
scenarios it not only refuses to see but cannot see, if it wishes to remain itself. This means, of course,
that, predicated on what it refuses to know, it is separated from itself and can never quite become or
remain itself. (Butler, 1997, pp. 5-9, emphasis added)
For Butler (1997) to be a subject is to have been given a place in language
(subjection), “to occupy the site of the subject” where one can “enjoy intelligibility only to
the extent” that one is “established in language” (pp. 10-11). In other words subjection is
fulfilling the conditions of intelligibility, where the person occupies a site worth the
sighting/citing of the Other on whom the person depends. In turn, by desiring subjection

sensorimotor experience with subjective experience. (2)The source-domain logic arises from the
inferential structure of the sensorimotor system. And (3) it is instantiated neurally in the synaptic
weights associated with neural connections. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.73)
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one is enabled to exert power on the social order; one assumes a position of social weight, as
it were, and can make a sense that has (discursive) effects on others. This is how subjection
is also the condition of possibility “to be a site of alteration” (p. 11). If the baby doesn’t
submit to the mother’s understanding of his cries, how can he ever hope to be understood
and secure his food by crying and gesturing in the “hungry” way rather than the “wipe my
bottom” way? Drawing on Butler’s work suggests that the desire and fear of the therapist’s
utterances stems from a primary “passion to be,” as Butler argues, but also a passion to not
be dependent – “what it refuses to know” – because this dependency in an asymmetrical and
intimate relationship has become the sign of the formed “I”’s extinction. The therapist’s
voice, then, is the sight/cite for hope and danger.
Subjection requires mourning for desires that are prohibited if status as a subject is to
be granted by the loved and needed Other(s). In Gender trouble: Feminism and the
subversion of identity, Butler (1990) used Freud’s account of melancholia to think through a
new way to understand gender identity and sexual orientation based identity as
performatives: the iteration through bodily action and expression of a claim upon which the
“I” that says I am “man,” “woman,” “heterosexual” or “homosexual.” To preserve the love
from the parents that embody and speak the taboo against homosexuality, for example, the
child gives up homosexual desires, gratifications, and fantasies by becoming their negation, a
subject who could then utter in latter life with certainty “I could never be gay.” Thus, Butler
argues when examining identity as performative in general, “The formula “I have never
loved” someone of similar gender and “I have never lost” any such person predicates the “I”
on the “never-never” of that love and loss. Indeed the ontological accomplishment of
heterosexual “being” is traced to this double negation” (Butler, 1997, p. 23). Extending this
process to identity formation in general, this double negation is the “foreclosure of desire”
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that is the condition of the subject, the “I” that speaks, because it not only denies the desire
but denies its loss which is the trace of what was lost. To admit the loss forces a turn to see
what was lost and face the terrifying consequences: not being.
Thus, one should find ambivalent reactions in the discursive wake of a therapist
confronting the patient with the denied “I”s. On one side the allure of the therapist’s
sightings/citations is that they hold the promise of reunion with an unknown that is felt to
be missing, the mark of an incomplete mourning for a possibility of having the other be involved
in the creation of the self. At the same time the sign of this incomplete mourning is the occasion
of anxiety for the “I” that he or she has come to be bent on being, an “I” that is performed (as
in the repetition compulsion) to quell the very anxiety over having the other involved in
producing self-recognitions that transgress its restricted scope.
Anxiety agitates “the subject already formed” (again, the patient) to turn away from
the production of self-recognitions required for becoming since they are subversive to the
“I”’s formation:
What would it mean for the subject to desire something other than its continued
“social existence”? …. The subject is compelled to repeat the norms by which it is
produced, but that repetition establishes a domain of risk, for if one fails to reinstate
the norm “in the right way,” one becomes subject to further sanction, one feels the
prevailing conditions of existence threatened. And yet without a repetition that risks
life – in its current organization – how might we begin to imagine the contingency of
that organization, and performatively reconfigure the contours of the conditions of
life? (Butler, 1997, pp. 28-29)
So, what is the paradox that confronts the unhappy “subject already formed” when
he or she walks into the therapy situation? The therapist’s job is the paradox. The
therapist’s job is to provide the occasions for “a repetition that risks life” as revealed by what
is repeated in the patient’s communications. The sum of the predicates produced by the “I”
are the contours of the condition of its formation and limitation: what is “in” the “I” is in
his or her discourse.
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In CKPP, then, the therapist’s transgressive understandings short-circuit this anxiety
and its maneuvers of denial. By transgressing the conscious content of the speaking “I” the
patient is suddenly confronted with the sight of an identity that has already been invoked by
the desire of the therapist – who has selected it as a topic for discussion. If the reflexive
self-understanding does not destroy the other with whom one can identify, then perhaps to speak
it is not the sign of the end of the world. It can be a “site of alteration” and articulation
(ibid, p. 11) instead of a site (site, cite and sight) of extinction.
When Mrs. P was ACTIVATING the discussion orbited a gap, as it were, in her
understanding of a range of her experience (e.g., “why I’m so sad…”). In this sense, the gap
instigated the sites of the conversation between our “I”s because it was agitating, a problem
to be talked about, a disturbing present that refused to pass. Hopefully, Butler’s language
provides a way to examine the sites of subjectivity in the session and how their constitution
figured into Mrs. P’s turns towards and away from subjection.
However, a person is not just a subject in the sense that a subject the term “subject”
indicates the site a person occupies within the ever-mobile contours of discourse as a shared
system of symbolic beliefs and practices of power (e.g., speech acts). Nor is a person just a
self in the sense that the self is a consciousness operating in a field of issues that originates in
the visceral experiences of the body-in-the-world. To acquire verbal language requires new
experiences of a nascent self-possibility, an “infantile self” as a subject – a place or position –
put into a structure of symbols and practices already formed within a context of belonging to
another, a context of intimacy. To be a person is to be both a self and subject, to inhabit
physical, symbolic and psychological space – where psychological space cannot be reduced
to language
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In de Rivera’s terms, the psychological space that seems most relevant for the study
is the dimension of intimacy. The Kleinian account suggests that the paradox of subjectivity
facing the infant and the infant-in-the-patient is its conflicting experience of intimacy, since
paranoid anxiety can be understood as the anxiety of having the other involved in one’s own
concerns and depressive anxiety as the anxiety of having the self be involved in the concerns
of the other. These are the two poles of de Rivera’s conception of intimacy as one
dimension of the psychological space between people organized by the binary emotional
pairs of fear and anxiety, love and security, desire and confidence, hate and depression.
Along this dimension one can move the object towards (desire) or away from the self (hate),
or the self towards (love) or away from the object (fear). Therefore, if ACTIVATION is the
conversational moment where the patient is positioned to align with the therapist’s
understanding (to open him or herself to it and accommodate it), then it is also a
conversational moment where the patient is positioned to accommodate more of his or her
own experience to the extent that that is the only subject matter the therapist talks about.
Conversely, if DEFENCE is the conversational moment where the patient moves away
from ACTIVATION, then it is a moment where the patient fears (moves him or herself
away) or hates (moves the therapist away) his or her own experience – again, assuming a
situation where the therapist’s observation is accurate. The analysis, therefore, should show
how intimacy figures into the paradoxical person-forming process of CKPP that occurs in
the discourse.
But another framework is needed to understand how putting words to the “agitating
gap” in her experience operated, if ‘making the unconscious conscious” is the moment of
bringing some set of aspects of experience into language so they can be understood.
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In Rhetoric as philosophy: the humanist tradition, Grassi (1980) argues that rhetoric
is the basis of any rational discourse (i.e., the digital aspect of communication in the terms of
Waltzlawick, et al.). Grassi’s interpretation leans on Dante’s theory of true language as the
expression of human historicity (pp. 76-82). The power of this language is held in the power
of the metaphor, or speech that allows people to imagine possibilities of relatedness to
things and each other:
It [the “archaic” speech] is metaphorical, i.e., it shows something which has a sense,
and this means that to the figure, to that which is shown, the speech transfers
(metapherin) a signification; in this way the speech which realizes this showing “leads
before the eyes” (phainesthai) a significance … [it] sketches the framework for every
rational consideration … rhetorical speech “comes before” every rational speech, i.e.,
it has a “prophetic” (prophainesthai) character. (p. 20)
Rhetoric is the basis of language because throughout human history language has
changed when its guiding metaphors have changed as the result of human labor. Through
changes in human practices “tensions” are encountered in experience that require new
names so that the foreign elements of experience can be assimilated within the governing
symbolic order of the epoch: “through work, in temporal and spatial relationships … The
concepts through which we come to understand and “grasp” each situation come from our
ingenious, metaphorical fantastic capacities that convey meanings in the concrete situations
with which we are confronted” (p. 100).41 If this account holds for the history of the
individual beginning with birth, as well as the individual in therapy seeking to change
through discursive work, then a possible “site of alteration” will be a moment in the record

41

For a historical example, Harvey’s treatise On the circulation of the blood (1955) was one aspect of a larger
change that occurred in Europe: the change of the metaphorical basis of the human body. His work facilitated
the ascendancy of the mechanical metaphor for rational discourses on the body.
Harvey presents convincing arguments that can be substantiated by anyone who follows them in the text.
However, the power of his claim that the heart is a pump was relational. He argued for a new way to relate to
this material thing called the heart: relate to it as a pump without spirit.
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where new language and metaphors will be uttered by virtue of the assumption of a site that
incorporates a new aspect of experience.
These aspects of Butler’s and Grassi’s frameworks will provide an interpretive
counterpoint to Bion’s

and enable the interpretive analysis to move forward with an

altered texture.42 First, we turn back to some passages already examined to understand how
Mrs. P was enabled to turn towards, and momentarily assume, a site of alteration before
resuming the analysis of the last few exchanges of the session:
061
062
063

Like I’ve been saying. I think these fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed get dropped and
perhaps it’s because you don’t expect another person to stay with you and help you make sense of
what feels overwhelming inside.

Like other interpretive utterance already examined, the parameter of my subjectivity as
disclosed to Mrs. P through these comments is a vision of herself that transgresses the sense
she has been making in prior turns – transgressing the “cheery deal” (059) “I” formation,
“that you record as my dramatic voice” (060).
The discursive site occupied by my “I’ve been …” at this moment is predicated on
her existence “you…you” (062) of the “because” clause. This is a conception (

),a

creation within the range of my subjectivity that uttered it. For me to have existed at that
moment as the subject producing these utterances required her to exist within the boundary
of my uttering “I” as a subject with a gap in her experience that I desired to fill (

). In

this sense, a “part” of Mrs. P was a component of the foundational conditions for my “I”
formation to perform as a site of articulating, “because you don’t expect …” (062). In other
words, as the basis for my intelligibility, an aspect or part of Mrs. P’s existence was proposed
in the “because” clause (062).

By “counterpoint” I mean in the sense of a musical composition where two independent melodies are
combined to accentuate in a way that neither could on its own.
42
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So, my “I” was the product of the interaction; its possibility was intertwined with the
birth (

)of “part” of her subjectivity within that “I” formation. Let us call this the

“baby-self”, defined as a range of sensuously or viscerally apprehended experience ( β elements) that is
ill defined (not understood and therefore “in need” of α function) and has the potential to become
organized into an intelligible aspect of the self that can be spoken about (a conception

that can

be put into words).
At the same time the “you … you” opens a site for her baby-self to occupy a place in
intelligible social existence – to be brought into language. Thus, if she recognizes her babyself it is within this site of articulation, opened within my subjectivity, as the creative product
(fecal gifts) of our verbal intercourse (

) rather than a toxic product (persecutory feces)

that must be kept away from both of us. Also, if she recognizes the baby-self within this site
then it becomes a possible site of articulation for her to occupy as a cosubject of the dialog –
another

. So, what does Mrs. P do with the site of articulation opened within my

transgressive utterances?
064
065

Yeah. [tearing] that makes sense. Yeah because principle people at crucial ages for me they
disappeared whether death or loosing a sister going to college or marriage is like a death. Yeah.
Notice there is no “I” spoken in her utterances. Instead, its place in language is

occupied by tears (She could have said, “I want to cry that makes sense”). The “sense” it
made registered viscerally, she was “moved” by my speech as people say. It seems that the
“I” she invoked in prior utterances is in background; what is foregrounded is its condition of
possibility, “because …”. It is an unhappy “I” “because … for me”. However, instead of
choosing to speak her tears as the subject of the utterance (064), she occupies the syntactic
place of a direct object in a sentence (“for me.”), where “principle people” are the subject of
the “disappearing” action. At this point, Mrs. P is not the subject of her experience,
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occupying a site of alteration; she is speaking as the direct object (D/O) subjected to an
experience.43
Yet her “because” clause (064-065) is an elaboration within the parameters of the
“because clause” in my prior turn (062-063), as if to say, “yes, the opening in your uttering
‘I’ matches this content’ (
that the baby-self conception (

) – “because …”” (064-065). The “because” clause shows
) she a ligned with was an experience analogous to

death: “loosing principle people … is like a death.”44
In terms of the constitution of subject sites, then, by opening a place for the babyself within my experience – the reflexive limit of my uttering “I” – Mrs. P, likewise, opened a
space for her baby-self within the parameters of her uttering and passive “I” (passive in the
sense that she was subjected to the baby-self rather than the subject of it as a range of her
experience). In Butler’s terms the baby-self is the “discursive limit” of Mrs. P’s reflexivity,
because it required the transgression of that very limit through my interpretive utterances for
it to begin to be articulated by her. At this point in the session, Butler might say that Mrs. P
was facing the “temporal paradox” of the becoming subject:
The temporal paradox of the subject is such that, of necessity, we must lose the
perspective of a subject already formed in order to account for our own becoming.
That “becoming” is not simple or continuous affair, but an uneasy practice of
repetition and its risks, compelled yet incomplete, wavering on the horizon of social
being [or not] (Butler, 1997)
Moreover, this point for turning away or towards becoming a subject involved the
transformation of Mrs. P’s emotional grasp of me. As the person through whom the
account of her becoming a subject already formed was taking place, she “met the other”
This suggests that while Mrs. P was working on a problem in her experience, she was doing so in a way that
blamed the Other, dealing with depressive anxiety in a paranoid way.
44
Thus, in Butler’s terms, the repeated experience of having lost “principle people” is an unmourned loss that
has conditioned the formation of the unhappy, tearing “I” that is facing “a death” – “the loss marks the limit of
reflexivity, that which exceeds (and conditions) its [the subject’s] circuitry. Understood as foreclosure, that loss
inaugurates the subject and threatens it with dissolution” (Butler, 1997, p. 23).
43
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(me) to “take hold” of the reality I was offering, “bring it in”, and “show” me the baby-self
that corresponded to my citation. For de Rivera, these are the instructions of joy,
confidence, security and self-regard, respectively.45 In other words, for Mrs. P to
ACTIVATE to the extent she could, and face a painful aspect of her experience, she had to
grasp me as a helpful (good) figure and within that figure catch sight of a range of her
experience (the bereft baby-self) that was more or less off limits to the reflection of the
subject already formed up to that point. Aligning with a “good” me as I transgressively
sighted/cited her, then, facilitated her speaking “I” to incorporate the baby-self within its
utterances, so that it might become – quite literally – the subject of her talk. If I was a good
enough figure, then what I offer (a “part” of her) may not be so dangerous. By desiring the
baby-self and speaking it I demonstrated that the anxiety surrounding the identity has been
overcome, thus making it easier for the patient to align with the production because it
becomes a sign of belonging to the therapist, to life, and distinguished it from being a sign of
estrangement from the therapist, that is, death.
The next interchange shows the relevance of facing death for the appropriation of a
site of subjectivity. Mrs. P selects her vacation as the “death like” change to talk about in
response to my interpretive utterances. Like before, these utterances (066-068) appear to
transgress the limit of her reflexive awareness, since she elaborates in her subsequent turn
(069-072), giving a name to the baby-self:

45

According to de Rivera’s model of emotions, emotions are what define psychological space along the
dimensions of status, openness, and intimacy (cf., deRivera, 1977). Each emotion has an “instruction” by
which it regulates our behavior in this psychological space. For example, anxiety is “keep world out of the
self.” Obviously, his scheme has limitations. However imprecise his model may be for deducing the patient’s
emotional state, reasonable inferences can be made based on the interaction. For example, in this instance it
seems clear that Mrs. P agreed with my utterances, therefore she was not keeping the “world out”, so anxiety
can be ruled out.
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066
067
068

So, perhaps inside you feels out of control because of there are several death-like changes you are
dealing with right now – the bombing of the terrorists, your daughter’s wedding, and the fact that we
won’t be meeting next week because you won’t be here

069
070
071
072

Yeah cause I like routine right and I’m not going to be here next week and I’m like one of those
orphans – the smartest kids are the one’s who get abandoned in hospitals and learn to have to get
along by being nice w hich fends off being orphaned. Yeah, because that image just came to me right
now I can – those little orphaned AIDS babies who have been dropped like a hot potato.
Here (069-072) Mrs. P selected her absence from therapy from among the other

discursive sites from which to constitute an “I” to speak about “death-like change.” In
general terms, by aligning with the therapist who has just offered a sighting/citing of the
missing sense of the self, the patient aligns with “a part” of herself that intuitively satisfies
the contours of the gap in intelligible experience (again,

) – the mysterious source of

distress for the subject already formed. Through inclusion of the baby-self this reunion, in turn,
pushes the limit of the “I” that speaks; it is an elaboration of that “I” from within itself (so
that in this example, Mrs. P goes on and offers a name for her baby-self, “orphaned AIDS
babies…”). At the same time this reunion

occasions putting the limit of her reflexivity

in play by occasioning my next turn:
073
074

What I’m hearing is that right now you live with fears of being dropped by me like you felt dropped
by your mother as a baby.
073 is another assertion

, showing that I understood her “little orphaned AIDS

babies who have been dropped” to describe her identity in relation to me, where I am
identified as the deserting or withdrawing institutional mother. Within the “I’m hearing…”
is a discursive site

for Mrs. P as the D/O of my action, where I am figured in

exclusionary terms. Thus, it
subjectivity for her subjectivity

opens a discursive a place

within the site of my

figured in overwhelming terms (dropped, overwhelming

with need, AIDS baby-self), and thereby contradicts the propositional content of her
analogic presupposition (recall, that analogic messages propose a definition of the
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relationship; it this case it is “you are abandoning”), since an orphan

without a

faces an

end of life situation.46 The first few utterances of her next turn indicate three truth
conditions for
075
076
077

.

Well maybe but that’s if I don’t come back, because then essentially I would have been dropped by
you. [asked to repeat, she did then began] No, the only parallel is if you went out in front of a
truck and got killed, that’s the logical parallel to that ….
The first two truth conditions involve Mrs. P eradicating the possibility of treatment

by leaving. This is the “I” as a site predicated on “don’t come back,” a withdrawal of
from

and the possibility of

.. This a part of Mrs.P’s “I,” her subjectivity already

formed (the “essentially I” in fact) that rejects the possibility of being within the site
(sightings/citations) of my uttering “I” as her therapist who “I would have been dropped
by.”
This indicates a temporal ambiguity, since the beginning of this utterance projects an
ending that one would expect to be in the future conditional tense rather than the past (“I
would be dropped by you” rather than “I would have been dropped by you”). So, the first
truth condition could be interpreted as her not returning to therapy after her holiday.
However, the second seems more likely given the context of the communicative work so far
in the session; it seems that the “would have been” condition refers to the session itself, and
the moments where I could have dropped her (i.e., made no room within my discoursing
subject site) but did not, thus contradicting her expectation with each repetition. The
iteration of my “I” was a paradox. On this account her deflecting talk was the attempt to

In Kleinian terms, this was a TRANSFERENCE interpretation. Notice that it structurally corresponds to a
PHANTASY (cf., p. 61, above): As Mrs. P’s. EXTERNAL OBJECT I exist in the condition of deserting
mOther (an identity) as a result of her orphaned-AIDS-baby relationship to me. That my condition of
deserting depends upon her action towards me is underscored by her response that at face value does not seem
– nor did it sound at the time – logical.
46
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“not come back” and each time the deflecting “I” repeated this performance I brought her
back, so to speak, providing a place, for the orphan baby-self.
The third truth condition is formulated on the basis of negating the first two
(“No…”). In this scenario I am destroyed because I have put myself in harm’s way (“if you
went out in front of a truck and got killed” 076-077). Now, a truck belongs to the category
of containing

vehicles that carry

contents

for consumption (produce, fuel,

productive things like machines, etc.) or destruction (garbage and wastes of various kinds).
Using this translation, the phantasy is that the attempt at containing her will destroy me, or
she might be overrun by the therapy, since its aim is to deliver

.as a vehicle for insight.

Yet I just contradicted one option by performing a subjectivity predicated on
including her baby-self within its parameter (073-074), which Mrs. P confirms in her next
utterance with a conditional clause “But ….” She has finally incorporated the conception
offered in 073-074 (the

of my prior turn becomes a

for her to deal with in her

subsequent turn). Notice what happen to the “I” that “contains” the conceived baby-self, so
to speak, for under 14 words. Its position as the “I” that speaks is taken over, or perhaps
run over, in the attempt by the minister “I” which is bent on being the “I” that offers me
conceptions rather than taking in conceptions. In other words, the self she is “wanting to
have” in response to having the conception of the baby-self is the minister self that is not
dependent on a mother-therapist in a hospital setting; she does the self she wants “to have”,
she performs it to make baby-self disappear. Previously, this pattern (cf., pp. 107-109,
above) has been articulated in terms of a “collaborative completion”:
077
078
079
080

… But yes it could play right into not wanting
to be orphaned, w anting to have a self. I was doing reading on disappearance of the self into preexistence and there is literature on disappearance into pre-existence [stated in an emphatic tone to
emphasize she is right]
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This kind of collaborative completion, then, is a means to exclude the baby-self from
her conscious experience of the moment – to close the site for its possibility of becoming
intelligible as an uttering “I.” This is a double exclusion. On the one hand, the baby-self (a
range of her sensuously or viscerally apprehended experience with the potential to be
brought into language) is excluded from her own awareness; “a part” of Mrs. P that has to
deal with loss in the face of change is lost and avoided. At the same time, the baby-self is
also excluded from social reality because it cannot be spoken about, for to speak about loss
would risk its resurgence. Thus, it is impossible for Mrs. P to talk with others to secure their
support in the face of losses since the hegemonic “I” wants nothing to do with loss, so to
speak. Its formation is predicated on the negation of loss in Butler’s (1997) terms. Hence,
loss also becomes the source of alienation or isolation from others (“its not like she’s being
taken off to jail”, i.e., incarcerated and off limits to Mrs. P)
In other words, her final utterance in this turn shifts topic and context away from
her fear in the context of her relationship to me, her Other. She interrupts herself – or
better yet, the orphaned self that was speaking, forwarding a topic that is completely foreign
to what has been talked about in the session, but not foreign to what she has been doing through her
talking. In 077-078 Mrs. P shifts from what she does not want to belong to her identity, her
self – “be orphaned” – to what she does want to belong to her identity – “a self.” The
following utterance has a self, so to speak, she says “I was doing reading … ,” which
suggests it is a different self (“I”) than the one previously speaking, not an “I” afraid of
being orphaned, but an “I” that studies and ministers on “disappearance into pre-existence.”
It is another example of “dropping” herself, “deflecting,” that “annoying thing that
happens…and blocks whatever” she tries to “get at.” At least that is how it seems I
understood it at the time based on my response to her turn:
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081
082

You are disappearing from here right now because we just touched on your fear of being orphaned by
me so you mentally moved away to thoughts of before you existed.
Clearly the “you” in this utterance is not referring to Mrs. P in her physical presence

as if she were teleporting out of the Enterprise on Star Trek. Yet in a way she was
teleporting herself out as the cosubject of a conversation in which I could participate. I can
contribute nothing to her understanding as a fetus (before existing as a baby how can one be
said to exist?). In effect, my assertion was pointing to how she extinguished her existence
with me in the room as the orphan I was talking and listening to, “disappearing from here
right now…”
As with my previous utterances throughout the session, this assessment links her
action in the here and now through her speech to her emotional sense of things, falling
within the eight characteristics of CKPP outlined so far. The pragmatic effect of my
sightings/citation was to open a discursive site within my uttering “I” for Mrs. P to
sight/cite herself as a subjectivity of her experience and not a D/O (I did not say, “oh, there’s that
annoying thing that happens to you again”). The description I uttered occasioned a moment
for her to recognize her “I” in a moment of its formative repetition (performative iteration
in Butler’s 1991, 1997 terms) based on a fear of loss – “the annoying thing that happens.”
Thus, the citation provides an occasion to alter that subjectivity by means of a double
recognition that transgresses what she could apprehend in her experience – as the “subject
already formed” on the ground of denying that aspect of her experience. Apparently, the
effect of this double recognition was to move Mrs. P:
: 083

[Tears start streaming, nods in agreement, I let a few moments pass]

Of course what you, as the reader, cannot know since you weren’t there is how
different it felt to be with Mrs. P by the end of the session. Gone was the kinetic energy that
projected the stress of busyness. Gone was the see-saw smiling polite tone, the “cheery
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deal” as she called it herself (059)– the traces of that presence crumpled on the desk in a
small pile of used white tissues beside her, with one still clasped in her hands as if weighing
them down in her lap. Her face looked sad between those tears – cocked a bit towards me
as her lips cocked to one side as though they slid there, as though repeating some form from
Francis Bacon’s visual lexicon of anguish – tearing and nodding. I waited a few moments:
084

Our time is up for today

This section has argued that the allure of the therapist’s voice stems from the longing
to be understood without having to say what had been unspeakable out of the anxiety over
the paradox of subjection. The patient has a desire for life to be different in some way, yet is
communicating in a way that the denial of who he or she could be organizes the
performance or iteration of his or her “I”:
The foreclosure of certain forms of love suggests that the melancholia that grounds
the subject (and hence always threatens to unsettle and disrupt that ground) signals
and incomplete and irresolvable grief. Unowned and incomplete, melancholia is the
limit to the subject’s sense of pouvoir, its sense of what it can accomplish and, in that
sense, its power. Melancholia rifts the subject, marking a limit to what it can
accommodate. Because the subject does not, cannot, reflect on that loss, the loss
marks the limit of reflexivity, that which exceeds (and conditions) its circuitry.
Understood as foreclosure, that loss inaugurates the subject and threatens it with
dissolution. (Butler, 1997, p. 23, emphasis in original)
Through discourse in an asymmetrical relationship of intimacy and dependence the
patient was positioned to become the subject of her own experiences that had been excluded
from occupying a space within her conscious subjectivity – the space of the self.
This was achieved by addressing the infant-in-the-patient through transgressively intimate
utterances. The orphaned AIDS-baby self was recognized and occasioned by the therapist’s
utterances for alignment by Mrs. P as the self of the subject already formed who was in
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crisis. Once she aligned with the “baby-self” its experience was verbalized by her self as part
of her conscious self – that is, it become a possible object of knowledge for Mrs. P. as a
subject in discursive co-existence with the therapist-mother. Thus, the section has provided
an account of how the self-subject forming process works in CKPP.
To be understood as a preverbal infant is to be understood without having to say
what one is experiencing. The experience is materialized in the discourse47 of the Other and
thereby signifies a possibility for relating to that Other – a sign of mutual belonging and
accommodation of the self to the Other and the Other to the concerns of the self (reciprocal
love in de Rivera’s account of intimacy). On one side, the yearning to be understood and
sighted/cited differently fueled the patient’s utterances, since the symptoms are the pressing
disruptions in the story of which she is conscious, the inscriptions of an unhappy “I” or “I”s
on the text of her life. They are not “the scars of a corrupt text” but the traces of a nascent
who, a lonely voice in the room trying to be heard.48 That there are absences in what the patient
could sight/cite about herself is a given, since the “I” that speaks is predicated on what
cannot or must not be allowed to be heard lest it risk falling out of the range of human

For Butler (1993) discourse has material effects as a reiterated acting (a pragmatically performative network
of norms) that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface. On this account, the
self is the more or less stable reiteration of patterns of relating that is materialized “on” or “within” the site of
the body, creating the effect of a pre-given fixity or substance. Hopefully, the parallel between this and the
Kleinian account of phantasy, internal object relations, introjection and projection is clear.
48 I think, however, that Butler’s points apply both to pathological and non-pathological situations. Referring
to pathological cases as instances of a “corrupt text,” as McCarthy cites Habermas, implies that the
communication of ‘normal’ people is without ambiguity or contradiction. There may be less in nonpathological cases but no one is completely self-transparent. Compare, McCarthy (1978):
As Wittgenstein stressed in his account of “language games,” the “grammar” of ordinary language
games governs not only the connection of linguistic symbols but also the interweaving of speech,
action and bodily expression. In a normally functioning language game, the different classes are
complementary. In pathological cases, however, they no longer fit one another; actions and
nonverbal expressions belie what is expressly stated. The acting subject either does not observe the
discrepancy or is not able to understand it. Nevertheless the symptomatic expressions … are
expressions of the subject. They cannot be dismissed as accidents: “their symbolic character, which
identifies them as split-off parts of a symbolic structure, cannot be permanently denied. They are the
scars of a corrupt text that confronts the author as incomprehensible.” (p.197)
47
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intelligibility: a state of no meaning for anyone (psychosis) – against a backdrop of
psychological death, a “disappearance into pre-existence.”

A satisfactory early relation to the mother…implies a close contact between the
unconscious of the mother and the child. This is the foundation for the most
complete experience of being understood and is essentially linked with the preverbal
stage. However gratifying it is in latter life to express thoughts and feelings to a
congenial person, there remains an unsatisfied longing for an understanding without
words. …This longing contributes to the sense of loneliness and derives from the
depressive feeling of an irretrievable loss.
~ Melanie Klein (1963), On the sense of loneliness
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Conclusion
The error [the structural model of psychic apparatus based on non-observable
entities] becomes obvious if one examines more closely the evidential basis of
psychoanalysis, namely, the clinical experience to which Freud himself constantly
referred in defending the scientific status of his work. The analytic dialogue between
patient and therapist was the sole empirical basis for the development and quasiexperimental testing of psychoanalytic theory; thus the meaning of its concepts and
hypotheses must be explicated in connection with the analytic situation and not in
terms of an empirically unjustifiable energy-distribution model.
(McCarthy, 1978, p. 196)
While the practice of contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented
psychotherapy has been described in other works of varying degrees of clinical-theoretical
sophistication (e.g., Hinshelwood, 1994; Joseph, 1988; Ruszczynski & Johnson, 1999;
Solomon, 1995), what is new about this study is the method by which it has been conducted,
the genre in which it is written, and the extent to which it has attempted to reconcile the
practice of CKPP with contemporary philosophical works that address the problematic
conceptions of selfhood and subjectivity; specifically, what it means to be a self, a subject
and how therapy is one culturally created and perpetuated arena within which selfhood and
subjectivity are produced through discourse.
The primary aim of this study has been to show through a detailed analysis of one
session how the practice of CKPP operates: explaining its assumptions, practices, and the
involvement of the therapist. As worded in the introduction, the study has deployed a
hermeneutic methodology and nonfiction genre to tell a story of contemporary Kleinian
psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy from the perspective of a novice. The study has
empirically shown that as a form of communicating it involves patterned linguistic usage and
role behavior that are coordinated into a specialized “communicative competence” with the
aim of an ontological accomplishment: self-subject forming processes.
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Like the account of a zoo provided by a tour guide, this account is a systematic yet
idiosyncratic report on the workings of CKPP from the inside. Just as the tour guide would
adjust his account of some aspect of the zoo or animal’s behavior depending on how your
questions required more detail – explaining this building in environmental or historical
terms, those animals in zoological terms, and perhaps both in commercial terms (“you can
buy pictures of that tiger in the gift shop”) – the cyclical form of hermeneutics required the
interpretive framework to change along with the evolution of the governing question as the
analysis proceeded. Thus, a creative nonfiction genre was chosen. The nonfiction is in the
“facts” of documented utterances exchanged during the session and the literature cited
throughout the analysis; the creative is in the weaving together of a wide array of different
perspectives and shifting narrative voices: here the therapist speaking to the patient – there
the supervisee listening to the memory of the supervisor offering guidelines and bits of
clinical wisdom, here the researcher of the communicative exchanges – there the theoretician
grappling with complex conceptual issues. The result is an idiosyncratic story of CKPP as a
“system of possibilities and resources, frustrations, and obstacles, and two [researchers] will
find both commonalities and differences in their accounts of it” (Packer, 1985, p. 1093).
Nine characteristics stakeout the territory of CKPP viewed as a specialized communicative
competence. These are numerically indicated in the following paragraphs that descriptively
summarize these findings.
From the patient’s perspective, imagine you walk into the same room every week,
perhaps two or more times per week, at the same time for an uncanny conversation with a
stranger, who, by virtue of their strangeness, is able to tell you secrets about yourself with
unflinching candor that you never knowingly told them – and at times these secrets were
things you never knew until they were first mentioned by this stranger. This makes him or
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her stranger and not less so, particularly because all you see him or her do is (1) write down
everything you say, think about it, and tell you things you don’t know about yourself as he or
she learns about you. You pay for this doubly strange person to learn with you and about
you in an uncanny relationship. You are assured that whatever you say and do during that
hour will never be revealed to anyone else without your permission. All of this is
intimidating because this person knows you intimately while you know nothing about his or
her private life. You are letting this stranger matter so much in your life that you want to
depend on them to help you change yourself, while you have little if any idea of how your
words affect them other than how they speak to you about yourself. Built into the other
stable elements that frame your visits is (2) an asymmetrical relationship of dependence and
power.
From the perspective of the therapist, each session is also a brush up against the
uncanny. The patient comes in with a problematic present that refuses to pass. Each
session involves some anxiety. No matter how many times you’ve done it in your career or
with this particular person, you can never predict how you will be implicated in that
problematic present. Neither can you predict with any certainty how he or she will respond
to your (3) descriptions about the patient’s reality that, by the standards of every day
conversations, are transgressive in form and function since they aim to foster a
metamorphosis in the patient’s life, one intimate session at a time.
Moreover, this task involves resisting what one habitually does in everyday
conversations with friends who have problems: you may not give advice, must resist asking
questions, offering reassurance, offering prescriptions for what he or she should or should
not think or do, or telling stories about yourself to show that you can relate. While your
comments are (4) grounded topically in what the patient says, they must go beyond that to
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show the patient experientially in (5) the here and now of their relationship with you what he
or she does, does not do, and the consequences of their action for contributing to their
experience of the problematic present that refuses to pass. In other words you are restricted
to offering (6) descriptive hypotheses about the form and sequence of the patient’s
experience and how its elements are related outside their everyday awareness.
In addition to the challenge of formulating these interpretive utterances that
articulate – optimally – something new and unpredictable and the facing the consequences as
the patient responds, there is the challenge of knowing when to say them. Unlike the turn
taking structure of an everyday conversation, you try to speak (7) only when you think the
patient is not engaged in a critical self-reflection of their problematic experience. How do
manage all this? What are your tools? One tool is the note writing that provides a record of
what has been going on in relationship for you to use to (8) decode the patient’s stories and
patterns of communicating in terms of his or her main anxiety and the relational practices of
power that subtend the problematic present that refuses to pass. Another tool (9) is the set
of theoretic-clinical concepts and techniques that you have learned from readings and from
supervision, which include five guiding question to govern learning about the here and now
of the other: how does the patient see me? How is the patient trying to use me? What does
the patient do with what I say? What is the main anxiety? And, what does it feel like inside
to be with this person?
The nine characteristics described above constitute the communicative competence
of CKPP. Originally, it was hoped that the design of this study would be able to show how
this specialized communicative competence was the direct result of supervised clinical
practice, since it is assumed in the empirical literature that supervision works by means of
“changing trainee characteristics.” However, as the analysis proceeded it was realized that
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while the communicative competence could be articulated that a longitudinal element was
needed to trace the changes in communicative skills as the direct result of the supervision.
Yet, it also became apparent that the communicative competence of CKPP was geared
towards subject formation by means of a paradoxical communicative effect. Thus, rather
than include the longitudinal element, it was decided to focus on the subject forming
processes as an example of the “paradox of subjection.”
Given the tropography of CKPP is coordinated by tropes of mother-breastfeeding
infant dyad, the paradox of subjection was examined as the operation of weaning, which
defined the specialized communicative competence of CKPP taken as a whole – a
framework for the conversation as well as the communicative patterns operating within that
framework. This paradox refers to the notion that in order to become a subject that can
have effects on others and the larger social world one must desire subjection; in order to
have a recognizable form with social weight, one must desire and submit to a process of
formation. This paradox was redescribed for research purposes as the subject-forming
process of CKPP. Examining these subject-forming processes occasioned by the
transgressive utterances of the therapist required looking at the instances where preverbal
aspects of experience were languaged to try and articulate how this process worked.
More concretely in terms of this analysis: Mrs. P came to the session with a
problematic present that refused to pass. This began with a fragmenting anxiety over feeling
“so sad.” However, as she and I worked to learn more about it, the anxiety became
articulated as the grasp of herself as being deserted by her mother and sister in the past, her
daughter in a pending marriage, and ultimately, deserted by me as one of a string of
“principle people” that “disappeared” when she needed them – that is, when she was
confronted with a situation of deprivation. This evolution of learning involved a paradox.
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One the one hand the orphaned AIDS-baby self is a definitive identity, a metaphor that
sketches out the framework within which she understands the repetition of time in her life –
a reiteration of desertion where her concerns are the reason the other flees (“disappeared” or
they push her away (“dropped like a hot potato”). This orphaned identity was the correlate
of an institutional mother identity. On the other hand, as a mother figure, I was not
abandoning her concerns in the session. I was pursuing them through interpretive
utterances.
Thus, in general terms, it seems that the paradox of subjectivity, through the
specialized communicative competence of CKPP, is for the therapist to become the paradox of the
patient: the Other who could be what one always expects yet discursively effects a
displacement of one’s expectations, thereby opening the possibility of a new relationship.49
Furthermore, it is by embodying (i.e., verbalizing) the displaced expectation that a new
experience of another is made possible and the problematic present might begin to pass.
CKPP addresses the paradox of subjectivity through discourse in an asymmetrical
relationship of intimacy where the patient is positioned to become the subject of his or her
own experiences through a discursive subjection to them. In Habermas’ and Kögler’s terms:
in a productive dialogue of asymmetrical power and dependence, knowledge about the self
becomes knowledge for the self through the alterity of the Other by means of the experience of a
difference in a relational repetition. This is the critical hermeneutic formulation of CKPP as
weaning.
Additionally, in its creative non-fiction aspect, this study has provided a window into
a therapeutic method that is based on a radical shift in the history of psychoanalysis: the
By “discourse” I mean the entire interactive process of sense making between participants that involves the
embodiment of role behavior, speech, and affective expression, that draws from “a set of norms, preferences, and
expectations relating language to context, which speaker-hearers draw on and modify in producing and making sense out of
language,” as described by Ochs (1990, p. 289, italics in original)
49
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shift from the governing trope of the surgeon to that of the mother-feeding-infant. While it
is beyond the scope of this study to address this topic with the thoroughness it deserves, a
discussion of its impact regarding the understanding and handling of the transference
requires discussion. The ethical implications will be addressed in the Afterward, along with a
self-appraisal of the study.
As already noted, Grassi (1980) argues for the primacy of metaphor in the
contouring of any rational discourse, the speech that frames the speaker-hearer’s possibilities
for imagining relatedness to things and each other. As argued by Stepansky (1999), the
dominating trope upon which Freudian discourse has been erected, practiced, taught,
defended and criticized is that of the surgeon. Although he carefully explicates and
examines the real and possible dangers inherent to metaphorizing psychoanalytic therapy
along the lines of surgery, he also argues for it when used in a sophisticated and elastic
manner. In short, the problem is not inherent to the metaphor, but how it is appropriated: is
it used as a starting point for imagining the benefits and the risks to deepen and complexify
discourse, or as tunicate on critical reflexivity at the expense of those who are really
suffering, or worse, to justify abuses of power?
The problem, I submit, has never been with medicosurgical analogies per se. Rather,
it has always resided in the truncated vision of medicosurgical activity that underlies
and informs such analogizing – and in the tendentious use of such analogizing by the
supporters and detractors of classical psychoanalytic technique…. Modern surgery,
both in its therapeutic obligations and in its technical ministrations, opens to a
wealth of metaphoric possibility that awaits appropriation by contemporary doctors
of the mind. We have briefly considered Ferenczi’s transmutation of Freud’s surgical
metaphor into an obstetrical metaphor, with analytic treatment figuring as a
“midwifery of thought.” This image, which fruitfully combines elements of passive
receptiveness (the analyst as “onlooker at a natural proceeding …”) and active
intervention (“… but who must be at hand at the critical moment with the forceps in
order to complete the act of parturition that is not progressing spontaneously”) has
yet to be pursued beyond Ferenczi’s early writings of the 1920s. Yet the obstetrical
metaphor approximates Selzer’s vision of the modern surgical act, of operative
restraint in the service of a creative thera peutic task, far more adequately than
Freud’s original metaphor did. (Stepansky, 1999, p. 223-224)
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However, Stepansky is in error with regard to the fate of Ferenczi’s obstetrical
metaphor. As Ferenczi’s analysand and pupil, Melanie Klein pursued and transformed it
into the image of the mother-feeding-infant with important consequences for the theory and
practice of psychoanalysis, particularly with regard to the notions of phantasy and
understanding transference as “the total situation.”50
Burston (1996) rightly notes that for Freud and his followers, “unconscious fantasy is
a device to avoid the experience of something real” while for Laing (like other existentialphenomenologists) the true function of fantasy, “is to express the truth of lived experience
in symbols and metaphors, whose intuitive and poetic insights often exceed our conscious

As noted in the beginning of Chapter two, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive
analysis tracing the complex web of the development of Klein’s thought and her place in the history of
psychoanalysis. Many aspects of this have not been addressed such as the political context within the early
psychoanalytic movement (e.g., the mixture of theoretical and personal animus that characterized the schism
between Klein, Freud, and Anna Freud), how the specific conceptual and technical innovations of Klein’s
developed on or out of the work of her analyst mentors Ferenczi and Abraham, the negative consequences of
her decision to analyze her own children, including the schism that developed between Klein and her own
daughter who sided with Grover, Anna Freud, et al., during the Freud-Klein controversies, etc. Furthermore,
there is the lingering controversy over how Freudian Klein was or was not. In the early phase of her work
Klein and her followers were adamant that their work represented the logical extension of Freud’s and that
therefore it was legitimate despite the protests of Anna Freud and Freud himself. Burston (1991, 1996)
characterizes Klein as a “crypto-revisionist” who, while identifying and speaking with the tongue of the
orthodox, was actually subverting the orthodoxy in an self-deceptive or sneaky manner. I disagree, or rather, I
think the matter is too complex to be resolved since Klein, Freud, and Anna Freud openly disagreed on Klein’s
assertions about phantasy and the priority of the internalization of good objects in the depressive position for
the resolution of the Oedipal drama to occur (recall that for Freud internalization of objects only begins with
the resolution of the Oedipal situation well after infancy).
Since I doubt Klein was so dense as to not notice that Freud and his daughter rejected her clear divergence
publically and in writing, for example, with respect to phantasy and the development of internalized objects in
infancy (cf., Sayers, 2000), one may wonder what was her interpretation of orthodox Freudianism to which she
proclaimed allegiance? Could it have been Freud’s commitment to explore the unconscious and adapt theory
and technique to evolve with clinical findings and material? Since Klein used the classical technique with
children whereas Anna Freud did not, does this mean that Klein was more Freudian than Anna Freud and
Freud himself? Clearly there was a political interest in claiming legitimacy by invoking the name of Freud.
Perhaps there was also a psychological benefit for a female, divorcee, lay analyst, who followed her clinical
instincts into the hitherto fore unexplored terrains of children and psychotics which both Anna and Sigmund
had written off as unanalyzable according to their version of classical technique. Perhaps Ms. Klein needed the
psychological support of identifying her exploratory zeal with the earlier Freud’s to overcome her own anxieties
about diverting from the popular path of least resistance. Perhaps Ms. Klein secretly hoped to curry the favor
from a surrogate father figure that she never received from her own father, another Jewish doctor who rejected
Melanie publicly while glowing in the accomplishments of his other daughter. As a student of contemporary
Kleinian technique these questions continue to have historical and political interest, but they have little bearing
on the practice of CKPP, and I doubt the historical evidence exists to conclusively decide the issue.
50
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rationality and acuity. If fantasy in this sense is allied to our conscious adult selves, we
become more, not less, in touch with reality” (p. 215). Freud’s conception of fantasy as
necessarily and only distorting was related to the Freudian conception of transference as
something to be removed, for, by definition, the transference is the distortion of the analyst
due to unconscious fantasy. The goal of Freudian ana lysis was to remove the transference,
like a surgeon removes an excess of the body that hampers normal functioning.
For Klein, phantasy can be distorting but is also necessary for participating in a
socially agreed upon reality (“reality testing”), as well as creativity. Consider the following
hypothetical examples for illustration. Two different patients see the therapist smirk a little
when he hears their responses to an interpretation. After a few minutes, patient A draws the
therapist’s attention to it and says, “you know I’m sure this is just my reaction, but when you
smirked while I was talking I felt like you were telling me my reaction was stupid and it really
hurt.” Patient B notices the smirk and starts yelling at the therapist, accusing him of plotting
to cut off his penis, and no amount of apology or reassurance seems to soothe patient B. In
both these cases phantasy is at work and in both cases it can be viewed as an expression of
“the truth of lived experience in symbols and metaphors” (ibid., p 215).
For patient B, his persecutory castration phantasy is “true” in the sense that he felt his
right to assert his viewpoint was cut off by hurt feelings due to the therapist’s gesture. It is
metaphorically true. However, his persecutory castration phantasy is distorting in the sense
that the idea of cutting off his penis due to his speech was nowhere in the therapist’s mind,
the therapist had lapsed into a daydream about his pending vacation. His phantasy was
distorting his sense of his therapist’s identity and his identity in relation to the distorted
therapist. His phantasy was distorting in that it has the weight of an ontological and
epistemological conviction that if the patient has a perception that it must be true and not
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subjection to negotiation with other people (“omnipotent phantasy” in the jargon). His
phantasy was also distorting by attributing a motive without any evidence of its veracity (a
“projective identification” phantasy), and, because of the omnipotent phantasy, it was
impossible to assess or question the veracity of the attributed motive. Furthermore, because
of the above phantasies, it was impossible for the patient to notice that his radical shift in
identifying the therapist was related to his emotional pain of hurt and anger, and that when
he feels angry he sees others as attackers. This hypothetical case is one where paranoidschizoid phantasies dominate the transference. The fact that his castration phantasy may be
a poetic description of his actual experience does not mean that it is an accurate appraisal of
social reality, however that may be locally defined by consensus. The therapeutic goal is not
so much to surgically remove the transference but to provide the necessary conditions for
the patient’s phantasies to mature through understanding – from surgery to growth and
development in a “holding” relationship. It is not just the sense of the therapist that is
transferred, it is the whole experience of the “total situation,” the relational context is transferred, as
noted in Chapter 3 above. Stated differently, perhaps more hermeneutically, because a prereflective, bodily sedimented, relational context is transferred, the therapist “shows up” as
this or that depending on the phantasized context of the relationship activated at that
moment.
Like patient B, patient A’s had a phantasized reaction to the gesture. But the nature
of his phantasies were on a depressive order, and therefore resulted in thought and speech
that made it possible to negotiate the meaning of the event with another person, before the
rapid foreclosure of possible meaning as in the case of patient B. Notice patient A said, “it
felt like you were …” indicating his grasp of the demeaning significance as a possible
meaning, it was “as if” the therapist had purposely hurt him. The persecutory interpretation
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is still virtual, because it contrasts with other possibilities that he uses verbal language to try
to sort out before committing to an interpretation of the therapist (significantly lower
omnipotence). Patient A also acknowledges that may be “just [his] reaction” indexing his
idiosyncrasies as a factor contributing to his understanding (the phantasy that his
participation has a causative effect on the attitude of a separate and important object towards
himself). The fact that he initiates a reparative conversation with the therapist indicates that
he values the therapist as a good other whose “goodness” or good will he has a responsibility
to maintain through accommodating the therapist’s perspective. Thus, the hypothetical case
of patient A shows how depressive phantasies are necessary for “reality testing,” understood
as the ability to negotiate social reality between two different yet related people. Removing
depressive phantasies is neither desirable nor possible.
One may question the use of the term phantasy in this latter case. Although patient
A has better “reality testing” than patient B, the term phantasy is still appropriate because
the disturbing, possible meaning that patient A described was one possible meaning. As a
possible meaning that patient A spontaneously produced it was neither a fact nor a given. It
was an intended relational meaning that may or may not have been true – a virtual reality
about the therapist, as light emanates from the sun’s reflection on a plane mirror from a
virtual focus. Phantasies may be thought of as virtual foci, possible points from which an
interpersonal event can be illuminated in different ways, can mean very different things. The
virtual precedes the actual in creation, including the creation of the meaning (shared or not)
of an interpersonal event. Transference as the total situation can be developed and
differentiated to broaden the patient’s range of tolerable interpersonal meaning in therapy,
but not removed from examination as long as the therapist maintains the blankness of the
screen, to the extent this is possible.
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Methodologically, this study has implications for supervision and psychotherapy
research. Every psychotherapy session or supervision meeting, to some extent, depends on
communication between the participants, and this study has demonstrated an empirically
grounded, systematic, and rigorous interpretive method to articulate such communicative
patterns. Demonstrating efficacy in either of these arenas would require studies designed to
assess longitudinal effects of the communicative work by comparing changes in
communicative competence, which can be traced to the communicative work of the
supervisory or therapeutic encounters – bearing in mind that not all intervening variables can
ever be ruled out when studying human phenomenon from any perspective.
The method demonstrated here may also be used for the comparative study of
therapeutic approaches in terms of their theoretical constructs and practical implications.
For example, “empathy” is a key word for many different schools of therapy although it is
by no means clear that they define the concept the same. One idea for a future study might
be to elicit verbatim session records or excerpts for Kleinians, ego psychologists, selfpsychologist, and Rogerians who have defined them as exemplifying “empathy.” These
records would then be analyzed for their communicative patterns to discern what
characterizes “empathy” in these various therapeutic discourses, as well as any patterns that
characterize patient responses to these “empathic” moves.
Similarly, within the Kleinian tradition, one interest of the author’s is to solicit
session vignettes from Kleinians that exemplify various central anxieties that can be
articulated into patterns of distorted communications and communicative aims. For
example, in so far as a clinician can diagnose a patient based on the kind of transference the
patient enacts, can “Schizoid,” “Narcissist,” and other “personality types” be reconfigured as
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certain patterns of distorted communicative agendas? One benefit of such a project is to
produce research results that have immediate clinical relevance, since it would provide
clinicians – inside and outside the Kleinian orbit – with clear, participant-observer accounts
that may be used to identify patterns in their everyday practices.
This would take clinical research in the direction of fulfilling Habermas’ goal of
reconstructing psychoanalytic theory as a theory of systematically distorted communication - using Kleinian theory rather than Freudian. Kleinian theory is well suited for such a
project, since it is already “purged of [Freudianism’s] neuropsychological trappings”
(McCarthy, 1978, p. 198); contemporary Kleinian psychological theory is a purely
psychological account of relational dynamics between people, viewed as dynamic
organizations of composite parts, functions, and modes.
Unfortunately, this study did not address one significant area of Kleinian ontology
and ontological work of its technique: for Butler the “inner” of the subject is a result of
melancholia through discursive interaction and not an unproblematic pre-given that is
“discovered” by clinicians and social theorists. Kleinian theory implies this in that the
mechanisms of introjection and projection are the means by which the “internal world” is
built up – that is, it is a construction for navigating the vicissitudes of social attachment.
A related problem this study has highlighted – although not addressed directly – is
the problematics of the terms “self,” “subject,” “mind,” “ego,” etc. Are these the same? Do
they each indicate one facet of a multiplicity we might designate as the “person”? Butler,
following Foucault, reserves “subject” to indicate a placeholder in a discursively
circumscribed cultural milieu. But is there not more to being a person than the point of
interface within language? Has the “linguistic turn” in philosophy and the human sciences
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of the 20th century culminated in an early 21st century “linguisticism” just as the dawn of the
20 thjCentury was struggling with psychologism, historicism, and sociologism?
True, the “linguistic turn” has provided a way out of the mind-body, subject-object cleavages
called intersubjectivity. Yet if there is more to personhood than being a subject, a node in
language, then intersubjectivity has split us off from this extra-linguistic. Rather then being
an “encapsulated ego” we are encapsulated within the horde of a sensus commnis.
The Kleinian thesis of phantasy, the examples provided above involving Trude and
the child terrified by her mother’s broken shoes, as well as the therapeutic encounter itself,
attest to the fact that there is a sense outside of language, a sense about which language must
organize itself. In the case of Mrs. P, her “I” was threatened with dissolution by the
encounter with loss as a transcendental empirical problem (it was transcendental in the sense
of transcending the range of her linguistically mediated empirical perception). The discourse
of the therapy became organized around this problem. The problem was realized in
language but it constituted the language as much as the language realized it. Love, hate, guilt,
reparation, envy, greed, anxiety, depression, death, loss, these are all so many problems of
becoming as a person that have organized literature, poetry, and visual art across cultures
and history as much as these artistic forms have realized various expressions of these
problems for various peoples.
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Examine the painting of Francis Bacon’s at left (Head 1, 1948, Richard Zeisler
Collection; Louisiana Museum for Moderne Kunst, 1998). At an initial glace this image is
disturbing. Attempts to say, “what it is” are thwarted despite the fact that one’s words try to
cling to its sense like antibodies swarming a foreign protein. “Oh, my gosh,” “Gross,”
“ugly,” “you call that art?” “I could do that.” One can imagine the words that go out to
attack the disturbing sense that disrupts the common sensibility of art, threatening the “I”
that utters them. Our language faculty hits its limit in the attempt to comprehend Bacon’s
image. His image is an imaginary that resists inscription, like a bloodstain in the wash.
His image is a new presentation of an affect and perception that could only be
realized by an artist that imposed restrictions on his palette of color (e.g., reds, purple’s),
visual lexicon of images (e.g., the
gaping mouth, fragmented body
parts tenuously held
together/confined by external
structure), techniques for brushing
(e.g., construction of tense geometric
spaces through the use of line), and
philosophical interests in subject
matter (e.g., visceral experience) to
create his works on canvas. Similarly,
CKPP utilizes a disciplined
communicative competence – the
discipline of techniques and the
techniques of discipline – to occasion
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self-creative moments in therapy out of something that is there to be realized, a virtual reality
of and for the patient, as much as its disciplined use of language shapes what is realized.
So, if there is sense, perception, and affect outside of language, how then to
conceptualize the person? Kleinianism is a doctrine of parts – aspects of experience
(emotions), faculties (seeing, talking, thinking, imagining), and modes (taking in, putting out).
This suggests an image of the person that is both a one and a many at the same time: a
diacritical unity. Indeed, the notion of splitting implies that the overly defended person is
trying not to be more than one thing – i.e., trying to avoid feeling good and bad, happiness
and loss, to avoid thinking about a feeling, etc. Its “integrated ego” is not a monad of
experience, but a unified multiplicity confronted with potentially rapturous encounters. In
the case of Mrs. P., for example, the session could be characterized as helping her encounter
loss as a unified self composed of parts, which threatened the “I” with rupture as a totalized
unity, a multiplicity confined to one possibility. How can this conception of the person be
used productively in psychopathology as the study of deformations in learning from
experience?
The author is interested in pursuing this doctrine of parts and its theoretical
implications by the critical and reciprocal examination of Kleinianism and Deleuze’s
transcendental empiricism. Deleuze writes the following about learning:
For learning evolves entirely in the comprehension of problems as such, in the
apprehension and condensation of singularities and in the composition of ideal
events and bodies. Learning to swim or learning a foreign language means
composing the singular points of one’s own body or one’s own language with those
of another shape or element, which tears us apart but also propels us into a hither
unknown and unheard-of-world of problems (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 192)
Deleuze’s conception of learning is based on that of the person figured as a diacritical unity
rather than a totalizing unity: a composition of parts that reconfigures its organization in
terms of a localized field of problems like every other organism. For Deleuze the singularity of
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the human organism resides in how it approaches some problems differently. 51 While it is
beyond the scope of this paper to explicate his work, the author is interested in the
exploration of dialoguing Kleinianism and Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism to articulate
a conception of the person that avoids dualizing knowledge, the person, the person in the
human world, and the human world from the rest of nature.
Finally, Deleuze succinctly questions a basic premise of psychoanalytic theory that
has not been adequately addressed:
Consider the two presents, the two scenes or the two events (infantile and adult) in
their reality, separated by time: how can the former present act at a distance upon the
present one? How can it provide a model for it, when all its effectiveness is
retrospectively received from the later present? Furthermore, if we invoke the
indispensable imaginary operations required to fill the temporal space [e.g., Lacan’s
object a or Kleinian phantasy], how could these operations fail ultimately to absorb
the entire reality of the two presents, leaving the repetition to subsist only as the
illusion of a solipsistic subject? (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 104)
Deleuze offers a solution to this problem in theory; however, if it is to hold weight it
must bear itself out empirically. The hermeneutic methodology employed in this study is
well suited to examine this question and explore the implications of Deleuze’s philosophy
for conceptualizing the person, and specifically, the person as the patient in a contemporary
Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy.

Take for example “the problem” of light. Photosynthesis is one of the plant’s responses to the problem of
light; the bee, like other insects, responds to light by using it for navigation and the temporal organization of its
activities; the mosquito, like many organisms, has developed a special kind of eye that is particularly attuned to
blues, purples, and reds, since these colors predominate in the evening and the morning. Deleuze writes
regarding animals that “An animal forms an eye for itself by causing scattered and diffuse luminous excitations
to be reproduced on a privileged surface of its body. The eye binds light, it is itself bound light. This example
is enough to show the complexity of synthesis. For there is indeed an activity of reproduction which takes as
its object the difference to be bound” (Deleuze, 1968, p. 96). In terms of the faculties such as memory,
thought, sense, language, etc., for Deleuze these work in concert – giving the appearance for common sense of
a unity of the faculties under one “I” – but really work independently. So for example, the painting of Bacon’s
forces one to comprehend it primarily through sense perception and affect since the language faculty meets its
transcendental limit – i.e., the limit of what about the painting can be put into words. (cf., Deleuze, 1968, pp.
138-147)
51
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Afterward
I would like to take this moment, and I mean “moment” because I am evaluating
some personal implications of this study at this particular time in my training. I am going to
discuss what I think are the implications of the paradox of subjection, but this time from the
perspective of my story. Immersing myself in CKPP and subjecting myself the discipline of
it’s technique, under the tutelage of Dr. R. in supervision and putting my skills in the
interpretation of texts to work, so I could allow the literature to teach me as I learned the
power practices of its knowledge-power complex, has changed my subjectivity.52 As Judith
Butler says, it has changed my subjectivity by inducting me into a symbolic order, situated in
a power-knowledge complex. But, also like she says it should work, in order to do so I had
to desire and have faith in some inarticulate notion of the kind of clinician I had hoped to
become; I had to turn to it from inside; the desire had to motivate me to become the kind of
subject one has to be in order to do work within its symbolic order.
This means risking for both patient and training therapist. To believe in a life – that
is point of faith in Kierkegaard’s use of the term. To have an authentic dream is to believe in
a life, to dream it up and change to continually approximate it – that radical idea of selfcreation that the Enlightenment philosophers gave us as part of our tradition, culminating in
one strange historical form – the original Euro-American way. Does the fact that this was
dangerous and involved other ideological aspects that led to genocide and now
environmental degradation mean that none of it should have happened?
My point in this is to refigure the “concern” for abuses of power in CKPP. I think
this may, has, have, and unfortunately does happen. With power comes responsibility and
52

I am forever indebted to my undergraduate education at St. John’s College for providing an intellectual
climate that fostered self-directed learning in such a disciplined way.
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part of the point of training is develop that sense of responsibility and respect for the new
powers you have. The implication of this work is that I have been learning to practice
wielding a subjectivizing voice and receive payment for it. I have been learning how to be
able to “call it as I see it” as a therapist, to speak in a voice that is challenging for the patient
to hear and for me to utter. The damaging subjectivizing voice is one that chronically closes
down on possible meaning too quickly without self-correction and is not based on the
clinical evidence – like the stereotypes of Kleinian work and, as I see it, poor therapy in
general. What are the institutional safeguards for this? Humility, close supervision, and my
own therapy. I am told Betty Josephs continues in her own group supervision with her
peers and she has been practicing for fifty years!
So, I would also like to discuss some of the ethical issues around deploying a
subjectivizing voice. For if Judith Butler is right about subjection then that means some
kind of new power will be the outcome, as what practices (repeated behaviors with an
intended effect) I need to operate in this new way develop and the one’s I don’t need will
atrophy – a loss of certain desires. The lost desires demarcate the outer parameter of my
becoming self as it becomes. 53 (I would like to thank Roger Brooke for pointing this out,
although in analytic terms of the Oedipus complex). 54 So as a therapist this requires I not
exhort the patient to do this or that, because the patient has to decide to keep going and in
53

What are these lost desires for me? One has been the desire to go into academia, which I had originally
wanted to do. Do I miss it? Not really, I would still like to teach but not in that context. Another, more
difficult one to work through, has been the loss of desire to maintain or cultivate certain friendships, since the
demands of this way of working require a certain kind of support. This has been a cost that, while unfortunate,
was consciously accepted because I believe this way of working is worth it for me and also for the people who
come to me for help. It has caused some tension in my relationship with important thinkers in my life who
have had to struggle to listen to my use of concepts that seem too “realist” or simply, too anachronistic for
their taste. Of course some doors close as others open.
54
This is where I question how much post-structuralists, other than Judith Butler and her followers, really
understand the psychological implications of their notions. Foucault, for example, I think used the term
“subject” without ever defining it because if he defined it he would see Oedipus starring him in the face. In
other words, how is it that the human subject is shaped by change in time without it – a priori – having the kind
of subjectivity that can be subjugated, an embodied subjugation of desire? I think this is the point Dr. Butler
makes in the Psychic Life of Power.
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which direction to change for him or herself, out of desire and in the face of anxiety around
the losses becoming a new kind of subject require.
So what is this power? It is the power of wielding a subjectivizing voice in a highly
structured communicative context potentiated by its very structure with emancipatory
potential –– the nature of which I have phenomenologically described in this study. Selfsubjection into CKPP has yielded some other derivative consequences – for once you
subject yourself to a specific symbolic order and its attendant power-knowledge complexes
your worldview changes as well. You may start interpreting world events in its terms if you
want. You might reel at the implication of how much we communicate in our everyday
interactions without any awareness of the messages we’re sending out if you decide to focus
on that. One also has to face many of the issues your patients deal with and it is very
emotionally challenging work. In order to speak to the patient where they are in a fresh and
genuine way you have to be able to identify its analog in yourself as the point from which to
speak. This kind of work has challenged me to grow emotionally as a person.
So what are the limits of this power? That is an ongoing question for me. It has
been suggested that as a dyadic metaphor that the mother-infant metaphorizing would
preclude dynamics that are triadic. Theoretically, I do not agree with this since the infantile
feeding situation is triadic and not dyadic for Klein. By three months the infant recognizes
that the milk is the term for struggle with the mother. That is when the Oedipal struggles
begin.55 Clinically, the four times patients have prematurely dropped out of treatment I have
been able to find problems in my ability to accurately show them that I see and can name
their anxiety. So, based on my experience with dozens of patients and their wide range of

55

Not to mention the fact that the note writing creates a triadic dynamic in the therapy – the patient has to
watch your mouth “mate” with the words you write down – watch you have a relationship with your own mind
that they are excluded from.
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presenting problems, the limitation so far indicate my lack of experience more than an
inherent blind spot in the theory or practice as it stands. This does not mean that there are
not any blind spots. And if there are, and when I find them, I am free to try and understand
them in terms of this tradition and work to alter it if that is necessary, or go somewhere else.
Practically, there is the problem of what to do with this kind of work in our managed-care
age. How amenable is it to working on a short-term basis? Is there an ethical way to do
that?
A central component of this voice is its focus on the here and now relational
transactions as they occur. It has been asked, “What are the ethical consequences of this
aspect of the technique in terms indexing the symbolic content in terms of the patient’s
relationship to the therapist?” Specifically, what about the real unethical activities the patient
may come in and describe and what about the self-aggrandizing stance that relates what the
patient does to the therapist?
One of the difficulties I struggled with to work in this way was accepting the idea
that as their therapist, I could matter as much as these kinds of interventions suggest. It
takes courage and discipline to engage in a relationship that can matter that much to
someone, precisely because of the emotional challenges and the responsibility involved in
the work. From the “outside” it seems off the charts that this level of attachment is at issue
so quickly, therefore to talk about it with the patient must be off and a sign of making “wild
interpretations,” or could only be the product of the need for narcissistic supplies from the
patient. I can relate to that sentiment. I thought it too at the beginning. But from the
“inside,” what I find more strange and continue to be surprised by is that once I muster up
the courage to make one of these comments, how, when accurate, the patient agrees and
seems a bit more relaxed or comforted by hearing it. All I can say at this point is that this
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level of attachment is always at stake for everyone to the extent we are precariously attached
as subjects. I base this assertion on both my clinical experience and the work of Judith
Butler, because that is her point in the Psychic Life of Power – subjection is our paradoxical and
ambivalent basis for attachment to others – “intersubjectivity” in newer terms.
As far as the patient’s extra-therapeutic activities that he or she presents in the
session is concerned, these are important as objects of projection. In other words, two
different personalities will describe the same event it different ways; their experiences will be
different. What is more clinically important is how they systematically interpret the events
and people in their lives, because this one means for identifying with how they are
constituting their experience. Of course this does not mean that, for example, John wasn’t
almost hit by a car, or that a married man who describes compulsively cheating on his wife
isn’t really doing it, or that it does not have an adverse effect on his wife. But his ethical
consciousness is his responsibility to develop, as part of developing as a subject with a
conscience that is robust enough to commit and authentically see and care for the good of
anOther. And developing a network of supportive friends is part of what it would mean for
John to slowly give up trying to be invisible out of a paranoid anxiety. A free subject needs
others on whom to depend and must be able to be the dependable other for someone else,
able to sustain and nurture a social bond with another person.
This brings us to another paradox. The paradox of not exhorting patients to be a
this way or that – the restraint (not hiding) of neutrality and note writing – yet by your very
way of comporting yourself the patient becomes a certain kind of subject, in the sense of
new capacities as a self. Is this the hidden normative agenda at work? Probably, although
I’m not so sure it is hidden in CKPP, as I have described some of its values in the preceding
paragraph and the study itself. But as Judith Butler also points out, there is no outside
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power and discourse for a socially intelligible subject. Perhaps we need to be discussing this
question more: what kind of subjects our psychotherapy practices are fostering in society
and as a society in general? It would seem like a good idea to believe in the kind of
subjectivity that one is endeavoring to foster, both in terms of consciously accepting
responsibility for what you are doing and in terms of professional integrity. As I understand
them, I accept the values implied in CKPP about developing subjectivity.
Of course it might be asked, “What if the patient doesn’t share the values in CKPP?
How would it respect that difference of the Other in terms of treatment and isn’t it
contradictory to think of CKPP as a universal model and claim that it is a model that
respects difference?
There was a patient I worked with for six months, Jean, who, after six months of
therapy, decided she wanted to terminate psychotherapy to pursue pharmacotherapy and
social activism groups to deal with her problems – bear in mind I had referred her for
psychiatric evaluation and medication but she refused. During our final termination session
she explained that she had finally realized that when she first came to see me she wanted me
to help her forget her unprocessed (my paraphrasing) experiences of childhood sexual abuse
rather than deal with them, and that I wasn’t going to help her do that. Jean was right on
both counts, so we ended therapy because she decided that what I was offering was not what
she was looking for. However, it did help her to clarify what she did and did not want in a
therapy at this time in her life.
My point is: how can Joe or Jane public-at-large make a truly informed decision
about whether or not their values in a therapy are a reasonable match with the therapist
unless they make and renew the decision based on their experience? And if it is true that
CKPP fosters autonomy and a greater sense of possessing freedom-of-mind, then it is up to
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the patient to decide who and how they want to become based on their experience, including
the length of treatment. Similarly, if I think a patient has a problem that I am not qualified
to help them with or do not want to help them with for whatever reason, I can and should
refer them elsewhere. Perhaps this issues points to the fact that respecting difference
involves determining to what extent one can or is willing to accommodate it.
The question of “universal applicability” is more complex. If Judith Butler is correct
about her universal claim for a paradox of subjectivity, and CKPP is a subject forming kind
of work, then it would follow that CKPP could have a universal applicability even if not
universally distributed as a cultural form. Similarly, if I drove a car into the deepest recesses
of some unexplored land and came across an indigenous human group without auto
technology, my car would still exist and work for them if I showed them how to drive. So,
the car has (virtual) universal applicability even if it is not universally distributed or realized.
The issue of an imposition of values is of another order: the ethics of introducing a foreign
technology into a culture and the unforeseeable consequence of such an introduction to the
vernacular society. Again, the principle of self-determination seems to be the best safeguard
for respecting cultural and individual integrity. What I am arguing about CKPP is that it is a
model that respects differences by fostering individual subjectivity.

Coming full circle, then, it seems this qualitative study lends support to Wampold
and Holloway’s argument that, “whether it be changes in skill level, attitudes, selfunderstanding, or some other characteristic, the effect of supervision results most proximally
in some modification of therapists’ characteristics. These changes in the therapist will then,
it is hoped, result in the delivery of more efficacious treatment . . .. all effects of supervision
are transmitted through therapist characteristics” (1997, p. 12, italics in original). However,
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the vehicle of “transmission” is not the therapist’s “characteristics” if this is understood
simply in behavioral terms. This study suggests that it involved a change in the therapist’s
being-in-the-world.
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SESSION TRANSCRIPT
(Original notes not corrected for spelling and grammer)
Key: Black type = Subject’s utterances
Blue type = Therapist’s utterances
Brackets = Editorial and non-verbal notations from original notes
The three or four of theses are the silences that I wasn’t able to come up with anything
for. I’m trying to survive this week.
I think your feeling overwhelmed inside and don’t quite know how to deal with the
feelings of being scared inside.
Mmmhmm.[slight tearing] Yeah and its ironic too because at the same time I feel like I’m
making progress in my new post and in a way my confidence in growing. In one sense
it’s all brand new and in another it’s what I’ve always thrived on -- its like crisis. It’s not
always successful -- the visitations with patients. When people in crisis or end of life
issues, but it somehow works out -- but it’s a success when I make out a report and
evaluate my work, but I guess at the same time I go with whatever is my fear or maybe
I’m making someone else fear my own. Oh, in chaplaincy I saw it addressed this week
on television this whole thing of counselors being sought out like madmen doing all these
services and work. Its what people demand or ask for. But the chaplains are probably
the most pathetic ones when you get a group together you say, “I don’t know what to
say” which gets people to talk about fear. Whatever I’m afraid of when someone is going
to get in there on my fear I deflect them
And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of
you got scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept. Its like you
drop your feelings that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them.
Yeah, I’ve always done that. [Tears stream] Yeah, I’m probably going to be processing
15,000 different things. Yeah, processing things to do with my daughter’s wedding all
this introspective stuff between now and Tuesday when I leave. [Tears stream] This isn’t
very deep -- no for me it is -- I think one of these things is I’m feeling guilty because I
haven’t been able to help out too much with my daughter’s wedding and it goes way back
because I can’t remember anyone in my family who hasn’t really been totally involved in
their daughter’s wedding plus the problems I have with the need to control, usually
mom’s do their daughter’s weddings. But I’m still from that tradition, so I’m probably
feeling a lot of conflict about -- emotionally I have some input into this. Intellectually
I’ve tried to let my children make all the major decisions on their own. I think maybe
I’ve identified with my own mother who was major controlling, which is what dynamic
women are. And the sister I was in the arms of -- I think I used her or she filled the shoes
of my mother. I think I haven’t looked enough at the input she [the sister] had on my life
because she went off when I was ten. I still have my own mother [her mother died in the
80’s] but she was -- I don’t know -- an institutional mother. It was an institutional type
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relationship a parallel between my mother sending me off to school at an early age and
my sending my kids away.
I think one way you are trying to keep some powerful feelings away is by turning our
conversation to events in the past that are easier to talk about.
Yeah to make the comparisons. I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad. I’m in extreme
circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism.
I hear that a part of you is feeling sad, scared, and angry at your daughter for getting
married as if she were deserting you now like you felt by your sister, and the problem is
you don’t feel you have a way to contain these feelings inside.
I could be. Yeah. I feel like I’d add to them remorse. Is remorse a feeling or are sad and
remorse the same thing? Remorse is the biggest and that comes to how I feel. Its
limiting my concept of my daughter’s freedom. Its not like she’s being taken off to jail.
She’s getting married and she’s fine and I’m keeping all my hopes, wishes and ambitions
for a daughter that I’ll keep repressing because I’m not supposed to cry at the wedding.
So I probably feel good about the ceremony itself, cause it’s being worked on by both
sides of the family. But I guess the greatest thing about it is how both planned the
ceremony should go, which is the most you could ask for in an interfaith wedding.
Just now when you began to feel unbearably bad about your wishes for your daughter’s
wedding you began to focus on the bright side.
Yeah, that’s the annoying thing that happens. Yeah. Because I’ve always done that and I
don’t keep going and I don’t know why or where I stopped but something over and
blocks whatever I try to get at. I’m sure that happens when I’m doing my work. My PC
Response score is totally on the supportive side [some personality type test they are
given] It goes from authoritative to intrstructional to all way over to empathic and
supportive responses – my natural responses are empathic and very supportive. But I’m
naturally that way, but I cannot keep going [with what she is feeling as first mentioned] ,
but that’s kinda improved since I stared coming here as its been reflected in my verbatims
[group supervision]. I want to know why I do the little cheery deal, which you record as
my dramatic voice.
Like I’ve been saying. I think these fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed get
dropped and perhaps its because you don’t expect another person to stay with you and
help you make sense of what feels overwhelming inside.
Yeah. [tearing] that make sense. Yeah because principle people at crucial ages for me
they disappeared whethe r death or loosing a sister going to college or marriage is like a
death. Yeah.
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So, perhaps inside you feels out of control because of there are several death- like changes
you are dealing with right now – the bombing of the terrorists, your daughter’s wedding,
and the fact that we won’t be meeting next week because you won’t be here.
Yeah cause I like routine right and I’m not going to be here next week and I’m like one
of those orphans – the smartest kids are the one’s who get abandoned in hospitals and
learn to have to get along by being nice which fends off being orphaned. Yeah, because
that image just came to me right now I can – those little orphaned AIDS babies who have
been dropped like a hot potato.
What I’m hearing is that right now you live with fears of being dropped by me like you
felt dropped by your mother as a baby.
Well maybe but that’s if I don’t come back, because then essentially I would have been
dropped by you. [asked to repeat, she did then began] No, the only parallel is if you went
out in front of a truck and got killed, that’s the logical parallel to that. But yes it could
play right into not wanting to be orphaned, wanting to have a self. I was doing reading
on disappearance of the self into pre-existence and there is literature on disappearance
into pre-existence [stated in a tone to emphasize she is right or not crazy]
You are disappearing from here right now because we just touched on your fear of being
orphaned by me so you mentally moved away to thoughts of before you existed.
[Tears start streaming, nods in agreement, I let a few moments pass]
Our time is up for today.

